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ABSTRACT
The primary aim of this dissertation was to develop 
and test hypotheses relating to the constancy of the Income 
elasticities of Individual taxes levied by the State of 
Louisiana and of Its aggregate tax structure. These hypo- 
theses were then Incorporated Into ordinary least squares 
regressions to provide long-run forecasts of tax revenues.
The earliest researchers on the subject of fore­
casting state tax receipts by use of the elasticities 
approach either made no mention of the possibility of 
changing income elasticities or assumed them constant. 
Dockel, and Legler and Papke, reached conclusions Inconsis­
tent with their assumptions of constant elasticities.
Singer utilized dummy variables to allow for shifting in 
Income elasticities due to changes in tax rates, bases, or 
administration. Wilford explicitly labelled his elasticity 
coefficients as averages for the time series studied. 
Richardson was the first to make explicit a cause of the 
phenomenon of Increasing Income elasticity of a tax struc­
ture, which was that the relatively more elastic taxes grew 
faster over time than the less elastic taxes, and hence 
acquired greater weights In the determination of average 
Income elasticity of the tax structure.
xi
This dissertation formally models three causes of 
changing Income elasticities. First, Income elasticities 
of individual taxes might rise or fall with time or Income. 
These were modelled by logllnear functions, with tax revenue 
dependent on personal Income. Second, Income elasticities 
might rise or fall as various tax rate or base changes occur, 
or as administrative changes influence tax revenues. These 
were modelled by a dummy variable technique similar to 
Singer's. Third, the income elasticity of a tax structure 
would rise as Income rose, toward a limit of the most 
elastic component of that tax structure.
These concepts were applied to the Louisiana tax 
structure, which was partially disaggregated into six tax 
groups, five sensitive to Income movements, and the sixth, 
the severance taxes, largely independent of the level of 
Income. The time period 1948 to 1974 was selected to test 
the hypotheses described above. This was a period of rela­
tive stability in the tax structure, although many rate, 
base, and enforcement changes occurred.
The primary results were first, that the Income 
elasticity of the Income tax and the sumptuary taxes 
declined over time, while the Income elasticities of the 
other three groups increased. Second, the income elasticity 
of the tax structure was shown to Increase over time, 




The level of expenditures by Louisiana state 
government, over the very long run, Is presumably deter­
mined by a public choice mechanism. If this public choice 
mechanism works well, expenditures will tend toward that 
level which provides exactly those goods and services 
which Louisiana citizens demand of their state government. 
This collective decision is a part of the overall process 
by which owners of purchasing power allocate their 
expenditures among all possible goods and services, public 
as well as private. However, over shorter time spans, 
due to budget constraints and other constitutional 
limitations, expenditures are normally constrained to an 
amount approximately * equal to anticipated receipts from 
state sources.
This view is in contrast to that of Milton Friedman,
who wrote that
. . . in the long run the level of taxes comes closer 
to determining the level of spending than the other 
way around . . . .  [0]nce the new level of taxes Is 
in place, it tends to become permanent or nearly so, 
and thereafter spending is determined in large part 
by how much the revenue structure will raise.*
^■Milton Friedman, An Economists Protest, Second 
Edition, 1975* Thomas Horton and Daughters (Glen Ridge, 
New Jersey), p. 87.
1
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Professor Friedman's statement was written ?.bout federal 
revenues and expenditures, but it is more applicable to state 
government, since the state of Louisiana, like most states, 
has more limited ability for deficit spending than does the 
federal government. The state's new constitution sets 
important limits on the ability of state government to 
borrow funds, especially for non-capital purposes, and to 
incur deficits.2
The level of tax revenue is vital, whether viewed 
from short run or long. This dissertation attempts to 
measure the ability of the present structure of state 
taxes to provide revenues for future fiscal operations.
By placing attention only on the level of revenues, this 
dissertation assumes that expenditures by state government 
will at least maintain the scope and quality of current 
programs.
In merely maintaining the present scope of state 
government programs It Is likely that more dollars will 
be required in future years than now. Many programs 
have expenditures in part determined by the number of 
people who benefit; as the state's population continues to 
grow, and more persons benefit, expenditures on these 
programs must also grow. Some programs require purchases of 
materials; if these goods rise in price over time, then
^Constitution of the State of Louisiana, especially 
Article Vll. Part I. Section 6(A), Section 7(C), and 
Section 10(B).
3
larger expenditures will be required to purchase the same 
real quantity as before. As wage rates rise throughout 
the economy, so must wages paid by state government If It 
Is to attract the same quality work force as now exists.
Thus In the context of an economy which displays growing 
population and upward trends in wage and price levels, 
nominal state government expenditures must increase if the 
current scope and quality of programs is to be maintained. 
Further, a rising standard of living may lead to demands 
for new public services. Thus state government expenditures 
can be expected to rise markedly in the years of the decade 
ahead. If these expenditures are to be financed by tax 
revenues, these revenues must rise accordingly.
It is appropriate here to define certain terms used 
in this dissertation. The base of a tax is the definition, 
by statute or by constitutional provision, of what is 
taxed. The schedule of tax rates is an algorithm for 
determining the tax liability incurred by a taxpayer with 
a given tax base. The aggregation of tax liabilities 
over all taxpaying units thus measures the entire amount 
due the state from the tax. The quality of enforcement of 
the tax laws may affect the fraction of that liability 
actually remitted to the state. Certain administrative 
details relating to due dates, source withholding, and 
cost-of-collection rebates complete the list of items 
which determine the timing and quantity of tax receipts.
The above-mentioned Items, aggregated over all taxes levied
4
by the state, comprise the tax structure.
Individual taxes and the aggregate tax structure 
possess certain measures of responsiveness called elas­
ticities. The simplest definition of an elasticity is the 
ratio of the percentage change in tax revenues to the 
percentage change in the variable, the responsiveness to 
which is being studied. This general form can be presented 
as
c » 3 TR V
v TT~ TR *
where ev is the calculated elasticity of tax revenue TR 
with respect to the variable V. Income elasticity is 
measured by replacing V with some measure of income. 
Similarly, the commonly used rate and base elasticities 
are created by the appropriate substitutions.
The ability of the tax structure to generate 
revenues can be discussed using income elasticity as the 
focal point. The income elasticity of a tax (or of an 
aggregate of taxes) is but one criterion of the "adequacy" 
of a tax, but it is the measure that has received the 
most attention in academic debates on tax structures. The 
elasticity of tax revenue with respect to aggregate 
personal income, ey, is a measure which indicates whether 
the rate of growth of revenue from a tax can be expected 
to exceed, equal, or fall short of the rate of growth 
in personal income. As ey1*!, tax revenues should grow 
faster than personal income; as ey<l, the personal income 
growth rate should exceed the tax revenue growth rate.
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A similar set of statements can be ,,'.ade abo.’.t the elas­
ticities of tax revenues with respect to other exogenous 
variables.
State-federal revenue sharing is still an experi­
mental program, and should not be treated as a permanent 
part of the state financial resources. Deficit financing 
cannot be regarded as a significant source of funds over 
the long run. The severance taxes are levied on resources 
that are declining in quantity. Even if these taxes are 
based on rapidly rising product prices, they cannot be 
expected to continue as the dominant revenue producer of the 
state.
The reasons above Indicate that primary interest 
must fall on the revenues of the remainder of the state's 
tax structure. Of primary interest are forecasts for 
fiscal years 1977, 1980, and 1985. These forecasts will 
provide both intermediate- and long-term projections of 
the yields of selected state taxes, and of the aggregate 
of revenues responsive to income levels, at the current 
structure of bases and rates. Constitutionally imposed 
obstacles to altering the state's tax structure provide 
adequate reason for projecting revenues from the current 
structure. Such projections can be used as planning aids 
for the appropriate state legislators and officials.
The primary contributions of this dissertation are 
as follows. Previous efforts in the areas of tax revenue 
forecasting, tax revenue responsiveness to economic change,
6
and Louisiana tax structure are stuoied for their possible 
contributions. The tax structure of the state of Louisiana 
is examined in detail in order to determine how (or 
whether) the responsiveness of tax revenues generated 
by the tax structure varies over time. Intermediate range 
forecasts are made of tax revenues, particularly those 
varying with income. These forecasts provide additional 
insight to the state's agencies and planning authorities, 
and provide empirical evidence concerning the hypotheses 
related to variations in income elasticities.
METHODOLOGY
For the general purpose of tax revenue forecasting, 
two techniques are commonly used. One technique uses 
appropriate econometric devices to forecast values of the 
tax bases, then applies existing tax rates to those values 
to obtain the forecasts of tax revenues. This approach 
is referred to as the rate-base method. The other method, 
the elasticities approach, assumes that changes in general 
economic conditions are responsible for changes in tax 
revenues, at fixed tax rates, base definitions, and adminis­
trative efficiency. Regressing tax revenues against certain 
macroeconomic variables yields estimates of the responsive­
ness (elasticity) of tax revenues to economic changes. The 
former method is better suited to short-term forecasting; 
the latter, to long-term forecasting.
7
Both methods can take advantage of 'ihe variety 
of econometric methods now available. The dependencies 
of one tax upon another can be accommodated by proper 
specification of the model: by utilizing simultaneous- 
equation estimation methods, or by utilizing data aggre­
gated in such a way that the dependencies are concealed 
in the aggregation. If, for example, auto license revenues 
are correlated with gasoline tax collections, then an 
estimate of their sum avoids a separate statement of the 
dependency.
This study began as an attempt to apply simul- 
taneous-equation techniques to forecast the tax revenues 
and expenditures of Louisiana's state government; however, 
the course of further research indicated that the inter­
dependency of relationships was not a significant char­
acteristic of the tax revenue models. The revenue of 
tax "A" was not a significant explanation of the revenue 
of tax "B"; nor did any major non-severance tax rates 
or revenues exert significant causation on the variables 
designated as independent, which included personal Income, 
per capita personal income, and population. Thus multiple 
regression analysis utilizing the method of ordinary least 
squares proved sufficient to display adequately the 
Important economic relationships that determine the levels 
of tax revenues.
This dissertation will utilize the elasticities 
approach for two reasons. First, the aim of this
8
research Is two-fold; to obtain reliable estimates of 
future tax revenues and to measure the responsiveness of 
the tax revenues to income change. The latter aim can best 
be accommodated by the elasticities approach. Forecasts of 
total income-related tax revenues are desirable, and it is 
felt that the estimate of the aggregate of revenues by the 
elasticities approach will be preferred to the aggregate 
arrived at by summing the forecasts of the Individual 
taxes by the rate-base method. Since this dissertation 
attempts to provide clues for long-run state planning, 
long-run estimates of tax revenues are required. Long­
term revenue movements are best fit by a logarithmic 
function. The coefficients of such a log-linear regression 
can be Interpreted as elasticities.
The other major consideration leading to adoption 
of the elasticities approach over the rate-base procedure 
is the very complexity of the state's tax structure. The 
state levies many taxes, most of which are subject to large 
numbers of exemptions and other forms of special treatment.3 
Furthermore, the rate schedules for some taxes, notably 
the severance, alcoholic beverage, excise license, and 
tobacco taxes, are quite complex.** These problems
^For example, see the Department of Revenue Tax 
Guide. 1975 edition for lists of exemptions from sales tax 
and Income tax.
**See Ibid., for examples. The actual rates may have 
been altered since this book was published, but the degree 
of complexity is practically unchanged.
combine to make the use of the rate-base estimating method 
a difficult task. This is not to deny the importance of 
tax rates; certainly statutory or constitutional tax rate 
and tax base changes affect tax revenues. These phenomena 
must be Included in the models if the elasticities method 
is to provide valid results.
PLAN OF THE PAPER
The problem set out in earlier paragraphs is 
treated in the following steps. First, the relevant 
literature concerning the responsiveness of tax revenues 
to economic growth is briefly reviewed. This survey 
serves to place the present study in proper perspective. 
Three areas within the literature are examined in Chapter 2. 
Responsiveness of revenues derived from fixed tax structures 
in general, from theoretical and empirical standpoints, is 
the first of these, and is followed by a survey of works on 
the responsiveness of other state tax systems and on long­
term tax revenue forecasting in other states. Finally, 
attention is given to articles oriented toward the Louisiana 
tax structure and toward revenue estimation and responsive­
ness for the State of Louisiana.
Chapter 3 briefly describes the current tax 
structure of the State of Louisiana in order to provide 
the appropriate background. This discussion Includes 
a review of significant events in the evolution of the 
state's tax structure, particularly those rate, base, and
administrative changes that have occurred curing the time 
span of this project, 19^8 to 197^. Chapter 3 also 
contains the master data record for the dissertation; 
this record is an account of revenues of currently levied 
taxes, and is organized both by individual taxeB and by 
the relevant tax groups. A discussion of data sources and 
data-gathering difficulties is included. The second 
major section of the chapter is devoted to the definition 
of the forecasting base: which taxes (licenses, fees, 
etc.) should be included in the aggregate to be forecast.
Chapter  ̂ contains the theoretical aspects of 
this dissertation. For certain special cases, the 
desirability of incorporating time-dependent income 
elasticities into the structure of the model is demon­
strated. This approach allows for movement of income 
elasticities of individual taxes, and allows for signif­
icant changes in the income elasticity of a tax structure 
over time.
The fifth chapter contains an analysis of the 
empirical results of this research. The models introduced 
in Chapter 4 are tested for their ability to provide 
adequate explanation of the revenue generating processes. 
Where models prove to be inadequate, attempts are made to 
improve them through variations in the real and dummy 
variables which appear, and in the forms taken by the 
income elasticities. Following this analysis of the 
different models is a section discussing those equations
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to be used as the elements of the forecasting models.
Each tax and tax group is represented by at least one 
equation.
Those equations are used in Chapter 6 to produce 
the tax revenue forecasts. The first major section provides 
the extrapolation of values of income, price level, and 
population statistics, which are the exogenous variables. 
Several extrapolated series are produced, reflecting dif­
fering assumptions concerning the future course of United 
States and Louisiana economic growth. The tax revenue 
forecasts are made from the independent variable extrap­
olations and regression results; forecasts are presented 
for the current tax structure and for some tax structure 
variations. These forecasts are used to test the hypotheses 
of Chapter 4 concerning the Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem. 
Hie final section reviews the progress of the research and 
recapitulates the major findings of the dissertation.
Chapter 2
SURVEY OP THE LITERATURE
This chapter serves to provide appropriate 
recognition of the works of previous researchers relevant 
to the present study. Articles concerned with theoretical 
issues relating to Income elasticities, or to state and 
regional revenue growth problems, and works on revenue 
projections and revenue responsiveness in other states, 
are discussed in chronological fashion. A section discussing 
prior contributions concerned with the Louisiana tax 
structure concludes the chapter.
THE ELASTICITIES APPROACH 
AND STATE TAX REVENUE 
GROWTH: GENERAL
William Vickrey, in an important 19^9 article, 
proposed several theorems about the responsiveness of 
Income tax yields to movements in National Income.^ His 
aim was to prove that Income taxes were not elastic 
enough to be as counter-cyclical as Musgrave and Miller
^William Vickrey, "Some Limits to the Income 
Elasticity of Income Tax Yields," Review of Economics and 
Statistics. XXXIX (May, 1 9 W ,  mo^THT:-------------------
12
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had earlier proposed.2 The first of Vickrey's theorems
stated that the income elasticity of a group of taxes
could not exceed the elasticity of its most elastic
component; and that the elasticity of the tax system was
the weighted average of the elasticities of the component
taxes. The second theorem stated that
The income elasticity of the yield of any tax is 
unaffected by a proportionate change in all the 
rates, if avoidance and incentive effects be neglected.
The third theorem was
There exists a simple income tax, consisting of a flat 
rate of tax on all income above a given exemption, 
that has an elasticity at least equal to that of any 
income tax.3
These results held if the components were independent 
and additive. Independence implied that the yield of one 
tax was not dependent on the yield of some other tax. The 
additive characteristic required that the total tax yield 
was the sum of the yields of the individual taxes. It was 
not clear why the first theorem required these assumptions. 
Vickrey stated that, for a "simple" income tax (i.e., a 
tax with only a single rate and exemption), the income 
elasticity depended only upon the size of the exemption, 
and that "the elasticity of a simple tax Is equal to the 
ratio of the total income of the persons taxed to the income
2Richard A. Musgrave and Merton H. Miller, "Built-in 
Flexibility," American Economic Review, XXXVIII (March,
19*18), 122-128.
^Vickrey, op. cit., p. 140.
14
above the exemptions to which the t«x rate is applied."1*
This definition of income elasticity of the income tax was 
dependent on assumptions about Income distribution.
Vickrey had assumed that as national income varied, the 
Lorenz curve of income distribution was constant.
Many of Vickrey*s conclusions depended on the 
pattern and time path of income distribution; his primary 
conclusion was that it was improbable that a tax of major 
revenue producer status could be designed with elasticity 
that exceeded 2.0.5 vickrey did not mention possible 
changes in income elasticities except through changes in 
bases and exemptions.
One article of importance appeared in the American 
Economic Review in 1952. Groves and Kahn conducted an 
investigation into the income elasticity of various taxes, 
attempting to measure the effects of income growth on 
tax revenue changes.^ The principal aim of this article was 
to determine whether the taxes were "adequate;" that Is, 
whether they could, over time, generate revenues to main­
tain the volume and quality of governmental services.
Ibid. , p. 140 .
5Ibid., p. 144.
^Harold M. Groves, and C. Harry Kahn, "The 
Stability of State and Local Tax Yields," American Economic 
Review, XLII (March, 1952), 87-102.
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To this end, they felt It desirable to have taxes whose 
"yields. . . vary In the same direction as total Income, 
but . . . less than In proportion to the variation In 
total Income."?
Emphasis was placed on a "built-in stability"
different from the current usage of the term; to Groves
and Kahn It meant to protect state governments from revenue
losses due to recession or deflation.
Hence, if it is deBired to maintain intact at all 
times the level of government services and to finance 
them from taxes primarily, the total of state and 
local tax revenues has to be of less than unit 
income elasticity.8
Groves and Kahn clearly did not gear their analysis 
to an era of pressing demand for new state government 
services, for increasing volume and faster increasing 
costs of existing services. The same tax designed to 
prevent the rapid fall of revenues during the recession 
will most likely prevent the rapid rise of revenues during 
boom, as the percentage increase in tax revenue must by 
definition fall short of the percentage Increase in income.
In his doctoral dissertation, and in articles 
derived from it, Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., estimated income 
elasticities of state and local taxes in order to determine 




cyclically.  ̂ He found that state and local government 
receipts were stabilizing during expansions and destabi­
lizing in contractions* and that expenditures were 
stabilizing during contractions, destabilizing during 
expansions.1® He attempted to measure the responsiveness 
of various state and local taxes to movements in GNF.
His estimate of the income elasticity of general sales 
tax collections was E«p ■ 1.27, and he noted that this 
measure was larger than that found by other investigators.11 
This estimate was derived by regressing percentage changes 
in general sales tax collections against percentage changes 
in QNP, for the period 1949-1960, in constant dollars.
The regression coefficient could be interpreted as the 
income elasticity.
In a 1964 article in the National Tax Journal,
D. G. Davies discussed the estimation of the elasticity 
of motor fuel taxes with respect to income.12 (The exact 
measure of income used was not disclosed in the article).
^Robert W, Refuse, Jr., "Cyclical Behavior of State- 
Local Finances," in Essays in Fiscal Federalism, edited by 
Richard A. Musgrave. !fhe Brookings Institution, Washington, 
D.C., 1965, pp. 63-121. See also, Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., 
"State and Local Fiscal Behavior over the Postwar Cycles." 
(Princeton, 1964).
10Ibld., p. 117.
11Ibid., pp. 95-97, especially note 32.
12D. G. Davies, "The Secular Income Elasticity and 
Revenue Stability of Motor Fuel Taxes," National Tax 
Journal. XVIII (December, 1965), 380-387.
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Davies referred to this measure as ''secular'1 income 
elasticity, arid estimated this value by utilizing a log- 
linear regression of tax yield against income, so that the 
regression slope was the elasticity in question.*3 This 
process assumed constant income elasticity and Davies 
recognized this fact. Some states were omitted from his 
study because Davies was unable to obtain satisfactory 
results with constant elasticities.^  In discussing the 
"three groups" into which elasticities may be classified, 
he wrote of an increasing average effective rate of 
t a x a t i o n . g y  a common definition of Income elasticity, 
e ■ marginal tax rate t average tax rate. If the average 
tax rate rose, all else unchanged, then the income 
elasticity must have decreased. Thus Davies implied 
changing elasticities.
W. T. Wilford turned to an elasticities approach
in order to provide new light on the "adequacy" of a tax
s t r u c t u r e . H e  wrote that:
The problem of adequacy is basically two-fold, for it 
involves, on the one hand, stability of the revenue 
structure during changes in levels of economic activity,
13ibid., p. 381.
u Ibid., p. 383.
15Ibid., pp. 381-382.
^Walton Terry Wilford, "State Tax Stability 
Criteria and the Revenue-Income Elasticity Coefficient 
Reconsidered," National Tax Journal, XVIII (September, 
1965), 304-312.
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and, on the other hand, the ability of the tax structure 
to increase yields to meet new social needs . . . .
These two goals are basically in conflict . . .  .17
He then wrote that in the face of general economic expansion 
states were slow to recognize this conflict, and hence 
slow to redirect their tax structures toward greater 
responsiveness to income increases.
In addition to the point Just made, Wilford's 
article made three other contributions. First, he noted 
that the elasticity coefficient e, from the equation
log R - log C + e log y (2.1)
was an average value, calculated over the time period
studied. R Is tax revenue, C is a constant, y is aggregate
personal income. He advised that the annual values of
j  p
* y/Rj which is the income elasticity, be studied for 
possible time t r e n d . W i l f o r d  was thus concerned that 
elasticities might vary with time or with Income.
Second, he incorporated statutory rate changes 
into his model. This was a feature Groves and Kahn had 
not treated, by assuming unitary rate elasticities.
Wilford's model was thus formulated as
log R * log C + e log y + f log r (2.2)
where r Is the tax rate, and other variables are as 





distinguishing between economic "growth" and "development." 
To him, the former Implied aggregate personal income growth; 
the latter, per capita income growth. He argued that 
economic "growth" might have varying effects on tax 
revenues, depending on how much "development" was present.2® 
He particularly noted that rising per capita incomes might 
lead to changing patterns of household consumption, 
generating a different impact on sales tax revenues than 
if the same aggregate income growth were caused by increased 
population.
Wilford reported estimated income and rate elastic­
ity coefficients, using data for the state of Texas, for 
several tax categories. All the rate elasticities were 
less than unity; none were negative. The elasticities 
with respect to aggregate personal income were generally 
greater than unity; only alcoholic beverage and cigarette 
taxes showed less than unit income elasticity. There were 
some anomalies among the results: the income elasticity of
motor vehicle licenses exceeded that of motor vehicle 
sales, and the ad valorem (property) tax had a greater than 
unitary income elasticity. He did not estimate elastic­
ities for a general sales tax.21
Pivotal research on the subjects of state tax 




by John B. Le^ler and Ferry Shapiro,22 They wrote that 
previous studies, by Groves and Kahn and by Wilford, of the 
relationship between personal income growth and state tax 
revenue growth possessed two weaknesses, in (1) ignoring 
the specific linkages between personal income and tax 
revenues, and (2) assuming that individual taxes could be 
studied independently of one another.2 3 They then attempted 
to build a theoretical model of state tax revenue genera­
tion. This model assumed a tax structure of an income tax 
and a sales tax with rates r^ and r2, respectively. Thus 
their tax revenue function was
R = rx.Y + r2.Ct (2.3)
where R - state tax revenues, Y - aggregate personal income, 
and Ĉ. ■ taxable consumption spending. Ct was treated as 
a function of Income, of relative prices (of taxed versus 
untaxed goods), and of the sales tax rate. Thus the 
revenue function became
R ■ R(y» N, p, r1? r2) (2.4)
where y * per capita income, N ■ population, and p * 
relative before-tax price. The arguments y and N have 
replaced Y. The total derivative with respect to time 
of the logarithm of equation 2.4 was
22John B. Legler and Perry Shapiro, "The Responsive­
ness of State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth," National 
Tax Journal XXI (March, 1968), 46-56.
^^Ibid., p. 46.
21
R ■ e-i * JL + e;>*N + eo*£X + ->jii*£2. + ■;•(:*£. (2.5)
R y N J n  r 2  ̂p
Each of the coefficients e^ was a partial derivative;
for example R . Each e^ was thus an elasticity of
R with respect to the appropriate argument.
Legler and Shapiro argued that If the e^ were 
constant over time, then the functional equation 2.k 
became the specific form
R - A-yel-Ne2-r1e3*r2e4*pe5 (2.6)
where A Is the antllog of the constant of Integration. In 
the appendix of the article, Legler and Shapiro described 
a method of testing the hypothesis of constant elasticities 
over time. For each state of the Legler-Shapiro study, 
this hypothesis could not be rejected "at high levels of 
significance.,l2i*
Legler and Shapiro assumed, as had Wilford before 
them, that aggregate personal income could be treated as 
the product of per capita income and population. If 
aggregate Income growth were due entirely to population 
growth, or entirely to per capita income growth, the effects 
on tax revenues might be different. In particular, they 
argued that a rising per capita Income, by changing the 
"market basket" of goods consumed, might alter sales tax 
revenues by an amount different from that produced by the
2^Ibld.. p. 52.
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same increase in aggregate Income due to population.
increase.
Two criticisms can be raised against this important
work. First, the model did not reflect the interdependency
stated earlier in their article:
If, as in many states, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct 
sales tax payments from his taxable Income, it is 
clear that a rise in sales tax receipts resulting from 
an Increase in the sales tax rate or changes in 
consumer preferences leads to a decline in the income 
tax base and receipts.26
The revenues of both taxes depend, not on taxable Income as 
implied in the above quotation, but on aggregate personal 
income. The argument lists for the two taxes do not 
Include any variables that would lead to interdependence; 
the level of income does not depend on the level of tax 
revenues.
Second, some of the estimated elasticity coef­
ficients were negative. Legler and Shapiro argued 
correctly that negative elasticities are plausible in the 
real world, due to the Interdependence of taxes. But 
within the context of their own model, which as argued 
above lacks Interdependence, negative rate elasticities are 
not to be expected.
Two articles appeared in the National Tax Journal 
in response to the article by Legler and Shapiro. The
25Ibid., pp. 47-48. 
26Ibid., p. 47.
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first of these was by Ben-chieh Liu, who pointed out a
2 7technical error in their work. Liu argued that Legler 
and Shapiro were incorrect in stating unit rate elastici­
ties occurred only when the demand for taxable goods was 
perfectly inelastic with respect to price. Liu suggested 
the following correction:
. . . the only condition under which the percentage 
change in sales tax revenues equals the percentage 
change in tax rate Is, that the consumption expenditures 
on the taxable goods are gerfectly inelastic with 
respect to the tax rate.2°
Liu stated that the difference arose on goods 
subject to two or more levels of taxation, whereby one tax 
could affect the price of a good, and hence the revenues of 
the other t a x . 2 ^  Wilford made the same error, according 
to Liu.30 Legler and Shapiro replied that Liufs correction 
was valid. They had omitted from the article an assumption 
of perfectly elastic supply of taxable goods. According to 
Legler and Shapiro, this assumption would have led to 
equivalence of the two positions.31
2?Ben-chieh Liu, "Comments on the Responsiveness of 
State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth," National Tax 




3ijohn B. Legler and Perry Shapiro, "The Responsive­
ness of State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth: A Reply," 
National Tax Journal. XXII CJune, 1969), 299-300.
2k
The second article in response to xhe work of 
Legler and Shapiro was more fundamental and less technical 
in its criticism. Professors Frledlander, Swanson, and 
Due took issue with the specific form of the aggregate 
tax revenue function (equation 2.6) posited by Legler and 
Shapiro.32 The multiplicative revenue function was 
unrealistic and should have been replaced with an additive 
function. According to these critics, Legler and Shapiro 
did no more to explore the mechanisms linking income to 
tax revenue than previous researchers had done. Further, 
the negative rate elasticities found by Legler and 
Shapiro were due to model misspecification.33
Frledlander, Swanson, and Due then developed their 
own model of tax revenue generation. The assumptions of 
the model were: (1) the tax structure consists of an 
income tax and a sales tax, (2) taxes are independent of 
one another, (3) the supply of taxable commodities is 
infinitely elastic, (4) per capita income and its growth 
rate are exogenous variables, and (5) the estimates to be 
obtained are short-run. 3**
Assumption (2) went contrary to the work of
3^Ann F. Frledlander, Gerald J. Swanson, and John 
F. Due, "Estimating Sales Tax Revenue Changes in Response 
to Changes in Personal Income and Sales Tax Rates,"
National Tax Journal XXVI (March, 1973), 103-110.
33ibid.. p. 103. 
3^Ibld.. p. 106.
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Legler and Shapiro, who had attempted to bu.lld into their 
model the interdependence of taxes. Frledlander, at al. 
explained that over a short period of time, the inter­
dependence of taxes was presumed unchanging, and hence an 
unnecessary part of the m o d e l . 35
Frledlander, et_ al. conducted empirical work on a 
cross section of fifteen states. Like Wilford and Legler 
and Shapiro, they treated aggregate personal income as the 
product of per capita income and population. Relative 
prices of taxed versus untaxed goods had been among the 
arguments of the tax revenue function, but was dropped 
when it contributed nothing statistically. The empirical 
phase of this project thus treated sales tax revenues as a 
log-linear function of the sales tax rate, per capita 
income, and population.3̂
They argued that states with food included in the 
sales tax base should have higher rate elasticities. This 
should be so since food demand was generally price 
inelastic; the lower the price elasticity, the higher the 
rate elasticity.37 The average rate elasticity for the 
fifteen states was 0.93; the average for states exempting 
food was 0.87. Interestingly, the extreme values of the
3 5 l b l d . . p .  1 0 6 .  
3 6 I b l d . , p .  107.
3 7 I b i d . , p .  1 0 7 .
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rate elasticity were both found in states which excluded 
food from the sales tax base: Maine (0.71) and Florida
(1.18).38
J. A. Dockelfs dissertation, The Responsiveness of 
the Iowa Tax Structure, had many elements in common with 
this current study. His primary Interest was long-run 
tax revenue projections; his basic analytical tool was the 
use of income elasticities as the measure of responsive­
ness; he expressed interest in testing for changes in 
income elasticities.39 After demonstrating that the Iowa 
tax structure had undergone significant rate changes as 
well as administrative changes, Dockel discussed the 
separation of tax yield elasticity into a base elasticity 
and a rate el a s t i c i t y . T h i s  concept had previously been 
elaborated by Rafuse, and was designed to account for the 
effect of a tax rate increase on the purchases of a good 
or service not completely inelastic in demand. **1
For the Iowa Income tax specifically, Dockel 
regressed income tax revenues against total personal income
38lbld., pp. 108-109.
39j. A. Dockel, The Responsiveness of the Iowa 
Tax Structure, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, iowa 
State University, Ames, Iowa, 1970). The reader is specifi­
cally referred to pages 6,7, and 4 8.
iinIbid., pp. 46-7.
^Rafuse, op. clt. . p. 9In.
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In log-linear form, so that the regression coefficient 
would be the yield elasticity (and base elasticity as 
well, as there was no rate increase to consider). He 
utilized step variables to determine whether shifts had 
occurred In tax yields as a result of administrative 
changes.^ He aiso used another dummy variable, equal to 
the logarithm of personal Income when the step variable 
equalled one, and zero otherwise, to determine whether 
the slope of the regression line had changed.**3,44 
However, he did not state specifically that a slope change 
implied an income elasticity change.
For the Iowa tax structure, Dockel estimated an 
overall income elasticity of .85, up from .81 due to 
administrative changes in 196?.^ This relatively low 
value is due In part to the state’s heavy reliance on an 
inelastic property tax.^6 He did not mention the possible 
change in that income elasticity due to economic factors.
This dissertation suggests In Chapter 4 that the 
Income elasticity of a tax structure changes as income
**2Dockel, op. clt. . p. 45.
^ Ibld. . P* **8.
^This device is discussed later In this chapter, 
on page 33.
^Dockel, op. cit. . p. 104-105.
1,6IbId. , p. 40.
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changes. Those taxes more income elastic than the average 
for the tax structure will rise in the proportion of tax 
revenues generated, those less Income elastic than average 
will decline.**7 Dockel’s projections of Iowa’s tax revenues 
were not consistent with those results. Particularly, he 
estimated that the property tax, less elastic than average 
for the Iowa structure, would gain in share of tax revenues 
produced: that the sales tax, approximately average in 
elasticity, would lose share; and that the income tax, 
corporate income tax, and insurance premium tax, all 
greater than average elasticity, would remain about the 
same in share of tax revenues produced.**®
The American Council on Intergovernmental Relations 
pointed out the desirability of unit or greater income 
elasticity in a state-local tax system. In particular, an 
elasticity of unity would allow a state tax structure to 
grow as fast as the economy around It; an elasticity of 
1.2 would promote a state-federal balance; state sources 
would grow as rapidly as federal sources.**9 But this seems 
undesirable from two standpoints. The federal system is 
so elastic that fiscal drag is a problem forcing occasional
**7See pp. 129-13^.
**®Dockel, op. cit. , p. 123.
^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
Federal-State-Local Finances: Significant Features of 
Fiscal Federalism, 1973-7** edition, p. 3"!
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tax cuts of varying scope. While state tax revenues do 
not have the same impact as federal tax revenues in terms 
of a macroeconomic leakage, the lack of appreciable fiscal 
drag creates no cause for a system of such high elasticity. 
Second, the income elasticity of the state tax structure 
will grow as income grows; if the system has an initial 
income elasticity of 1.2, that elasticity will rise to 
even higher levels, if any individual tax has an elasticity 
larger than the average elasticity for the tax system. Thus 
while the income elasticity of a tax structure can be too 
small, it might also be too large. ACIR suggested that 
state personal income taxes should produce about 25 percent 
of state revenues in order to get adequate elasticity and 
to avoid inequities of property and sales taxes.50
In an article attempting to explain a recent 
phenomenon of state tax rate and base reductions, Leon 
Rothenberg wrote that an inflationary economy was beneficial 
to state government financing. He argued that state 
governments' revenues would rise faster than expenditures; 
that revenues were more responsive to inflation than were 
expenditures. Amplifying this statement, he wrote that 
such levies as sales taxes and income taxes (the latter 
due to withholding) responded quickly to price and wage 
level changes. Expenditures, on the other hand, were much
50Ibid., p. 1.
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slower to respond, as wage and salary payments and many 
other state government expenditures were due to contractual 
or constitutional restrictions, stable over the short run.51 
Rothenberg's opening statement became less profound 
as It was developed. He was not discussing the amount, 
either percentage or absolute, by which revenues and 
expenditures changed. Rather, he was writing about 
different time lags In the adjustment process.
His arguments are perhaps sound, as short-run 
analysis. Over a longer time frame, it seems plausible 
that expenditures would go through a "catching-up" phase, 
particularly as wages and salaries rise to remain as 
competitive as before. Of importance to this dissertation 
1b not the lag structure by which revenues and expenditures 
react to price level changes, but the longer term percentage 
and absolute dollar amount adjustments, for which short-run 
timing differences would have been washed out.
In the first of two important contributions to the 
literature concerning state tax revenue growth and income 
elasticities, Neil M. Singer applied the technique of 
dummy variables to a state income elasticity study. 
Recognizing the inability of some earlier works to 
effectively deal with statutory rate and base changes,
S^Leon Rothenberg, "A New Look in State Finances: 
Tax Reduction and Restructured Tax Systems," National Tax 
Journal. XXVII (June, 197^0, 175-181.
Singer utilized dummy variables to measure the impact of 
these discretionary changes. He wrote that the frequency 
with which some states had changed rates and bases might 
have led other researchers not to use the dummy variable 
t e c h n i q u e . 52 singer assumed constant income elasticities; 
he found that the dummy variables were generally significant, 
and that aggregate personal income generated better regres­
sion fits than other income m e a s u r e s . 53 He noted that some 
state income taxes allowed the deduction of federal income 
taxes; in these states, income tax revenues were dependent 
on the Federal income tax laws, and thus required dummy 
variables to account for the effect of changes in federal 
tax laws.5^
Michael Wasylenko noted that Singer's dummy variable 
method tested only for change in the intercept of regression* 
while discretionary changes in income tax laws might have 
altered slopes (elasticities) as well. Wasylenko wrote 
that the addition of another dummy variable would have 
provided a test of slope change, but would at the same 
time have reduced the degrees of freedom of the regression. 
He also noted that the frequency of discretionary changes 
would require several sets of dummy variables. Rather than
52Neil M. Singer, "The Use of Dummy Variables in 
Estimating the Income-Elasticity of State Income-Tax 
Revenues," National Tax Journal. XXI (June, 1968), 200.
53ibld.. pp. 201-203.
5**ibid. . p. 201.
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sacrifice degrees of freedom by using the dummy variables 
necessary to test for the Impacts of several discretionary 
changes, Wasylenko developed an alternate methodology. He 
estimated income tax elasticities and income tax revenues 
by utilizing a simulation of the income tax revenue 
generating process.55 process he developed was similar
in many respects to the "synthetic" tax revenue series 
used earlier by Robert Harris.5® The pattern of income 
distribution was pivotal to Wasylenko's model. He first 
computed the "effective base ratio" of taxable income to
total income for each income class. Then he computed the
"effective tax rate" for each income class; these rates 
were the ratios of tax liability to taxable income. He 
then projected future total income values, and simulated 
future tax revenues for each income class by applying the
previously calculated ratios.57 This method allowed
Wasylenko to determine rate, base, and total elasticity 
coefficients, which by his assumptions were constant.58 
In avoiding a problem associated with Singer's method,
55Michael Wasylenko, "Estimating the Elasticity of 
State Personal Income Taxes." National Tax Journal, XXVIII 
(March, 1975), 139-140.
S^Robert Harris, Income and Sales Taxes: The 1970
Outlook for States and Localities (State and Local Finances 
Project, Council of State Governments, June, 1966).
57wasylenko, op. cit. . pp. 140-141.
58lbld.. p. 141.
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Wasylenko developed a technique which lacked an Important 
feature of the Singer model: the ability to compare
policy alternatives.
The February 1970 American Statistician published 
an article describing a test which involved the use of two 
types of dummy variables to test for changes in both 
intercept and slope of the regression s u r f a c e . 59 a set 
of zero-one variables allowed a test for change of 
intercept. If the coefficient of this variable were 
significant, then the data accompanied by the dummy variable 
value 1 were responsible for a shift of intercept. A 
second set of dummy variables took on the value zero or
j, where is the ith observation on the £th independent 
variable, as the first set took values zero or one. These 
variables performed a test to determine whether the slope 
of the regression (with respect to the variable J) had 
changed. An intercept change could be interpreted as a 
once-for-all increase (or decrease) in revenues; a slope 
change would imply a change in the effective rate at which 
tax revenues grow.
Singer’s second contribution treated analytically 
the concept of income-dependent income elasticities of
^ D a m o d a r  Gujarati, "Use of Dummy Variables in 
Testing for Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two 
Linear Regressions: A Note," The American Statistician,
XXIV (February, 1970), 50-52. Also, "Use of Dummy 
Variables in Testing for Equality between Sets of Coeffi­
cients in Linear Regressions: A Generalization." The
American Statistician, XXIV (December, 1970), 18-22.
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state Income taxes.6° Although most previous researchers 
discussed the possibility of non-constant elasticities, 
few had actually formulated models which specified elas­
ticities which varied. Musgrave and Miller, writing about 
the elasticity of the federal Income tax, noted that the 
income elasticity varied with income. Dockel used dummy 
variables which tested for changes in the slope of the 
regression; he never explicitly associated this slope 
shift with an elasticity shift.
Wasylenko noted that elasticities could be shifted 
but his research did not further Investigate that possibil­
ity. Wilford urged researchers to examine the time-trend 
of the year-to-year elasticity values. Legler and Shapiro 
assumed constant elasticities; their empirical work led 
them not to reject an hypothesis of constant elasticities. 
Groves and Kahn, and Singer in a previous article, had 
assumed constant Income elasticities. Thus this second 
Singer article presented the first model of state income 
taxes which explicitly specified variable Income elastici­
ties. Singer noted that the Income elasticity of a 
state Income tax should not be treated as constant over 
wide ranges of Income. He listed three effects which 
caused income elasticity to vary with income. The
®°Neil M. Singer, "Estimating State Income 
Revenues: A New Approach," Review of Economics and
Statistics. LII (November, 1970), 4^7-433.
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"exemption effect" generated high income elasticities for 
those tax payers whose Incomes Just exceeded the tax 
exemption. This effect disappeared as all incomes exceeded 
the exemption. The "rate effect" generated changing 
elasticities so long as effective marginal and average tax 
rates changed. According to Singer, this effect continued 
until the highest marginal rate had been reached by all 
taxpayers. However, the average tax rate would continue to 
change (as Income changed) even after all taxpayers had 
reached the highest marginal tax rate. Thus the "rate 
effect" would not vanish when Singer claimed. Singer 
did not mention that the same effect might operate on a 
regressive tax structure as well. The "base effect" caused 
the income elasticity to vary as the income aggregate 
grew at a different rate than taxable income. Capital 
gains and transfer payments were noted as the primary 
sources of variation between the two income measures.®1 
Singer then posed the hypothesis that income 
elasticity was dependent on the rate structure. Assuming 
constant statutory rates, this implied that income 
elasticity was a function of the effective tax r a t e . ® ^
He found the rate effect to be significant, and concluded 
that for a progressive tax, Income elasticity declined
6lIbid.. pp. 427-428. 
®gIbld., pp. 428-429.
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toward unity >\a the effective tax rate rose.^3
Williams, Anderson, Froehle, and Lamb attempted 
to define more precisely and to establish quantitative 
measures for the tax criteria of yield stability, yield 
growth, and countercyclical stabilizing i n f l u e n c e . ^4 
Yield stability was measured by the reciprocal of the 
standard deviation of the logarithms of tax revenues.
Yield growth was measured by a long-run income elasticity. 
Stabilizing influence was measured by a short run income 
elasticity.^5 ^ linear regression of the percentage 
change in tax revenue against the percentage change in 
aggregate personal income was used to estimate the latter 
measure. The long-run income elasticity was measured by a 
log-linear regression of tax revenue against aggregate 
personal income. As no adjustments were made for rate or 
base changes, this method was equivalent to that used by 
Groves and Kahn. For the cross-section of states studied, 
most income elasticities were estimated to be at or above
unity.66
63ibid., pp. 429-430.
^William V. Williams, Robert M. Anderson, David 
0. Froehle, and Kaye L. Lamb, "The Stability, Growth, and 
Stabilizing Influence of State Taxes," National Tax 




W. T. Wilford responded to the Williams, et. al. 
article with sharp criticism.®'7 He wrote that the method 
of estimating long-run income elasticities gave spurious 
results for two reasons. First, in not specifying rate and 
base adjustments, the method used measured cun Income elas­
ticity which was biased upward by including the impact of 
these discretionary changes. Second, Wilford argued that 
the Income elasticity measured was an average value for 
the time period studied, and that Inflationary times result 
in increasing elasticities for income taxes. The possibil­
ity of time-dependent income elasticities, Wilford wrote, 
made . . even more imperative trend analysis of the 
elasticities."®8
Wilford further argued that rate and base adjust­
ments should be explicitly built into models concerned 
with income elasticity and revenue growth. Williams, 
et al. had omitted specific treatment of rate and base 
changes on the grounds that such statutory and adminis­
trative changes were so frequent and regular that they 
could be treated as commonplace, and expected to continue.®9 
Having argued that the Williams et al. elasticity 
estimates were biased upward, Wilford provided a set of
®?W. T. Wilford, "A Comment on 'The Stability, 
Growth, and Stabilizing Influence of State Taxes,'n 




Income elasticity estimated for the Louisiana tax structure 
to further support his point. He accounted for rate 
changes explicitly by Including a rate variable in the 
regression; he accounted for base changes by utilizing 
dummy variables. Only two taxes, the excise license tax 
and the personal Income tax, had Income elasticities 
greater than unity.70 Wilford's elasticity estimates are 
shown In Table 2.1.
A recent contribution by Berney and Frerlchs 
evaluated several methods of estimating Income elastici­
ties . ̂  They argued that since tax revenue is defined by 
the product of tax rate and tax base, that models not 
reflecting that definition were most likely mlsspecified.
The model used by Groves and Kahn would be correctly 
specified only if the tax rate and tax base were functions 
only of the income aggregate.72 xncluaion of the tax rate, 
as done by Wilford, led to a mlsspecified model if the 
Income aggregate were not the only determinant of the 
tax b a s e . 73 Berney and Frerlchs noted that failure to
70lbld., p. 457.
71Robert E. Berney and Bernard H. Frerlchs, "Income Elasticities for State Tax Revenues: Techniques of
Estimation and their Usefulness for Forecasting," Public 
Finance Quarterly. I (October, 1973), 409-425.
7?ibld.. pp. 410-411.
73ibld., pp. 411, 415-416.
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Motor Vehicle Licenses .76
Source: W. T. Wilford, "A Comment on 'The Stability,
Growth, and Stabilizing Influence of State 
Taxes,'" National Tax Journal. XXVIII 
(December, 1975), 457*
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include both rate-revenue and base-revenue elasticities 
resulted in substantial and unpredictable bias in the 
income elasticity.7**
They concluded that the preferred form of a model 
designed to estimate income elasticities and to project 
tax revenues would be log-linear and would include variables 
to explicitly detail the effects of tax rate and tax base 
changes. These conclusions were based on their observations 
that the logarithmic models yielded more conservative 
results, and that the models including rate and base 
variables were theoretically stronger, than other models 
surveyed.75 Another conclusion reached by Berney and 
Frerlchs was that "income elasticities by themselves may 
be of minimal value for short-run revenue forecasting."76
INCOME ELASTICITY AND TAX REVENUE 
GROWTH: LOUISIANA
Thomas R. Beard wrote of recent uncertainty in
revenues from severance taxes and non-tax mineral resources.
He stated that Louisiana, among the fifty states, was most
reliant on this form of revenue, and that
The remainder of Louisiana's state government revenue 
sources are simply not sufficiently responsive to
74Ibld., p. 417. 
75Ibid., p. 422-423. 
76Ibld., p. 423.
m
economic growth to provide a very rapid rate of 
expansion in total revenues.77
Of course, federal grants (revenue-sharing funds going into 
the state's general fund) and other non-tax revenues were 
included in that study, and their responsiveness to economic 
growth is suspect. Thus Beard did not directly state that 
the state government's tax structure was "not sufficiently 
responsive." Beard wrote extensively on the most trouble­
some area of this dissertation: the fact that projections
of future revenues are dependent on the political acts of 
the state legislature, on the federal government's revenue- 
sharing plans and legislative acts, and on the fate of 
petroleum prices in the international political arena.
He mentioned the slow-down in collections of 
sales taxes, and the decline in Income tax revenues, 
laying the cause of the reduced revenues at legislative 
acts reducing the base of each of these t a x e s . 78 But both 
of these taxes have income elasticities at or above unity; 
after these once-for-all base adjustments have been felt, 
these taxes will again take on the role of growth leaders 
in state tax collections.
77Flnanclng Qovernment in Louisiana: A Comparative
Study by Thomas R. Beard. Occasional Paper No. 21,
November 1974, Division of Research, College of Business 




In three papers prepared fcr the state of Louisiana 
Coordinating Council for Higher Education, James A, Papke, 
on one occasion with John B. Legler, projected tax revenues 
and state government expenditures for the State of 
L o u i s i a n a . 79 Since the projections techniques used in
these papers were quite similar to those used here, and
since the time frame for the projections was the same, it 
was important to devote space for an analysis of these 
works.
Legler and Papke wrote in the appendix of their
article that their revenue estimates were obtained from
the formal model
Rt - A'ytel*Nte2*rte3 (2.7)
where Rt ■ revenue of tax
yt * per capita income
Nt ■ population 
rt * tax rate 
t * time index
A, ex, e2, e3 are parameters, all but A being 
partial elasticities.80
This log-linear model utilized constant partial elasticities
of the tax to be treated. Legler and Papke reported the
79john B. Legler and James A. Papke, "Long Range 
Revenue Projections for the State of Louisiana: 1975,
1980, 1985," pp. 175-193; James A. Papke, "Long Range 
Expenditure Projections for the State of Louisiana," 
pp. 195-205; and James A. Papke, "Potential Revenue- 
Expenditure Imbalances: State of Louisiana," p. 207; all 
in Waster Plan Supplement, State of Louisiana Coordinating 
Council for Higher Education, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1972.
QnLegler and Papke, op. clt.« p. 180.
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following equation for the estimation of future values of 
total taxes for the state.®1
Rt - -10.0374 + 0.5056 y + 2.3715 N (r2 - .9944)
(2.8)
In utilizing this model, Legler and Papke correctly 
reasoned that future tax revenues would not grow according 
to some linear pattern of relatively constant year-to-year 
change, but rather would grow more like a sum deposited at 
compound interest. The partial income elasticity of 
.5065 is obviously less than unity. As will be shown in a 
later section of this dissertation, the overall income 
elasticity can be found by averaging the partial elasticities, 
using the growth rates of the respective variables as 
weights. The weighted average elasticity (with respect to 
personal income) is O.96, or slightly less than unity.®2 
This is in contrast to the value 1.05 reported by Legler 
and Papke In the conclusion of that article.®3
Given that the basic form of the model Is acceptable
for the purpose of intermediate- and long-term projections,
emphasis can be shifted to some details of implementing 
the model. Legler and Papke argued that while severance 
taxes have no clear bond to levels of income and population,
8lIbld.. p. 192.
®2e . .5065 x 5.15< + 2.3715 x 1.65% - 6.523 - 0.96
y 5-15% + 1.65* 5700
®3Legl er and Papke, op. clt. . p. 193*
past movement;-; show a close statistical rel ,j,tlonshl o.
Thus the high correlation coefficients were used to justify 
the use of an equation not suggested by a priori information. 
Since oil and gas production have begun to decline in 
recent years, this form of association must be viewed as 
invalid. Severance tax revenues should not be treated by 
the elasticities approach.
The study by Legler and Papke made no attempt to 
project nominal per capita income by first projecting real 
per capita income, then multiplying those results by a 
factor representing anticipated inflation. This would seem 
preferable, in light of the current instability of prices 
and the reasonable stability of real per capita income 
growth. Such a series as would be generated by the two- 
stage technique could very easily be revised simply by 
utilizing more current expectations toward inflation.
Papke stated that his model assumed the major 
taxes, aggregated, would be a constant fraction of total 
tax r e v e n u e s . a s shown later, the model actually assumed 
growing shares for the relatively elastic taxes. Thus the 
validity of his assumption lies in the relative elasticities 
of the major and minor taxes. Papke's assumption would be
8^Ibld., p. 175.
®5papke, "Potential Revenue-Expenditure Imbalance: 
State of Louisiana," p. 207.
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correct only if the weighted average Income elasticity 
of the major taxes equalled that of the minor taxes. This 
assumption could perhaps have been avoided if other taxes, 
as an aggregate, had been estimated using the same 
techniques as applied to the major taxes.
Legler and Papke reported the results of their 
regressions in tabular form. Some peculiarities emerged, 
hinting that the regressions could have been improved by 
some altered specifications. For example, the estimating 
equation for the Corporate Franchise tax had no significant 
variables in it. Only two taxes had all three coefficients 
a, ei» E2 significantly different from zero, and one of 
these, the Tobacco Tax, had a negative estimated income 
elasticity. Thus some of the equations might have more 
meaningfully been estimated by using population as the sole 
independent variable, or by using a regression forced 
through the origin.
W. T. Wilford's article "Is Louisiana's Revenue 
Structure Responsive to Economic Growth"^? attempted to 
measure the responsiveness of "self-generated" state 
revenues to Gross State Product. This revenue concept 
included all state taxes, licenses, fees, royalties, etc., 
and excluded only federal grants and Medicare/aid funds,
86Legler and Papke, op. clt.. p. 192.
^Louisiana Business Survey, VI (April, 1975)*
6-7, 10-11.
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and thus is mere broadly defined than the concept of 
Total Taxes used in this dissertation. Gross State Product 
is also a broader concept than Total Personal Income as 
used here. Wilford reported a 1972 weighted average 
elasticity of 0.83, for self-generated tax revenues with 
respect to Gross State Product. T h i s  was a bit confusing; 
in his Table 2 he divided state revenue into "income- 
related" and "nonincome related," while Table 4 displayed 
elasticities of "Tax Revenue" and "Total Revenue" to Gross 
State Product. The text explained that "Tax Revenue" of 
Table 4 is in reality "Income-related" revenue, and 
"Total Revenue" is the sum of "income-related" and "non­
income related" revenues.®® A terminological problem still 
existed, however, since the severance tax revenues were 
included in "nonincome-related" revenues. Wilford noted a 
tendency for this elasticity to rise over time. The 0.83 
value of 1972 represented an increase from an estimated 
0.71 in 1956. The equations used to estimate the revenue- 
income elasticities contained no formal provision for chang­
ing elasticities of individual taxes.
This feature did not represent a flaw, however, 
when used to estimate elasticities of individual revenue 
sources. As pointed out elsewhere in this dissertation, 
there are two sources of a changing Income elasticity of 
the revenue system. One of these is that the elasticities
88Ibld.. p. 11.
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of individual taxes may change with time and/or income; 
if this be the case, the estimating equations should 
reflect the fact in the modelling process. Wilford 
recognized the second source of elasticity change, at least 
implicitly, that the income-elastic revenue sources will 
produce larger proportions of Total Revenues (or income- 
related revenues, at least) as income grows, and thus 
increase the weighted average elasticity of the revenue 
system.
There are yet other reasons for the projections of 
this dissertation to differ from Professor Wilford's, He 
utilized a broader revenue base, which included more 
nonincome-related revenue. This would cause his income 
elasticity measure to be downward-biased from that of 
this dissertation. He utilized Gross State Product, which, 
according to the data he presented, grew on the average, 
6.79# annually (from 1956-1972).89 By contrast, Total 
Personal Income grew slightly faster, at 6.95# annually 
over the same period; this would make Wilford's elasticity 
estimates slightly upward-biased from those of this 
dissertation.
A second article by Wilford was more complete 
than the first in its treatment of the subject of the income
89Ibid.. p. 7.
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elasticity of the Louisiana tax structure.9^ The more 
recent article utilized the same methodology, reached the 
same conclusions, and was subject to the same criticisms 
as the article above. In addition, the second article 
presented two new points for comparison to the methodology 
of this dissertation.
Citing the difficulty of empirically measuring 
effective statutory tax rates, Wilford utilized dummy 
variables instead of rate variables to account for rate 
changes.91 Thus qualitative variables were substituted 
for quantitative ones. Such dummy variables also accounted 
for base changes. Wilford's models thus did not attempt to 
differentiate effects on revenue resulting from rate and 
from base shifts. The equations were also incapable of 
modelling shifts in rate or income elasticities.
Second, the formulation of the dummy variables 
may have been mlsspecified. Wilford's equations (5) and 
(6) purport to be the same economic model,92 but this is 
unlikely. As is shown later in this dissertation.equation 
(5) should be
C5') X± - aAYb 10fdi, not (5) X± - a1Yfad1f
9°W. T. Wilford, "On the Sensitivity of State 
Revenues to Qross State Product: Louisiana's Revenue-Income 
Elasticity Coefficients," Review of Business and Economic 




in order for equation (6) to be correct.
Wilford recently published a third article on the
Louisiana tax structure.93 Noting the volatility and
uncertainty surrounding severance tax revenues, Wilford
stated that the purpose of this article was to examine the
"dependability" of the major nonseverance taxes. More than
one-half of Louisiana's total revenues (total state sources,
less Federal Grants and Medicare receipts) was generated by
five nonseverance taxes: Gasoline, Personal Income,
Corporate Income, Sales, and Tobacco. Wilford produced
several tables of revenue and percentage change in revenue
forecasts, based on varying assumptions concerning Gross
State Product growth. The implicit income elasticities of
these estimates were different from those of the two
previous articles, although the data and methodology were
the same. Both Income taxes were income-inelastic; the
sales tax Income elasticity was approximately one-half.
Indeed, all five taxes were income Inelastic. These
calculations led Wilford to the conclusion that
. . .  in the absence of new tax rate or base adjustments* 
the five sources will contribute a progressively 
smaller percentage to revenues as the State Legislature 
is forced to search out additional revenue sources to 
meet rising expenditures,94
93w. T. Wilford, "Louisiana's Major Nonseverance 
Tax Revenues: Long-term Performance and Prospects," 
Louisiana Business Review. XL (March, 1976), 6-8.
94ibld., p. 8.
50
Such a conclusion is a tautology. Naturally, If more money 
is to be raised from other sources, a smaller share of the 
total is generated by the five taxes in question.
There is a very good reason for Wilford’s estimates 
to exhibit low income elasticities. Despite the long-run 
nature of the forecasts, Wilford utilized a linear model.95 
The resulting estimates tend to understate the responsive­
ness of tax revenues to changes in Gross State Product, and 
hence understate the income elasticity. As argued in this 
dissertation, a log-linear formulation would have been 
more appropriate, and would have led to higher income 
elasticity coefficients.
Professors Beard and Scott in their article,
"Revenue Projections for Louisiana State Government, Fiscal 
Years 197^-75— 1979-80",9^ provided two sets of estimates of 
revenues for state government; both sets are pessimistic 
in outlook. In only one year (of the six for which 
estimates are provided) do anticipated revenues exceed the 
anticipated amount of Inflation. The estimating process 
is similar to that used later in this dissertation.
Severance tax revenue and mineral resource revenue estimates 
were based on predictions of future oil output and prices. 
Revenues of all other state sources (except federal grants)
95ibid., p. 6.
^Louisiana Business Review, XXXIX (February, 1975)* 
2-5, 11-114, 16.
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were estimated using an elasticities approach: income tax
revenues were based, in Estimate I, on an assumed income 
elasticity of 1.25 (1.35 in Estimate II). Sales tax 
revenue estimates were generated on the basis of an assumed 
income elasticity of .95 (1.05 in Estimate II).
Beard and Scott displayed their results in two 
tables, the bottom line of each showing the year-to-year 
percentage increase in revenues. Interestingly, this 
percentage is constantly increasing for Department of 
Revenue sources (which include most of the states important 
taxes). Since income is assumed to grow at 9% in the first 
year, and 10% in succeeding years, and since the income 
elasticity is the ratio of the tax revenue growth rate to 
the respective income growth rate, it seems that Professors 
Beard and Scott have predicted an increase in the income 
elasticity of the state’s revenue system, although they do 
not explicitly state such a conclusion. Table 2.2 displays 
the forecasts by Beard and Scott for growth rates in tax 
revenues and in total personal income. Table 2.3 shows the 
income elasticities implicit in those forecasts.
Table 2.2
Revenue and Income Projections, 1975-76 - 1979-80*
Projected Annual Growth Rates 
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
(1) Department of Revenue Sources^ 3.5 3.9 4.7 5.5 6.2
(2) All state sources3 4.9 3.4 5.1 4.7 6.2
(3) Total Taxes Licenses Fees, etc.** 5.4 3.7 5.5 5.1 6.8
(4) Total Personal Income 9. 10. 10. 10. 10.
*Thomas R. Beard and Loren C. Scott, "Revenue Projections for Louisiana 
State Government, Fiscal Years 1974-75 - 1979-80," Louisiana Business Review 
XXXIX (Feb., 1975), 4.
^Includes Beer Tax, Corporate Franchise Tax, Income Tax, Sales Tax (General), 
Severance Tax, Tobacco Tax, Gasoline and Special Fuels Tax, alcoholic beverage tax, 
alcoholic beverage permits, anhydrous ammonia, electricity tax on cooperatives, 
power use (none after 197*1-75), gift, inheritance, inspection fees on petroleum, 
liquified petroleum permits, motor carrier fees, natural gas franchise, occupational 
licenses, public utilities, reforestation, soft drinks, supervision and inspection 
fees, and unknown owners.
^Includes Department of Revenue receipts, Mineral Resources, Other Taxes, 
Licenses, Fees, Department of Public Safety, and Federal Revenue Sharing Receipts.
**A11 State Sources less Federal Revenue Sharing Receipts.
Table 2.3
Implied Income Elasticity Coefficients
1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80
Department of Revenue Sources 
(Row 1 - Row 4, Table 5*1)
.39 • 39 .47 .55 .62
All state sources
(Row 2 - Row 4, Table 5.1)
.54 .34 .51 .47 .62
Total Taxes, Licenses, Pees, etc. 
(Row 3 - Row 4, Table 5.1)




BACKGROUND: LOUISIANA TAX HISTORY
AND STRUCTURE
The purpose of this chapter Is two-fold. First, 
the tax structure of the state Is examined briefly, In 
order to analyze changes In that structure that have 
occurred during the period 1948-49 to the present.
This analysis Is required If a meaningful econometric 
model of the tax structure is to be built. Second, the 
tax revenue data for the taxes to be studied is presented. 
These revenue data, singly and In aggregates, with the 
various Income, price level, and population data, provide 
the quantitative base for the regression studies which 
follow in Chapter 5.
The discussion on this and the following pages 
summarizes the major tax changes in recent Louisiana 
history. The legislating of new taxes and new tax rates, 
the redefining of tax bases, the transferring of a tax from 
one collecting agency to another, and changing the 
administration or enforcement of tax collections, are 
some of the Important features that are considered.
Some readers will find this discussion incomplete for some 
purposes; for a fuller description of rate changes and 
of statutory references, the Louisiana State Tax
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Handbook is recommended.1 This source also provider a 
concise treatment of the exemptions to the various taxes.
For a fuller treatment than is available even here, the 
reader is urged to consult the Louisiana Revised Statutes
pdirectly, or the latest Department of Revenue Tax Guide.
HISTORY OF TAX STRUCTURE CHANGES
Few of Louisiana's taxes have remained unchanged 
over the passage of the nearly thirty years under study. 
Changes In tax rates, definition of the tax base, methods 
of collection, and changes in the degree of enforcement have 
taken place in nearly every tax levied by the State of 
Louisiana. In addition, several taxes have been repealed. 
The tax structure has been altered by each of these changes. 
It is the function of the following sections to outline 
briefly the important changes that have taken place in the 
administration of each tax. This analysis facilitates the 
construction of a model of the tax structure. This model 
separates those changes In revenues that are due to changing 
economic conditions from those revenue changes that are due 
to structural changes In the individual taxes.
^Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. This book is published irregularly, 
most recently in 1969*
9State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue Tax 
Guide (1975 edition) Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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This report looks first at those ta:.:es that nave bet:o 
repealed; then individual taxes are examined for structural 
changes.
Repealed Taxes
Several taxes were repealed during the period of 
this study; most of these were not significant Income 
producers. In 1956, the severance taxes on frogs and 
lignite were repealed. The tax on frogs contributed, 
for example, less than $1000 in both 1950-51 and 1951- 
1952.3
In I960 the Kerosene Tax was repealed. Collections 
from this tax had declined steadily during the decade of 
the 1950's to Just over $200,000 annually.1* The Oleo­
margarine Tax, which frequently generated no revenue at 
all, was one of the four taxes repealed in 1962. Also 
in this group was the Dog Racing Tax, which was not a 
tax revenue producer as no dog races were held in the 
state. The Amusement License Tax and the Auctioneers 
License Tax were the other two taxes repealed.5 The former 
produced about $25,000 in 1955-56; the latter, only $100100.^
3Loulslana State Tax Handbook: 1952. Public
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
1952, p. 43. Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1953. p. 53.
**State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue Annual 
Report. fiscal years 1950-51 to 1960-61.
^Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1964. p. 2.
^Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1956. pp. 24-25,
26-27.
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The Ohs Gathering Tax was the largest revenue 
producer to be repealed prior to the major changes of
1970-73* Suspended December 1, 1958, the Oas Gathering 
Tax was later found unconstitutional, and was repealed.?
The state Ad Valorem Tax was eliminated in 1972 amid 
growing questions of the constitutionality of the way in 
which it was administered. The tax had produced over
p
$20 million in revenues annually since 1961-62.
The 1973 Special Session of the Louisiana 
legislature repealed three taxes: the Power Use Tax, 
the Lubricating Oils Tax, and the Tax on Generation and 
Sale of Electricity. Each of these taxes individually 
was a modest revenue producer; the three taxes combined 
contributed over $10 million annually in recent years.^
The tax repeals of 1973, in addition to being politically 
favorable, had two side effects. Among other critics,
Public Affairs Research Council had argued for years that 
Louisiana had too many taxes that were small revenue 
producers and "nuisance" taxes; and that the administration 
of these taxes was an undesirable drain on state finances.10
7Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969. p. 2.
8State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor,
Division of Administration, Financial Report. Fiscal Year 
Ended June 30. 19—  (Various years); and Louisiana State 
¥ax Handbook: 1969. pp. 114-115.
q̂Louisiana Financial Statement 1972-73. pp. 20,24.
10Loulalana State Tax Handbook: pp. 11-13 (1956 ed.), 
pp. 3,10 T1960, 1964 eds.), pp. 4,11 (1969 ed.).
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Thus with the repeal of the dozen taxes outlined above, 
total costs of collection decreased. For example, the 
three taxes repealed in the 1973 Special Session cost 
$75*000 to collect in fiscal 1972. This amount repre­
sented 0.35 percent of the revenues produced by those 
three taxes.11 While this figure is well below 0.78 
percent, which was the average cost of collection for 
the Department of Revenue in that year,12 it is well 
above the 0.14 percent cost of collecting the Severance 
Tax.13 As is discussed in later paragraphs, these 
recent repeals were part of a legislative package that 
increased severance tax rates significantly. The extra 
severance revenues generated should not have increased 
collection costs greatly, so that the net effect should 
be more tax revenue at lower total cost of collection.
Second, the income elasticity of the tax structure 
increased with the repeals discussed. The Ad Valorem 
Tax especially was regarded as a tax highly insensitive 
to income changes. The three taxes repealed in 1973 would,
11State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor, 
Division of Administration Budget, Fiscal Year 1972-73.
pp. 10-11.
-*-2State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue 
33rd Annual Report, p. 5.
131972-73 Budget. p. 10.
as a group, probably be Judged slightly inccme-inelastic. 
Thus the result of these changes, whether Intended or not, 
was to give up current revenues for more rapid rate of 
revenue growth In future years. More Is said on this 
subject in the next chapter.
The Severance Taxes
As the title Implies, these are taxes levied on 
the severance (extraction) of natural resources from the 
land and territorial waters of Louisiana. While the 
severance tax on crude oil and condensate, natural gas, 
and sulphur provide almost all of the severance tax 
revenues, there are taxes levied on several of Louisiana’s 
other natural resources.
Revenues of some minor severance taxes are dedicated 
to the Conservation Fund;11* while this dedication does not 
make the assessment any less a tax, the revenues thus 
generated are not counted as tax revenues by the Division 
of Administration, by Public Affairs Research, or (by 
default) by this dissertation. The amount of tax revenue 
involved is but a few million dollars annually.^5 A
•^Taxes on oysters, salt water shrimp, sand and 
gravel, shells, and skins and hides, are collected by Wild 
Life and Fisheries Conservation Fund. Generally, the 
revenues are expended on behalf of the contributors. For 
example; revenues from the tax on skins and hides serve to 
benefit trappers.
^Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969* P. 88. The 
total in 1967-6 8 was *1,4057^9371^
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bill recently Introduced Into the legislature would have 
returned unused funds In Wild Life and Fisheries accounts 
to the State General Fund. Had thiB move succeeded, it 
would have become necessary to include these minor severance 
taxes in the aggregate total taxes. However, the bill was 
not passed, and these tax revenues are still spent (or 
accumulated) by Wild Life and Fisheries, and are unavailable 
to any other state agency.
Another complicating factor in this series is the 
changing of the due dates for remitting tax collections. 
Collections were advanced one month on one occasion,
C1960-61), and two months on another (1958-59)
In the years prior to 19^8 the base of all severance 
taxes was altered several times : the original tax (1910) 
was on quantity; in 1912 the base was changed to value. In 
1916 the base changed to quantity, and in 1920 the base 
again became value. In 1928 the base became quantity, 
where it remained until 1973* Crude oil and condensate 
and natural gas provide almost all of the revenue of the 
severance tax. Crude oil and condensate, prior to 197^, 
were taxed on a quantity base. Rates varied from 18 to 
26 cents per barrel, dependent on the specific gravity of 
the product. Output of so-called "incapable" wells (wells 




Currently, crude oil and condensate are taxed ad valorem.
The ordinary rate Is 12*g percent of the value of the product. 
Special rates of one-half and one-quarter the ordinary 
rate apply to incapable and stripper wells. Prior to 
1958, natural gas was taxed at 3/10 cents per thousand 
cubic feet (MCF). In 1958, in order to avoid the loss of 
tax revenues as the Gas Gathering Tax was suspended, the 
severance tax rate on natural gas was Increased. The rate 
on the outgoing Gas Gathering Tax and the increase in the 
rate of Severance Tax on natural gas were the same, 2 cents 
per thousand cubic feet.*® Thus a much longer historical 
series of severance tax data can be assembled if the 
revenues for the Gas Gathering Tax are added to the revenues 
of the other severance taxes. For a short period of time 
in 1972, natural gas was taxed at the greater of 3-3 cents 
per MCF or ll*s percent of value. 19 Natural gas is 
currently taxed on a quantity basis, the full rate being 
7 cents per MCF. Four reduced rates apply to low produc­
tivity wells and to gas sold under certain contracts.20
As prices rise for oil and other increasingly 
scarce natural resources, the value extracted rises at a 
faster rate than the quantity extracted. This change 
provides a tax structure with greater potential revenue
l8Ibld., p. 2.
•^Department of Revenue 1973 Tax Guide, p. 63. 
2°Department of Revenue 1975 Tax Guide, pp. 73-75-
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growth. It would be improper to discuss the income elas­
ticities of the old and new structures, as growth in 
severance tax revenues may be much more dependent on 
resource availability than on the income-derived demand 
for the resource. Federal regulation of oil and gas output 
and prices may also limit the responsiveness of these goods 
to economic conditions. However, if output can expand as 
economic conditions raise incomes and prices (including the 
price of oil), the responsiveness of the severance tax on 
oil to economic change is greater if levied on the value, 
rather that the quantity of oil severed.
The Louisiana Sales Tax
Louisiana Is one of many states that depends
heavily upon a general sales tax for revenues. The levy
dates to 1938, when a 1 percent general sales tax was
enacted. This tax became permanent In 19**̂ ; the rate was
? 1raised to 2 percent in 19*18. In 1970, the tax rate was 
raised to 3 percent; food and prescription drugs were 
exempted from the 1 percent surtax. In the 1973 legislative 
special session, food and prescription drug items were 
exempted from the other 2 percent as well.22 The actual 
sales tax paid by the customer varies from 4 percent to
21Loulslana State Tax Handbook: 1969. p. 78.
c T. R. Beard, Financing Government in Louisiana:
A Comparative Study. Occasional Paper No. 21 (November, 
Division of Research, College of Business Adminis­
tration, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
pp. 111-112.
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6 percent, reflecting various city and parish sales 
taxes. Many of these were increased or initiated in recent 
years. It is possible that rising city and parish taxes, 
by increasing the final prices of products, have caused 
state sales tax revenues to rise less rapidly than would 
have been the case in the absence of these local taxes. The 
increase in the prices of consumed goods and services may 
have effected a marginal move toward saving.
In addition to rate changes, there were adminis­
trative changes to consider. The most important of these 
was the change in collection procedures. Originally 
collected by and from the retailer, the sales tax Is now 
collected from wholesalers.23 This 1964 move resulted In 
a much smaller degree of tax avoidance, as there are far 
fewer wholesalers than retailers to supervise. The retailer 
then remits an amount that reflects the sales tax on his 
sales, less the amount of sales tax paid the wholesaler.
The amount of sales tax revenue generated is 
reported differently by the Financial Statement of the 
Division of Administration and by the Department of 
Revenue Annual Report.2** These small differences aside, 
the sales tax series displays two major base changes
^ Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969, pp. 79-80.
2**The Financial Statement appears to Include the 
"Parish Service Change," while the Annual Report does not. 
There are small discrepancies in some recent years even 
with this adjustment.
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(1964-65 and 1973-74) and one rate change (1970-71).
The Income Tax
The Income tax levied by the State of Louisiana 
taxes the net Income of both corporations and Individuals. 
Corporations pay a four percent tax on net Income derived 
from sources within the state. Each corporation Is entitled 
to an exemption of up to $2,000, the exemption depending on 
the ratio of net income derived from state sources to 
total net income. For Individuals, the rate structure is 
slightly progressive. The maximum marginal rate is 6 
percent, levied on net income in excess of $50,000, These 
rates were in effect from 1934 to 1974, but numerous 
changes in the tax base occurred during that time. In 
1951-52 the tax base was reduced by an increase In exemp­
tions. The 1961-62 fiscal year showed increased collections 
as a result of instituting general withholding In that 
year. In 1970, federal income taxes paid was disallowed 
as a special deduction, but was reinstated in 1973. In 
1971-72, the incoming Edwards administration adopted 
stricter enforcement guidelines, in part by requiring the 
filer to show the amount of income reported on the 
appropriate federal Income tax return. Income tax revenues 
for fiscal year 1972-73 were decreased by the passage of a 
law, later found unconstitutional, giving state income tax 
credit for tuition paid to nonpublic schools. Income tax 
returns for calendar or fiscal 1975 and thereafter will be
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prepared on a form substantially simpler than that of 
previous years.
Legislation accompanying the new state constitution 
changed the definition of income to coincide with the 
definition utilized by federal income tax returns. 
Previously, certain forms of income were taxable at the 
state level, but not at the federal level; and certain 
items were deductibles or adjustments for state purposes 
but not for federal, and vice versa. For example, FICA 
(Social Security) payments made by Louisiana residents were 
previously deductible on state income tax returns, but tax­
able for federal returns. Conversely, most medical payments 
were not deductible at the state level, but were allowable 
on federal returns. Two exceptions still remain: federal
income taxes paid are still deductible from state Income tax 
returns, and interest earned on government bonds is treated 
differently by state and federal laws.
The State of Louisiana gained in two distinct ways 
by moving toward greater compatibility with federal income 
definitions. The cost of auditing state returns was greatly 
diminished, by having reduced the amount of extra effort 
that once went into searching out those parts of a state 
return that were not subject to federal audit inspection.
The cost of enforcement was reduced and the degree of 
enforcement increased. Second, the new definitions mean 
that there now exists a unique relationship between federal 
income taxes paid and state tax liability. A Louisiana
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taxpayer now merely uses a table to look up state iticome 
tax liability, based on federal tax liability. This table 
still takes Into account the dollar value of personal 
exemptions In Louisiana, and the 2, 4, and 6 percent 
marginal tax brackets.^5
These gains in simplicity and ease of administration 
were not without cost. The new state income tax schedules, 
in tying state income tax liability to federal income tax 
liability, make Louisiana's state income tax revenues more 
sensitive to changes in federal income tax laws. For 
example, the special tax credit employed on federal income 
tax returns for 1975 reduced federal income tax liability, 
and in turn reduced state income tax liability. The special 
tax credit for 1976 is generally larger than that for 
1975» and hence will reduce state income tax liability by 
a larger amount. These revenue losses are on the order of 
several million dollars per year. This experience should 
not be treated as a temporary one. The federal income tax 
structure is relatively income-elastic, and thus exerts 
"fiscal drag" as income grows. Further federal income tax 
cuts are a plausible policy option to relieve this growth- 
stunting phenomenon.
2^State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue 
35th Annual Report, p. 14. Also, Department of Revenue 
1975 Tax Guide, pp. 39-41.
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Gasoline Tax
The State of Louisiana first levied a tax on gas­
oline in 1921. The tax has been levied on a cents-per- 
gallon basis throughout its history. State sales tax is 
not collected on gasoline sales. In 1948 the gasoline 
tax rate was increased from 7 cents per gallon to 9 cents 
per gallon. This additional tax was repealed in 1952.
The tax rate remained at the 7 cent3 per gallon level unti] 
the legislature voted a 1 cent per gallon Increase, which 
became effective January, 1969, and remains in effect at 
this writing. Exemptions from the tax are minor, but tax 
rebates are allowed for certain users. As noted in 
Public Affairs Research Council’s Louisiana State Tax 
Handbook, 1969* fuel used in commercial fishing, school 
buses, aviation, and agriculture is subject to a refund of 
state gasoline tax paid.2^
Federal gasoline tax was 4 cents per gallon through­
out the period 1948 to the present; state gasoline taxes 
have been deductible on federal income tax returns for the 
entire period as well. The most notable influence on 
gasoline usage, and hence on tax revenues, has been the 
increase in living standards. This rising standard of 
living has been responsible for the trend of Louisiana 
residents to own more cars, bigger cars, and to travel
^ L o u i s i a n a  state Tax Handbook: 1969. pp. 48-50.
68
longer distances. Post-war changes In life style have 
Increased the average distance from home to work; the 
nation's highway system Is significantly Improved over the 
system of 19^8. Both of these factors have led to greater 
per capita gasoline consumption. Recent rapid Increases 
In the price of gasoline have caused some decreases in the 
rate of gasoline usage, and perhaps have caused a reversal 
of the trends suggested earlier. In Chapter 4, the income 
elasticity of the gasoline tax will be analyzed.
Tobacco Tax
The state's Tobacco Tax was first levied In 1926.
In 19 48, rates were increased to a level which remained in 
effect until 1972 when rates were again increased.
Cigarettes are taxed on a unit basis: 8 cents per
pack from 1948 to 1972; thereafter, the rate Is 11 cents 
per pack. Cigars are taxed on a unit basis, but are 
scheduled as well on an atJ valorem basis: the tax per
1000 cigars Increases with the retail price of the cigar. 
Higher priced cigars pay proportionately higher effective 
tax rates, until the top schedule Is reached. Smoking
tobacco is taxed ad valorem. The schedule of taxes on this
form of tobacco is relatively flat rate: approximately
27 percent of the retail price prior to 1972, now 33 
percent of value.^7
^ Louisiana sta ,̂e Tax PP* 100-
102. Also Department of Revenue 1975 Tax Guide, p. 80.
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Reveni.es from sales of the dominant revenue 
producer, cigarettes, thus rise only as unit sales rise, 
but revenues from sales of other tobacco forms rise as 
dollar sales rise. This is an important consideration in 
inflationary periods.
Beer Tax
The beer tax in Louisiana originated in 19 33 as a 
quantity-based tax. The original rate was increased the 
following year, from $1 to $1.50 per standard barrel. The 
next change in rate occurred in 19*18, when the per barrel 
levy increased to the current rate of $10 per barrel.2®
No significant changes in the definition of the tax base 
have occurred during the period under study.
Alcoholic Beverage Tax
The same legislative act that increased the beer 
tax in 1931* enacted the taxes on other forms of alcoholic 
beverages. Unlike the beer tax, the Alcoholic Beverage 
Tax has undergone several rate changes. In 1935, 1938,
19*10, 19*18, 1956, 1964, 1968, and 1972, either rates were 
increased, or administration of tax collection was improved. 
This tax also is a levy on the quantity of goods sold.
Liquor tax rates have risen from $1.58 per gallon in 19*18 
to $1.68 per gallon in 1956, to $2.50 per gallon in 1972.
2 flLouisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969, pp. 29-30.
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Still wine rates, which depend on alcohol content, ore re 
constant from 1948 to 1968. Sparkling wines, which were 
on a variable rate basis until 1956, are now taxed $1.58
per gallon.^9
The administration of the Alcoholic Beverage Tax 
collection was improved in 1964 with a change in the 
collection procedure, from tax stamps to a tax reporting 
basis.30 The collecting authority for Alcoholic Beverage 
permits has changed three times in the period studied. 
Until 1951-52, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board 
(ALBC) collected permits, while the Department of Revenue 
collected all other beverage taxes. Prom 1952-53 to 
1955-56, the Department of Revenue collected taxes and 
permits. The ALBC collected permits again from 1956-57 to
1971-72. Since that time the Department of Revenue again 
collects all beverage taxes and permits.31
Corporate Franchise Tax
The Corporate Franchise tax originated in 1932.
The only rate changes were in 1935 and 1946. For the 
period under investigation, the tax rate was $1.50 per 
$1,000 of capital stock, surplus, undivided profits, and 
borrowed capital of firms doing business in Louisiana.
^ Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969. pp. 23-24. 
30lbld., p. 24.
3!l951-52 Department of Revenue Annual Report, 
p. 12; 1956-57 Department of Revenue Annual Report,~~p. 5.
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Non-profit firms are generally exempted, as are insurance 
companies and new industries granted sDecific waivers. As of 
1969, no new industry exemptions had been granted.32
Two factors have influenced the pattern of tax 
receipts. As new industry is exempted from this tax, its 
rate of growth would be reduced. Second, the basis of the 
tax is a firm’s capital stock of the prior fiscal year, 
and the tax is due three and one-half months later. Thus 
there can be a significant lag between the economic events 
that alter capital stock and the payment of the tax. Prior 
to a 1958 change in the due date of this tax, the time lag 
was several months l o n g e r . 33
Motor Vehicle Licenses
At the close of the administration of Governor 
Jimmy Davis, the procedure for collecting the fees for 
motor vehicle licenses was changed. Act 318 of the 1962 
Legislature made the purchase of private passenger vehicle 
licenses biennial rather than annual. This resulted in 
increased collections of these revenues in fiscal 1963-64, 
the last year of Davis' administration, and reduced collec­
tions in fiscal 1964-65* the first year of the McKeithen 
administrations. This change caused the revenues of motor 
vehicle license fees to vary in a biennial cycle. Since
32Loulslana State Tax Handbook: 1969* pp. 5-6, 33-35* 
33Ibid., pp. 33-34, 114-115.
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the due date for private passenger vehicle licenses is in 
the spring of even-numbered years, collections are greater 
in those years than in odd-numbered years. Thus a fiscal 
year beginning in an even-numbered calendar year will have 
vehicle license revenues approximately twice those of the 
preceding year. Fiscal years beginning in odd-numbered 
calendar years generate revenues from this tax only on new 
vehicle sales, on truck and trailer licenses, on tractor, 
school bus, and other commercial vehicles, all of which 
continue to purchase licenses annually. 3**
The preceeding paragraphs have outlined some of the 
more important changes that took place in the state's 
revenue structure during the period of time under investi­
gation. Emphasis was placed on identifying the shifts in 
tax revenues of the more important taxes levied by the 
state, as brought about by legislative or administrative 
action. The following section of this chapter examines 
the current structure of taxes to point out which individual 
taxes should be examined for the task of projecting future 
tax revenues.
The remaining sections of this chapter accomplish 
two objectives. Firstj it describes the process of 
collecting the data: the time series of revenues of the
taxes selected for study. Second, the time series b o  
collected are organized by logical units, generally in
3**Louislana State Tax Handbook: 1969» pp* 107-108.
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accordance with the economic factors which cause their 
revenues to change.
TAXES TO BE DELETED
The next task is to assemble from original data, 
generally State of Louisiana documents such as the 
divisional Annual Reports and Financial Statements, the 
time series for the revenues of the taxes relevant for the 
problem at hand. Where possible, these series will 
exclude all "inspection fees", as they are self-generating 
and self-sufficient. Also, the data will exclude funds 
that are strictly dedicated to be spent on behalf of the 
contributors, as these are not taxes in the true sense of 
the word, but special industry assessments.^ As mentioned 
in an earlier paragraph, those taxes collected by and 
dedicated exclusively to certain agencies are not counted. 
This study is not concerned with those taxes which the state 
government collects for local and parish governmental units. 
Thus the Chain Store Tax, the City/Parish beer and sales 
taxes, and Hotel/Motel Occupancy taxes are not considered. 
Finally, there is no need to Include in thie dissertation
^This item may seem trivial, but such taxes were 
included in the measure of Total Taxes by Public Affairs 
Research Council. See Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1956, 
pp. 82,96-97.
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those taxes which yield no revenues what soever. The following 
paragraphs will examine each of the above cases in turn.
Self-Generating Inspection 
^ees
Certain taxes levied by the State of Louisiana 
do no more than raise enough revenue to recover the cost 
of services provided. These taxes are for the most part 
inspection fees; the fees assessed are in an amount Just 
sufficient to provide the inspection services. Their 
revenues are either completely or predominately withheld 
as a cost of c o l l e c t i o n . 36 t o  project these revenues would 
serve no purpose. These taxes are self-generating and 
self-sufficient; they neither add to nor subtract from the 
ability of the state to provide other governmental goods 
or services. Thus such items as the Motor Carrier Regula­
tory Pees, Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Fees, and 
Petroleum Products Inspection Fees do not appear in the 
list of taxes studied, nor do their revenues appear in the 
measure of Total Taxes.
Special Industry Assessments
There are several levies In the State of Louisiana 
that, despite their being named taxes, and despite their 
being collected by the various state tax collection
36see State of Louisiana Financial Statement 
1973-74, pp. 20-24.
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agencies, are really no more than special industry 
assessments. The nature of these assessments Is such 
that producers, growers, and sellers of certain goods 
contribute to an advertising fund or industry development 
fund, which is then expended on behalf of the contributors. 
The so-called taxes perform no allocative, distributive, 
or stabilization function, and thus are not considered 
taxes for purposes of this dissertation. Assessments 
that fall into this category include the Sweet Potato 
Tax, Egg Tax, Soybean Tax, and Strawberry Tax. The Egg 
Tax and the Soybean Tax were authorized by the state 
legislature in 1968; the Strawberry Tax was suspended 
in 1966.37
Taxes Collected for 
Local Government
To promote efficiency of collection, the state 
provides certain collection services for subsidiary 
levels of government. In particular, the state collects 
the Chain Store Tax, the Hotel/Motel Occupancy Tax, and 
various city and parich beer and sales taxes. The local 
governmental units pay a service charge for this state 
activity. Certainly the revenues produced by the tax
^ Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969» pp. 3-^.
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collection process should not be included If the funds 
play no part in the provision of state governmental 
services. Thus, where possible, the above-named taxes 
are not included in this dissertation.
Dedicated Severance Taxes
Reasoning along similar lines, the revenues raised 
by minor severance taxes will not be included. These 
revenues remain dedicated to use by the Wild Life and 
Fisheries Department, and hence are not available for the 
provision of any governmental service other than that to 
which they are dedicated.
No-Yield Taxes
The State of Louisiana has legislated some taxes 
that now yield no tax revenues whatever. These include 
the Bank Tax and the Royalty Gas Excise Tax. The Bank 
Tax would tax at a rate of 5 percent the interest earned 
by banks which do business in Louisiana but which are 
domiciled outside the state. However, such a form of bank 
organization has been declared illegal by the Federal 
Reserve System. The Royalty Gas Excise Tax insured that 
natural gas producers did not profit by reselling royalty 
owners * interest. The tax confiscates the difference 
between the higher price realized by the producer and the 
price originally paid. This tax had no yield in 1967-68, 
but had occasionally provided a few thousand dollars 
annually. The Oleomargarine Tax and the Dog Racing Tax
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were no-yield taxes but have now been repealed.
MAJOR TAX GROUPINGS
The preceedlng section pointed out taxes which are 
of little value in a model designed to project the state's 
ability to provide governmental goods and services. This 
amounts to specifying which taxes are to be included in 
the study. They are presented alphabetically in Table 3*1, 
and by tax groups in Table 3-2. The taxes are grouped into 
some logical arrangement to reduce the number of individual 
items to analyze and forecast. This is reasonable since the 
promary aim is to achieve productive forecasts of tax 
revenues in the aggregate.
First, those taxes based on resource extraction are 
grouped together; these comprise the Severance Tax Group. 
Those taxes which stem from use of internal-combustion 
engines comprise the Automotive Tax Group. The Sumptuary 
Tax Group includes levies on beverages and tobacco products, 
since these are the goods typically singled out by most 
state legislatures, including that of Louisiana, as "sin 
taxes" for the purpose of raising tax revenues. Certain 
major taxes are treated singly: these are the Sales Tax
and the Income Tax. All other taxes comprise a residual 
group, Other Taxes. This system of organizing the state's 
taxes put practically all of its tax revenues into six 
categories. These groups and their aggregate do not include
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any funds received from federal grar.ts, Medicare or 
Medicaid, non-tax assessments, rentals, royalties, or 
bonuses, since these funds are less subject to state 
legislation and other state policy action.
The severance tax group includes Severance Tax- 
General, Severance Tax-Reforestat ion (since the data cannot 
for all years be segregated from the former), and the 
now-unconstitutional Gas Gathering Tax. This tax group 
contributed a large and stable share of Louisiana's tax
Table 3.1
List of Taxes Comprising Total Taxes
1. Alcoholic Beverage Dealer Permits
2. Alcoholic Beverage Tax
3. Anhydrous Ammonia Permits
it. Beer Permits
5. Beer Tax6. Corporate Franchise Tax
7. Electric Cooperative Fees
8. Excise License Tax





lit. Liquified Petroleum Gas Permits
15. Motor Vehicle Licenses
16. Natural Gas Franchise Tax
17. Occupational Licenses




22. Soft Drink Tax




revenue collections, ranging from .k% to 12. of Total 
Taxes during the decade of the i960's. The portion of 
total taxes contributed by these taxes rose significantly 
during the 1950's to the current level; an almost uniform 
increase can be noted from 21.7 percent in 19*18 to 31*7 
percent in 1958.
The sumptuary tax group includes the Alcoholic 
Beverage Tax, but not gallonage and inspection fees;
Alcoholic Beverage Dealer Permits; Beer Tax; Beer Permits; 
Tobacco Tax; Soft Drink Tax. Generally, dealer permits 
are included and inspection fees are not. In some years all 
three items— tax, dealer permits, and inspection fees— are 
aggregated; in others, only the tax is present. One 
reason for such vagaries in reporting is that the responsi­
bility for collecting dealer permits has oscillated between 
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and the Department of 
Revenue. Inspection fees, since they are withheld in their 
entirety as a cost of collection, are not to be included 
here, as such fees do not contribute to fiscal operations. 
Thus, considerable searching of state documents is necessary 
in order to obtain a series that contained only tax and 
dealer permits for the relevant time period, 19*t8-*19 to 
1973-7*1 *
The automotive group includes Gasoline, Special 
Fuels, and Vehicle License Taxes. The remaining ten taxes 
make up the category "Other Taxes": Corporate Franchise
Tax, Excise License Tax, Inheritance Tax, Electric Cooperative
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Pees, Gift Tax, Occupational License Taxes, Public 
Utilities Tax, Natural Gas Franchise Tax, Liquified
Petroleum Gas Permits, and Anhydrous Ammonia Permits. Thus
the taxes appropriate to this study have been grouped as 
shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3*3 displays the time series of revenues of each 
of the individual taxes listed in tables 3*1, and 3*2, and 
the time series of revenues of the Gas Gathering Tax.
Table 3*4 shows the revenues of each tax or group of taxes, 
as described above, for the period 1948 to 1974. Table 3-5 
shows the revenues of each tax or tax group as a fraction
of Total Taxes, as defined in this dissertation.
The revenues for the above twenty-four taxes only is 
measured by the category "Total T a x e s " .39 with the 
exception of the Gas Gathering Tax, a tax repealed between 
the fiscal years of 194 8-49 and 19 73-74 would therefore not 
be included in "Total Taxes". This category measures the
39Most of the taxes in this list are collected by 
the Department of Revenue, while some are collected by 
other State agencies. Thus the label "Total Taxes" as 
employed in this dissertation does not coincide with the 
total of taxeB collected by the Department of Revenue. 
Similarly, "Total Taxes" is not the same as the list of tax 
and non-tax revenues reported by the Division of Admini­
stration in its Financial Statement, which includes several 
minor taxes excluded by the definition used in this 
dissertation. The Division of Administration also includes 
in revenues received the receipts of Medicare, Medicaid, 
Rentals, Royalties and Bonuses, Unemployment Compensation, 
and Federal grants paid to the state. In earlier years, it 
was common to refer to the amount "Revenues Affecting the 
General Fund," which excluded revenues specifically dedicated 
to state agencies or projects. The new constitution removed 
almost all such dedications.
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Table 3.2 
Six Major Taxes and Tax Groups
Automotive tax group 
Gasoline tax 
Special fuels tax 















Anhydrous ammonia permits 
Corporate franchise tax 
Electric cooperative fees 
Excise license tax 
Gift tax 
Inheritance tax
Liquified petroleum gas permits 




aexcludes Certificate of Title fees 
^personal and corporate 
cincludes tax on automotive sales 
^includes dealer permits 
erepealed December 1, 1958
Table 3.3
Louisiana Tax Revenues 
(in thousands)
19U8A9 19k9/50 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/51* 1954/55
1 . Alcoholic Beverage 
Dealer Permits $ 81*9-0 $ 852.1* $ 61*2.6 $ 8 kl*. 7 $ 8 2 3 . 8 $ 871.6 $ 8 6l.k
2 . Alcoholic Beverage Taxi kllO.l 1*528.6 1*109.7 l*069.k 5078.8 5 0 0 0 . 8 k933.8
3- Anhydrous Ammonia Permits 0 0 3.0 5-8 2 2 . 0 2 6 . 1 2 9 -k
k. Beer Permits a a a 160.5 166.3 173.k 172.0
5. Beer Tax2 1 1 1 0 9 - 2 llklk. 2 1 1 1 6 5 . 3 1 1 6 6 2 . 2 1161*1*. 0 12205.1* 1 2 1 2 1 . 0
6 . Corporate Franchise Tax 361*6.0 1*1*29.6 1*891.5 531k.9 5861.1* 6k70.9 7k96.2
7. Electric Cooperative Fees 5 . k 6.3 7.6 8 .1* 8.9 9.9 1 8 . 8
8 . Excise License Tax k 3k2 . 5 3572.7 3773.0 1*397.** 1*817.1* 5290.1* 5726.2
9- Gas Gathering Tax^ U9 1 1 . 6 6133.2 7355-7 9030.7 1011*1* .5 10951.2 12kk8.3
1 0 . Gasoline Tax 38731*. 9 1*21*95-2 1*5513.8 1*9630.8 1*361*3.5 1*1*613.2 k702k.S
1 1 . Gift Tax 126. 3 1 1 0 . 1 1 2 2 .1* 121.3 1 0 0 . 8 1 5 6 . 1 119.1
1 2 . Income Tax 19051.5 18678.6 19955.3 22766.1* 18586.1* 17027.8 1 9 1 2 8 . 8
13. Inheritance Tax 1U8 2 . 0 1399.9 1597.2 1851*.5 1388.7 1997.7 21k5 . 6
Ik. Liquefied Petroleum 
Gas Periaits 16.9 1 7 - 0 23.0 30.1* 38.5 1*1*. 1 1*3.6
15. Motor Vehicle Licenses 5 8 6 2 . 1 6 3 0 6 . 2 6753-8 6 8 9 8 . 0 769'6.2 8283.9 8863.5
1 6 . Natural Gas Franchise Tax 1 0 0 . 8 1 1 2 . 2 131*. 1 1 9 2 . 0 2 3 6 . 8 2 7 0 . 0 288.3
17. Occupational Licenses 3932.1 3691.8 3817.7 3 5 1k . 8 1*1 2 0 . 8 39kk, 7 3982.k
1 8 . Public Utilities Tax lkl.8 .1* 1551.1 1 6 8L . 1 1 8 1 0 .9 2013.** 221*9 . 1 2 3 7 0 . 6
19. Sales Tax 1*1*1*20.9 1*5000.7 50335-3 51*3 0 6 . 8 59293.9 631*55,1 6k8 0 2 . 2
2 0 . Severance Tax1* U561* 52073 57196 61721 65539 6 7 kk8 .li 661*79.8
2 1 . Soft Drink Tax? 1001.7 971.1 1 0 5 1* . 8 978-3 1025.T 1099.9 1 0 1 8 . 6
2 2 . Special Fuels Tax 2U8 .1* 293.0 !*l6 . 9 583.8 635.0 6 6k . 9 760.9
23. Tobacco Tax? 15781 . 1 1 8 1 2 6 .1* 18125 . 2 18779-3 1961*8 . 6 19580.5 1959k.2
Total Taxes 20511*5.1 221763-3 238368.0 258682,3 26253k.1* 271835.1 280kk9.6
Table 3.3 (Continued)
1955/56 1956/57 1957/58 1958/59 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62
1. Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits $ 856.8 $ 878.1 $ 8 8 8 . 5 $ 870.1* $ 881*. 8 $ 903-8 $ 889-6
2. Alcoholic Beverage Tax-1- 5625-U 6097.0 6170.3 6170.7 6510.3 6191-9 6692.7
3- Anhydrous Ammonia Permits 29-0 21*. 8 21* .9 26.5 25-3 28.2 23-1
1*. Beer Permits 1 6 8 . 0 a a 173-7 176 181. 2 181*.7
5- Beer Tax2 12251*. 9 12987.0 1287**-1* 12930.1* 1331b-3 13727-7 13929-7
6. Corporate Franchise Tax 8032.!* 8823.7 10292-9 21362.1 11*312.8 1U1 1 6 .1* 15197-9
7- Electric Cooperative Fees 1.5 15.6 1 6 .U 13-3 8.1* 15.7 13-9
8. Excise License Tax 51*89.3 719*1. T 7123-0 7615.8 81*51-9 8759-2 91bl*.1*
9- Gas Gathering Tax^ 13897-6 1 6 5 6 6 . 0 18665 -9 1581*3-6 10.2 76.8 b
10. Gasoline Tax 5221*9.7 55761.6 57808.1 59750.0 61916.8 6 1 3 1 b . 0 635U0.6
11. Gift Tax 11*3.0 79.1* 151-9 90.9 110. 5 21*0. 5 150.1*
12. Income Tax 21*256.: 29281*.1 29101*. 0 2993b. 1* 30830.8 31*218. 5 1*211*8.8
13- Inheritance Tax 2562.? 2660.7 2675-1 2818.1 7201.3 1*651* -2 1*801* . 0
It. Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Permits 1*1.2 1*3.1 51.1 51*. 3 5b .8 52-2 1*9-3
15- Motor Vehicle Licenses 9673.9 10028.9 1021*5.6 10653.1* 10986.3 1 0 8 2 7 . 0 11589-8
1 6 . Natural Gas Franchise Tax 306.5 32U.1 323.9 330.1* 1307-1 8 8 1 . 8 710.7
17- Occupational’Licenses 1*217.5 1*658-1 5061.3 5163-2 533b.8 5322.5 5522.5
18. Public Utilities Tax 2603.9 2750.9 2769.1 29bl.l* 3200.5 321*9.3 3bl3.8
19- Sales Tax 73570.3 80759-2 831*18.2 81*257 -1* 881*89. 2 85356.5 90062.5
20. Severance Tax 73109-8 82517.0 79096.2 1111*36.5 136319.7 11*7 0 6 5 . 0 11*9830.1
21. Soft Drink Tax^ 1203.1* 111*8 . 5 1202.2 1186.3 1221*.1 1197.1 1222 . 3
22. Special Fuels Tax 989- 0 111*6.0 1370.5 1708.3 2006.2 2202.0 2553.3
23- Tobacco Tax^ 2071*0.5 22323.2 23399.6 21*727 .9 2671*3.1* 271*70.8 279b3 - 0
Total Taxes 312025.6 3b6077.C 352812-9 1*00059-9 1*191*19-5 1*28052- 3 1*1*9667-1
Table 3.3 (Continued)
1962/63 1963/61* 196U/65 1965/66 1 0 6 6 / 6 7 1967/68 1960/69
1. Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits $ 968.1* $ 966.7 $ 992.6 $ 1007.8 $ 1019.5 $ 1042.9 t 1049.7
2. Alcoholic Beverage Tax1 6712.8 7186.1* 5251*.9 7 7 6 5 . 0 8589.5 9 0 1 0 . 0 9370.6
3. Anhydrous Ammonia Permits 25.1* 21*. 5 22.5 27.U 23.8 24.8 23.1
1*. Beer Permits 183.1* 182. 5 1 8 3 . 2 189.1* 368.5 376.0 556.8
5. Beer Tax2 14862.3 15399.7 16790.1 1751*3.1* 1 8 6 7 8 . 9 1 9 2 1 8 . 1 20112.7
6 . Corporate Franchise Tax 15532.3 16019.8 17377.2 1 8 8 3 2 . 0 2 1 3 1 6 . 1 22128.7 23617.3
7. Electric Cooperative Fees 13.7 15.3 11.7 1 6 . 1 1 5 . 8 1 2 . 0 21.5
8 . Excise License Tax 9540.5 1021*6 . 8 11151* .1 12U75.3 14156.7 15246.1 16624.8
9- Gas Gathering Tax3 b b b b b b b
10. Gasoline Tax 65981.2 69003.2 731*01*. 1 79523.2 84602.7 88161.4 98232.7
11. Gift Tax 231.1 11*7 .1 169 . 1 215 .8 230.1* 379.0 256.3
12. Income Tax 36016.7 1*081*0 . 8 50871.1 6 2 2 1 0 . 6 70204.3 T3317.2 79095.5
13. Inheritance Tax 5336.7 l*ll*l* .1 5013.1* 511*2 . 8 5272.3 6l85.7 6 3 1 2 . 0
l4, Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Permits 1*7.9 51.2 1*8.7 55-6 53.? 59.0 8 2 . 2
15. Motor Vehicle Licenses 121*57.9 15221*. 9 10573.5 171*88.2 111*2 2 . 0 21857-0 13678.8
l6 . Natural Gas Franchise Tax 61*2.1 7U5.3 761.3 811.9 825.3 877.7 948.2
17- Occupational Licenses 5 6 8 8 . 6 5781.1* 6330.7 7000.8 7503.5 7 8 3 6 . 2 8233.5
IS. Public Utilities Tax 31*91-8 3635.8 3837.9 1*098.1* 1*21*5.6 4520.9 4835.9
19* Sales Tax 9 6 9 2 9 . 9 IOL7 L7 .8 1181*02.5 132213.5 1U6 0 0 6 . 1 152229.3 1 5 9 8 1 0 . 6
20. Severance Tax** 163159.7 172232-7 178587.5 201*973.3 213892.1 238053.0 239512.5
21. Soft Drink Tax^ 1362.5 2077.6 2170.0 21*04.1* 2685.4 2726.9 3 0 1 5 . 0
22. Special Fuels Tax 2911*, 9 3 2 6 2 . 1 3911.9 1*6 1 6 . 1 5192.4 5559.8 6 6 5 0 . 2
23* Tobacco Tax^ 29080.7 2981*6.6 31179.2 32257.3 33075.4 32870.5 33128.4
Total Taxes 1*71310. 8 501787.3 537050.5 6 1 0 8 6 8.3 6 4 9 3 8 5 . 0 702192.2 725160.3
Table 3.3 (Continued)
1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/7L
1. Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits $ 1092.1
2. Alcoholic Beverage Tax1 9707.8
3. Anhydrous Ammonia Permits 19.3
L. Beer Permits 398.1
5. 3eer Tax2 22191.0
6. Corporate Franchise Tax 25759.6
7. Electric Cooperative Fees 11.7
8. Excise License Tax 18239-9
9. Gas Gathering Tax^ b
10. Gasoline Tax 112262.0
11. Gift Tax 1*18.9
12. Income Tax 82762.2
13- Inheritance Tax 6305. 9
1L. Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Permits 71-3
15- Motor Vehicle Licenses 2 2 2 5 7 . 0
16. Natural Gas Franchise Tax 1062.9
17. Occupational*Licenses 8728.2
10. Public Utilities Tax 5157.1*
19- Sales Tax 1661*85 .1
20. Severance Tax1* 21*9070 .7
21. Soft Drink Tax5 3221.7
22. Special Fuels Tax 7580.1*
23- Tobacco Tax^ 33178.5
$ 1 1 0 2 . 2 $ 7 7 8 . 3 $ 1 1 7 2 . 0 $ 1 1 7 6 . 0
131*2 0 . 2 11*860.7 1 5 6 6 0 . 8 1 5 7 0 5 . 0
2 0 . 9 2 3 . 6 2 2 . 3 2 1 . 9
1*17.2 UL5.lt 1*53.3 3 2 1 . 3
2 1 9 5 7 . 9 2 2 8 2 7 - 1 2 3 8 7 L . 6 2 5 3 2 1 . 2
281*35.7 2 9 0 9 8 . 5 3 0 6 U7 . 8 3U0L6.7
1 6 . 3 1 9 - 8 21*.2 1 U. 7
1 9 6 2 6 . 5 21523.1* 2 3 9 8 9 . 2 2 6 2 3 7 . 7
b b b b
1 1 6 1 7 8 . 8 1 2 5 1 5 1 . 0 1 3 5 7 6 6 . 8 1 3 5 5 6 9 . 8
5 2 3 . 3 1*87.8 1 1 3 9 - 1 6 3 7 . 7
1 3 3 1 6 5 . 8 I 8 L8 7 6 . 6 1 6 8 1 9 7 . 7 1 6 7 5 5 8 . 7
7021*. 5 9 L l l . 0 1 1 2 3 1 . 1 1 1 3 5 6 . 3
7 3 . 5 T2 . 6 9 8 . 9 1 0 L.8
161*10. 5 2 3 9 L8 . 3 1 8 6 8 0 . 1 2 8 0 2 7 . 5
1 2 1 3 . 2 1 U1 2 . 2 1 7 2 6 . 5 3 1 1 8 . L
9 0 2 0 . 9 9 7 3 1 . 8 1 0 5 2 B .7 1 1 U8 5 . 5
5 6 2 3 . 7 6 1 7 3 . 1 6 9 3 6 . 0 8 3 0 L.L
2 3 3 T 5 8 . 9 2 T 7 7 6 5 . 5 3 0 8 8 1 7 . 6 3 3 7 7 3 0 . 7 C
251*878.0 2 LL297 .1 2 6 5 3 9 9 . 2 3 8 7 8 5 0 . 0
31*1*7.9 3 5 7 8 . 3 3 7 2 5 - 2 UUL5.2
81*12.2 9 8 2 L. 5 1 1 2 1 5 . L 1 29LL. 9
1*1*581. 5 L7 L6 L.O L99L5.2 5 1 9 1 0 . 1
Total Taxes 775981*.? 919309.6 1033760.6 1109251.7 1263889.0
Table 3.3 (Continued)
Source: Division of Adninlstration Financial Statement. Fiscal year 19 -19 * and Department
of Revenue Annual Report. Fiscal year 19 -19
^Excludes gallonage and inspection fees 
^Excludes parish tax
^Rate doubled by 1938 regular session; tax suspended In 1936 special session, effective 
December 1, 1938
LIncludes Severance Tax — Reforestation.
^Includes dealer permits
^Included in Beer Tax
^No revenues after tax repealed
cParish service charge inseparable in 1973-7**. Sales tax separated from motor vehicle 
sales tax. Parish charge included in latter.
(X>o\
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1 9U8 /U9 $ 1U120.9 $ 1*91*75.6 $ 19051.5 $ 1*1*81*5-1* $32851.1 $15101.2 $ 2057U5.T
191*9 / 5 0 1*5000.7 58206.2 1 8 6 7 8 . 6 U9 0 9U,1* 35892.7 1U890.7 221763.3
1 9 5 0 / 5 1 50335-3 61*5 5 1 . 7 19955-3 5268U . 5 35297.6 I6OU3 . 6 238868.0
1 9 5 1 / 5 2 51* 306 . 8 70751.7 2 2 7 6 6 .1* 57112.6 3 6U9U .u 17250.U 258682.3
1 9 5 2 / 5 3 59293-9 75683.5 10586.1* 51971*.7 38387.2 18608.7 262531*.U
1 9 5 3/51* 6 3I* 5 5 -1 78399-6 17027.8 53562.0 38931.6 201*59. 0 271035.1
195W55 61*302.2 -75928.1 19128.8 5 6 6 6 9 . 3 38701.0 22220.2 2 8 0UU9 . 6
1955/56 73570.2 87007.!* 21*256.1 62912.6 1*001*9. 0 231*30.2 312025.6
1956/57 80759-2 99083.0 2928U.1 66936.5 U3U33.8 26580.1* 3U6077.0
1957/59 831*18.2 97762.1 29181*. 0 69^21*.2 1*1*5 3 5 . 0 28U89-1* 352812.9
1958/59 81*257 . 1* 127280.1 29931*. 1* 72112.6 1*6059-  u 1*01*1 6 . 0 1*00059.9
1959/60 33489.2 136329.9 30830.8 7UQ09.3 1*8852 .9 1*0007 .4 1*191*19.5
1960/61 85356.5 ll*7Ul .3 34218.5 71*31*3 . 0 1*9672. 5 37320.0 1*28052.3
1961/62 90062.5 11*9880.1 4 ? 11* 8 . 8 77633.7 50862.0 39030.0 U 9 6 6 7 .I
1962/63 96929.9 163159.? 3 6 0 4 6.7 81351* -0 53170.1 1*065 0.1* 1*71310.8
1 9 6 3 /6^ 101*747 . 3 172232.1 • ~ : - 0 . e 871*95 -? 55659.5 1*0811 . 3 501787.3
196V65 i:6**C2 . 5 176587.5 5C;-71.1 87339.5 56570.0 1*1*729.9 537050.5
1 9 6 5/66 132213- 5 20«973-3 6 2 2 1 0 . 6 101627.5 6 1 1 6 7 . 3 1*8676.1 6 1 0 8 6 8 . 3
1 9 6 6 / 6 7 196006 .1 213692.1 70201*. 3 101217.1 61*1*17.2 5361*8 .2 61*9335.0
1967/69 152229.3 238053.0 73817.2 115578.2 652UI* .1* 5727.0.1 702192.2
1963/69 15 9610.6 239512.5 79095-5 II8 5 6 1 . 7 67233.2 60 9 5 1 *. 8 725168.3
1969/70 166485.1 21*9070.7 82762.2 11*2099.1* 69789.2 65778.1 77598U . 7
1970/71 233759.9 251*878.0 133165.8 11*1 0 0 1 . 5 81*926.9 71578.5 919309.6
1971/72 277765-5 21*1*297.1 181*876.6 158923.8 89953.8 7791*3.8 1033760.6
1972/73 303817.6 265399.2 138197.7 165662.3 9U831.1 8631*3 . 8 1109251.7
1 9 7I/7I 337730.7 387650.0 167553.7 1765U2.2 98879.3 95323.1 1 2 6 3 8 8 9 . 0
1Line 19, Table 3.3 2 Lines 9,20, Table 3-3 3Line 12, Table 3.3 **Lines 10,15, 
22, Table 3.3 5Lines 1 ,2 , It, 5 ,21,2 3 , Table 3-3 ^Llnes 3 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,11,13 , l1*, 16 ,1T , 18 ,
Table 3.3 ?Lines 1-23, Table 3.3
Table 3.5














1 9 ^ 8 A 9 . 216 .21*0 .093 .210 . 1 6 0 .073
191*9/50 .203 . 2 6 2 .081 .221 . 1 6 2 . 0 6 7
1950/51 .211 .270 . 081* .221 .11*8 .067
1951/52 .210 .271* . 088 .221 .11*1 .067
1952/53 . 2 2 6 .288 . 071 .198 .11*6 .071
1953/51* .233 . 2 8 8 .063 .197 .11*3 .075
195V55 .231 .281 . 0 6 8 .202 .138 .079
1955/56 .2 36 .279 . 0 7 8 .202 .131 .075
1956/57 .233 .286 .085 .193 . 1 2 6 .077
1957/58 .236 .277 .083 .197 . 1 2 6 . 08l
1958/59 .211 . 318 . 075 .180 .115 .101
1959/60 .211 .325 .071* .179 . 116 .095
1960/61 .195 .311 .080 -171* . 116 .087
1961/62 .2 00 -333 .09'. . 173 .113 .087
1 9 6 2 / 6 3 . 206 .316 .076 .173 .113 . 0 8 6
1963/61* .2 08 . 31*3 .081 .171* .111 .081
1961/65 .220 . 333 .095 .161* .105 .083
1965/66 . 216 .336 .102 . 1 6 6 .100 .080
1 9 6 6 / 6 7 .225 - 329 . 1 0 8 .156 .099 . 083
1967/68 .217 .339 .105 . 1 6 5 .093 . 0 8 2
1960/69 .220 .330 .109 .163 .093 .081*
1969/70 .215 .321 .107 .183 .090 . 0 8 5
1970/71 .251 .277 .11*5 .153 .092 .078
1971/72 .269 .236 .179 .151* .087 .075
1972/73 .273 .239 .170 .11*9 .085 . 0 7 8
1973/71 .267 .307 .133 .11*0 .078 .075
Source: Table 3.1*
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inconsistencies brought about by change of 'jase, change of 
rate, or change of efficiency of administration, but will 
not reflect revenues of taxes not now in effect.
This measure of Total Taxes includes some funds 
which were restricted in use by legislation under the old 
constitution or amendments to it. Thus sizeable amounts of 
tax revenue generated by the taxes under consideration here 
could not be utilized freely by legislators. It might 
appear more practical to estimate general revenues and 
dedicated revenues separately, and in fact, such was 
commonly done in past y e a r s . H o w e v e r ,  two considerations 
lead this study to continue efforts to estimate the aggregate 
Total Taxes, as defined earlier. First, if dedicated 
revenues exceed expenditures, excess funds are returned to 
the general fund in many dedications. Should dedicated 
revenues fall short of anticipated expenditures, appropria­
tions from the general fund would fill the gap. Thus the 
general fund serves as the account-balancing agent even 
where funds are dedicated. The total of tax revenues would 
be important even in this case. Second, the new constitution 
contains considerably less revenue dedication than was 
present under the old. Thus the general fund is nearer to 
the aggregate total taxes than was previously true. For
^Note the previous importance of "Revenues 
Affecting the General Fund" in many tax revenue projections 
by state government and private researchers.
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both reasons, it is relevant to work with the concept of 
tax revenues, whether dedicated or not, used to provide 
public goods and services which perform some stabilization, 
distribution, or allocation function. The term Total Taxes 
still excludes those self-supporting items as inspection 
fees and special severance taxes. Total Taxes is thus an 
aggregate that has been developed for the purposes of 
this dissertation. It is not the measure "Total Taxes" 
used by Public Affairs Research Council or by the state's 
Financial Statement. Rather, it is the total, for each 
year, of those taxes levied by the state, less inspection 
fees and other self-financing assessments, which are 
currently in existence. Thus this measure will be less 
than total taxes reported by other researchers in earlier 
years, as it will exclude taxes levied in those years but 
which are now repealed. This provides a consistent 
revenue base on which to make forecasts of future tax 
receipts.
Chapter 4
ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S TAX STRUCTURE
The previous chapter examined in detail the Indi­
vidual taxes levied by the State of Louisiana. One purpose 
of that examination was to enable a logical arrangement of 
the many taxes Into a few tax groups. The base for fore­
casting future tax revenues was divided into six functional 
categories: Sales Tax, Severance Taxes, Income Tax,
Automotive Tax Group, Sumptuary Tax Group, and Other Taxes. 
A second major purpose was to provide details of the rates 
and bases of the individual taxes, so that theories of tax 
revenue generation could be formulated.
The construction of these models of tax revenue 
generation for the six taxes and tax groups is a major 
purpose of this chapter. The first section of this chapter 
investigates the relationships between changes in revenues 
of each of these six categories and movements in total 
personal Income and other Income measures. These models 
explicitly Include, where appropriate, Income elasticities 
which vary with time, with Income, or with legislative or 
administrative changes in the Individual taxes. These 
models are tested in Chapter 5- The best regression fits 
are used in Chapter 6 to forecast future revenues of the 
six taxes and tax groups.
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The second purpose of this chapter is to analyze 
possible movement in the income elasticity of the tax 
structure of the State of Louisiana. This is accomplished 
in two stages. First, the Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem 
is set forth and demonstrated by hypothetical cases. This 
theorem suggests that, under certain conditions, the 
weighted average income elasticity of a tax structure rises 
with the level of income. The Upward-Bound Elasticity 
Theorem is then combined with the models previously 
constructed. The result is a model of the time path of the 
income elasticity of a hypothetical tax structure similar 
to that of the State of Louisiana. This model demonstrates 
that, even where the income elasticities of some individual 
taxes may decline, the income elasticity of the entire tax 
structure may continue to rise.
MODELS OF REVENUE GENERATION 
FOR LOUISIANA TAXES 
AND TAX GROUPS
Each of the tax groups being estimated must be 
represented by a mathematical model. This model must meet 
four criteria. First, it should provide for estimates of 
future tax revenues that are of a reasonable and consistent 
quality. Second, the model should provide for a test of 
the hypothesis that tax revenues for the group in question 
are sensitive to movements of some measure of Income.
Third, the model should provide for a test of the hypothesis 
that the Income-elasticity of the tax or tax group In
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question varies with time or income in a predictable manner. 
Fourth, the equation chosen to represent the determination 
of tax revenues for a particular tax or group must make 
good economic sense, yet not be an identity or tautology.
The second and third criteria are rather direct; it is easy 
to ascertain whether they have been met by a particular 
equation. The first and fourth criteria are much more 
Judgmental: how does one measure the "reasonableness" of
an estimate, or grade the "economic good sense" of a 
particular equation?
The basic form of the models treated the revenue 
of each specific tax or group of taxes as the dependent 
variable. In this way, estimates of the revenue of each 
tax or tax group were made independently, then aggregated.
The independent variables were those whose behavior should 
logically have a significant influence on the level of tax 
revenue of the tax or tax group in question. Thus some 
measure of income was present as an independent variable.
For the most part, total personal income was the measure 
chosen. In some equations, this measure was decomposed into 
two or three multiplicative components, so that the "income 
variable" beceme two or three independent variables. If 
the tax rate had been changed during the study period, 
efforts were made to include it as an Independent variable. 
Regressing tax revenue against only the tax rate and tax 
base in log-linear form was avoided. This is obviously a 
tautology, represented mathematically by the form TR - r*B.
Several dummy variables were Introduced to reflect 
shifts In revenues brought about by factors other than the 
variables already described as the set of independent 
variables. A dummy variable Is normally a zero-one variable 
zero when not present, one otherwise. In logarithmic form 
this is satisfied by using a zero-one power of ten, since 
log^o 1*0, and log^o 10»1. Assume that the model
Y » A.Xia (4.1) 
is incorrectly specified, and that it requires the addition 
of the shift variable X2; the resulting model will appear 
as Y - A.X1a .10bX2. When X2-0, 10bX2-io°« 1, and does not 
change the value of the independent variable Y. When 
X2*l, 10bx2"10b , and does affect the regression by showing 
the Impact of X2. The regression is linear in its log­
arithms :
log Y » log A + a*log X^ + b-X2 (4.2)
If the model Is still not properly specified, and requires 
an elasticity shift variable, it can be Incorporated into 
the model as
Y - A*X!a+cX2*10bX2 (4.3) 
This model is also log-linear:
log Y » log A + a*log X^ + cX2 *log Xj + b•X2 (4.4)
The constant log A represents the value of Y which is
independent of X^ and X2. The coefficient a is the 
elasticity of Y with respect to The term b X2 is the
shift In the regression intercept (log A) due to the 
Influence of X2.
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Since the term b*X2 is a logarithm., its numerical 
value indicates a percentage shift in the value of Y, 
rather than an absolute shift. The term finally, is
the change in the elasticity of Y with respect to X^.
The models were generally constructed in log-linear 
form. This method provides the best fit in most cases, but 
equally important, is preferable a priori. This latter 
fact is best explained by the following hypothetical example. 










Linear versus Logarithmic Curve 
Fitting and Extrapolation
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and time, and shows the straight line representing the 
simple linear regression of tax revenues on time. While 
this fit may seem quite good, it is inferior, for purposes 
of forecasting, to a log-linear regression. Forecasts taken 
from this regression will be along the vector A, while 
actual values will be near the vector B. The linear 
regression, even for forecasts Just beyond the observation 
period, seriously understates the growth in tax revenues, 
and hence understates the income elasticity of the tax.
It Is apparent that a tax revenue function which 
has an exponential shape on a linear scale has a linear 
appearance on a logarithmic scale. The vector of forecasts 
and the vector of future values will be much closer together. 
Thus the log-linear form of regression can be used to 
reduce forecast error, and to improve regression fit, in 
cases where the underlying trend is exponential in nature.
Long-term predictions of tax revenues will require 
long-term predictions of income in order to establish 
those gross revenue movements. For this purpose, it is 
appropriate to separate total personal income, or other 
appropriate income measure, Into various components. For 
example, total personal income divided by total population 
equals per capita Income, and that total personal income 
divided by the consumer price Index equals real per capita 
income. Combining these two results, it is apparent that 
total personal income is the product of three factors: real 
per capita Income, population, and the consumer price
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index. Regressing revenues of a specific tax or segregate 
of taxes against these three variables will yield not one 
elasticity, but three partial elasticities. The regression 
will show the responsiveness of tax revenues to movements 
in each of the three factors separately.
The important reason for treating total personal 
income as the product of three component parts is that it 
may provide better estimates of future tax revenue movements. 
Since an important aim of this project is revenue estimates, 
this fact alone would make the disaggregation preferable.
A one percentage point rise in total personal income could 
be due solely to a movement in any one of the component 
parts. A one percent change in population might not yield 
the same change in revenues as a one percent change in real 
per capita income or a one percent change in the price 
level, all else being equal. Total personal income would 
rise one percent in each case, but the tax revenue impact 
might be different in all three cases. Thus the cause of 
the change in income needs to be considered.
The disaggregation provided adds flexibility to the 
model. In predicting future tax revenues, the future 
values of total personal income must also be estimated. As 
these estimates are in error, so are the resulting revenue 
estimates. The disaggregation used here allows for more 
useful alternative series. For example, a predicted 
series might be altered by examining the effect of only a 
changed rate of growth in population, all else remaining
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equal. Alternative series might be compile.; using the 
same real per capita income and total population figures, 
but reflecting different future price level movements.
The following example illustrates the regression of 
tax revenues against the independent variables per capita 
income (PCI) and population (POP), and shows the method of 
incorporating partial elasticities that change over time.
TR - A*PCIa *POPb (4.5)
The tlme-dependency of the elasticities is found in the 
coefficient a; a * a^'d-St), where t is the variable time. 
Thus the equation h.5 can be rewritten as
TR = A*PCIa'^1“6t^.POPb (4.6)
log TR “ log A + a>(l-6t)*log PCI + b.log POP
(4.7)
log TR * log A + a'log PCI -r\t log PCI + b*log POP
(4.8)
wheren replaces a"6. Equation 4.8 is linear in its log­
arithms. Thus to incorporate the time-dependent elasticities, 
an additional variable t*PCI was added. An additional 
parameter must now be estimated; the set of parameters for 
equation 4.8 is a', 6, and b. The parameter 6 can be found 
by returning to the relationship n “ a^6. The equivalent 
model, when Income is broken down into three components, Is
TR - A* (RPY* CPI)a"f1*,5t5 *POPb (4.9)
which becomes
log TR *■ log A + adogRPY + adogCPI - adlogRPY
- adt*logCPI + b-logPOP (4.10)
Another necessary step is to ascertain whether there
is an analytical way to reconstruct the income elasticity 
if the appropriate regression utilized as independent 
variables not total personal income> but per capita income 
and population, or real per capita income, consumer price 
index, and population. As the following simple example 
shows, a weighted average of the partial elasticities is the 
total elasticity with respect to total personal income.
partial elasticity of tax revenue with respect to popula­
tion (e^) be 2. Let per capita income grow 10 percent per 
year, and let the partial elasticity of tax revenue with 
respect to per capita income (e^) be 1. These assumptions 
comprise the model
Over the time interval of one year, total personal income 
will grow (1.01 x 1.10 - 1) x 100 ■ 11.1 percent, while tax 
revenue will grow 1% x 2 + 10% x 1 * 2% + 10% * 12 percent.
For small growth rates, this result can be approximated by 
£y - ci-gl + e2-82 (l).l
«1 + 62
In the general case, the total income elasticity can be 
approximated by the formula
Let population grow 1 percent each year, and let the
TR - A PCI1 POP2 (4.11)
The total income elasticity will then be
H J L  - 1.081
100
where the e.̂ are the partial elasticities of the independent 
variables, and the g^ are their respective growth rates.
Thus the total elasticity is a weighted average of the 
partial elasticities, with growth rates being the weights.
Thus Chapter 4 investigates the relationships 
between income movements and income elasticity movements 
for each of the major taxes and tax groups. The question 
of whether such an income elasticity exists, and if so, 
whether it is influenced by income movements Is entertained. 
In turn, the discussion focuses on the Sales Tax, the 
Severance Tax, the Income Tax, the Automotive Tax Group, 
the Sumptuary Tax Group, and the residual group Other Taxes.
Sales Tax
Prior to 1970, the State Sales and Use Tax would 
have been considered regressive with respect to income, be­
cause the two percent levy applied to most goods and services 
sold at retail. As it applied only to consumption items, 
the tax would have tended to distort the savlngs-consumption 
choice, and tax relatively more heavily those households 
that, voluntarily or not, had the higher consumption/income 
ratios. This led to the conclusion that the sales tax 
was regressive with respect to an income base, exacting a 
larger percentage of smaller incomes than of larger ones, 
as larger incomes had generally lower consumption/income 
ratios.
When the state sales tax rate was increased to 
three cents in 1970, prescription drugs, prosthetic devices,
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and food consumed off premises were exempted from this 
surtax. In 1973, these Items were exempted from the two 
cent state sales tax as well. The food exemption especially 
should serve to moderate or erase the regressivlty of the 
sales tax with respect to income, In that a variable expen­
diture exclusion is introduced. It Is believed that the 
sales tax as now enforced is very nearly proportional with 
respect to income.^ However, the regressivlty or progres- 
sivity of a tax does not bear directly on its income 
elasticity.
If the sales tax is roughly proportional to Income, 
the percentage of Income paid in sales taxes will be 
approximately the same at all Income levels. A one percent 
increase in disposable Income will generate a one percent
Increase In consumption of taxed goods and in sales tax
revenues. The marginal propensity to consume taxed goods
Is equal to the average propensity to consume taxed goods.
The relationship between Income and consumption of goods 
subject to state sales tax Is thus proportional.
Disposable income does not rise as rapidly as 
adjusted gross income or total personal income, due to the 
progressive impact of federal Income tax liabilities. Thus 
the consumption function assumes a flatter slope as Income
1Roger L. Burford, "Relative Merits of Income and 
General Sales Taxes for Louisiana— Some General Principles" 
Louisiana Business Review, XXXVIII (July, 197*0* 3.
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grows, and successive one percent increases in total 
personal income generate ever smaller percentage increases 
in sales tax revenues.
As living standards rise, the portion of income 
spent on subsistence declines. Pood, housing, and pre­
scription drugs are part of that subsistence, and all are 
now exempt from the state sales tax. Thus, over time, an 
ever larger portion of income earned in Louisiana becomes 
subject to the sales tax. This statement should hold true 
even though absolute expenditures on these exempt items 
also increase over time, as the standard of subsistence 
changes. These exemptions should make the sales tax elastic 
with respect to income; the decline of exempt items relative 
to total income should give the sales tax an increasing 
income elasticity. Sales tax revenue is proportional to 
consumption spending (spending on taxable commodities), 
and takes the form
TRsal * rs*c» (4.1*0
where TRgal ” sales tax revenues, in dollars
rs ■= the sales tax rate, and
C » spending on taxed goods.
The paragraphs above have given reasons for modelling 
the sales tax, not with a constant income elasticity, but 
with an income elasticity which varies with total personal 
income or time. Thus a consumption function of the form
C - TPIbt (4.15)
where TPI - total personal income, in dollars
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b = parameter determining oime path of income 
elasticity
and t = time index,
might be appropriate. Thus the following basic model was 
suggested.
TRsal “ r3a',rplbt (4.16)
where a * rate elasticity.
This equation, in logarithmic form, appears as
log (TRsal) “ a*log r + b*t*log TPI (4.17)
The shift in sales tax revenues which occurred due
to the change to collections at wholesale rather than
retail was modelled by the dummy variable D2. Revenue
growth changed noticeably when food and prescription drugs
were exempted, first from the third cent of the state sales
tax, then from all three cents of the state sales tax.
Both administrative and legislative base shifts were
accomodated by the dummy variable D6. The income elasticity
of the sales tax should have increased with the introduction
of those exemptions. Incorporating both dummy variables
into the sales tax model resulted in the following equation:
TRsai » ra.TPIbt+dD2+eD6.10fD2.10gD6 (4.18)
Two more models of the sales tax revenue generation 
function will now be examined. Income elasticity is viewed 
as a constant, but subject to shifts. A consumption 
function which meets this criterion is
C » Abt*TPIc (4.19)
In this model, A Is a constant representing the relation­
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ship between total personal income and taxable expenditures.
The income elasticity is not time-dependent. The wholesale
collections shift variable D2 was omitted from these
formulations. This function resulted in the sales tax
revenue equation
TR , = r a - A b t * TPIc+dD2+eD6 . xof*0 2 -10gD6 (4.20)sal s
The log-linear form of this model is
log TRsai * a-log r3 + b't+c*logTPI + d •(D2•logTPI)
+ e(D6 *logTPI) + fD2 + gD6 (4.21)
where b " = b log A. The multiplicative term dD6 shows 
the shift in revenues due to the exemption of food and 
prescription drugs from the sales tax.
Severance Tax
The various severance taxes are levied on the 
extraction of generally non-renewable resources. At fixed 
tax schedules, the tax revenues generated can be viewed as 
dependent on the value or volume of the resource removed.
For a variety of reasons, this tax base is not related to 
the level of income in Louisiana.
The extraction of some taxed commodities is 
occurring at near maximum rates, limited by availability 
of the resource. Extraction of other resources, notably 
natural gas, is at rates well below maximum, limited by 
factors more political than income-related. Much of the 
extracted material is exported from the state of Louisiana; 
this volume is largely independent of the level of income
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In Louisiana. For the above reasons, it Is appropriate 
that the models constructed here assign severance tax 
revenues an Income elasticity of zero, that remains zero 
over all income levels.
One of the two major objectives of this dissertation 
is to investigate the role of income growth in determining 
future levels of tax revenues. While changes in severance 
tax revenues are not thought to be caused by changes in 
economic activity, it remains necessary to forecast 
severance tax revenues in order to forecast future levels of 
total tax revenues. Since severance tax forecasts will be 
by methods other than those developed elsewhere in this 
dissertation, the forecasts which follow are largely drawn 
from those recently done by Beard and Scott, and by 
Richardson.2
Income Tax
This dissertation will attempt in later sections of 
this chapter to analyze some of the relevant character­
istics of the tax structure of the state of Louisiana. One 
of the most important single taxes is the income tax, which 
has both personal and corporate components. The following
^Thomas R. Beard and Loren C, Scott, "Revenue 
Projections for Louisiana State Government, Fiscal Years 
197^-75-1979-80," Louisiana Business Review, XXXIX 
(February 1975), 2-5, 11-1*1, 16; and James A. Richardson, 
"Louisiana's Revenue Outlook," Louisiana Business Review,
XL (March, 1976), 2-5, 8.
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paragraphs will examine some of the economic character­
istics of the state's personal income tax payers; later 
paragraphs will study the corporate income tax.
Theoretical Considerations. It is the primary 
purpose of this section to discuss the possible range of 
values of the Income elasticity of the Louisiana personal 
income tax. The initial points to consider are first, that 
the personal Income tax Is progressive in that rates are 
moderately graduated with respect to income and there Is an 
income exclusion; and second, that the effective rate of 
taxation is reduced by the fact that federal income taxes 
paid are a special deductible item tantamount to an 
exclusion for state income tax purposes. It should be noted 
that the Income elasticity of the Income tax exceeds unity, 
by virtue of the above-mentioned exclusions and graduated 
rates.
The actual income elasticity of the income tax at 
a point in time could be computed as follows:
1. determine total tax paid and total income 
earned by taxpayers in each of the three (2,4,6 
percent) marginal brackets
2 . compute average rate of taxation for each of 
these brackets
3- compute the average elasticity for each bracket, 
using the relationship:
Ey = Marginal tax rate * Average tax rate
4. compute the average elasticity by weighting 
each elasticity by the respective portion of income 
earned by taxpayers in that marginal bracket.
Two points should be noted here. First, the weights of
Item 4 can be expected to change over time. During a
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general rise In money Incomes, more taxpayers will move to 
higher tax brackets than vice versa. In particular, the 
weight appropriate for the open-ended 6 percent marginal 
tax rate bracket should rise during periods of rising money 
incomes. Second, incomes below the taxable threshold 
represent a fourth marginal bracket (0 percent); elasticity 
for this group is indeterminate. Thus the elasticity 
computed above applies only to those householders who 
actually had state income tax liability.
An alternative computation would measure the average 
tax rate of each tax return, compute the elasticity for 
each taxpayer, and compile the weighted average of all 
returns, using shares of taxed income as the weights.
Lacking facility for such a census, the same result might 
be achieved by use of a stratified sample of Louisiana 
taxpayers.
The above techniques give a value to the income 
elasticity of the state's personal income tax at a single 
point in time, and hence at a particular pattern of income 
distribution. The discussion below points out the minimum 
and maximum values of elasticity that might be obtained 
over time and over different income distribution patterns.
Income elasticity of the income tax is generally 
larger where income is equally distributed among all 
residents of the state than for any other distribution of 
the same aggregate income. The following statements provide 
an Intuitive proof of this hypothesis. At this distribution,
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all Individuals would pay the same marginal tax rate. The 
average tax rate would be at its minimum value, assuming 
a progressive schedule of tax rates. If any one individual, 
by virtue of an income redistribution, earned enough more 
than the other individuals to be taxed at the next higher 
marginal rate, the average rate of taxation (and tax 
revenue) would rise, and income elasticity would fall. 
Similarly, an income redistribution placing one individual 
only into a lower bracket, tax revenue also rises.^ Again, 
the average tax rate rises and income elasticity falls.
The following hypothetical cases illustrate some 
preliminary findings concerning the income elasticity of 
the income tax. The first example (Case A) makes the 
following assumptions:
1. the household consists of husband, wife, and 
one other dependent
2. the household takes standard exemptions
3. the household ha3 deductible expenses equal to 
the greater of the standard deduction (15? of 
AGI, $2000 maximum) or 10? of AGI
the household files a Joint return
5 - perfect income equality exists.
To illustrate the calculations, let adjusted 
gross income (AGI) in each household be $10,000. Utilizing 
197*1 tax laws, Federal income tax is $1047.50. Louisiana
3as sume n taxpayers each earning an income that is the 
dividing line between marginal tax rates ri and r2* Let n-1 
taxpayers each gain an amount of income 6 . The taxpayer loses 
an amount of income (n-l)i . Tax revenue changes by r2 *5 (n-l) 
less ri(n-l)6. If the tax Is progressive, r2 > ri, and tax 
revenue rises.
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income tax » .02 x $2,552.50 ■ $51*05.^ The average tax 
rate is |.̂.̂ -̂Q.5 . .51 percent. The income elasticity is 
therefore 2 percent * .51 percent - 3-92.
Now let income change by 1 percent to $10,100.
Federal taxes become $1063.65* Louisiana taxable income 
becomes $2626.5 Louisiana income tax will be .02 x 
2626.35 ■ $52.53. The  ̂qqq = 1 percent increase in 
income generated a 52.^3~51•05 = 2.89 percent increase in 
state income tax revenues. Thus the effective elasticity 
is not 3.92, but 2.89. The reason for the difference is 
that a one percent increase in adjusted gross income does 
not generate a one percent increase in income taxable in 
Louisiana. For example, an extra dollar earned in this 
case yields ($1.00 - $0 .15) x .19 = $0.16 in federal taxes,
a deductible item. At an AQI of $10,100, the marginal tax
rate is 19 percent. Income taxable in Louisiana rises by
^Taxable Income in Louisiana would be $2,552.50.
This figure is obtained as follows:
$10,000 Adjusted Gross Income
-1,000 Itemized Deductions
-5,400 Personal Exemptions
-1.047.50 Federal Income Tax Paid
$ 2,552.50 Income Taxable in Louisiana
5The calculations are as follows:
$10,100 Adjusted Gross Income
-1,010 Itemized Deductions
-5,400 Personal Exemptions
-1,064 Federal Income Tax Liability
$ 2,626 Income Taxable in Louisiana
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$1.00 - $0.10 - $0,162 * $0.7385. This reduces the measured 
elasticity from 3.92 to -7385 x 3.92 * 2.89, the actual 
percentage change in tax revenues. The two measures of 
income elasticity arise because two definitions of the 
concept are being used. The larger value of Income elas­
ticity is calculated by ey = marginal tax rate * average tax 
rate. The smaller value, the "effective income elasticity," 
is calculated by
z ' m  % change in tax revenue 
y % change in income *
where "income" refers to adjusted gross income.
Income elasticity would be undefined until house­
hold income reached almost $6600, since the tax liability 
and hence the average tax rate are zero. For an income 
incrementally larger than $6600, income elasticity would 
become infinitely large, declining as household income grows. 
At a household income of approximately $36,000, elasticity 
will have fallen to its minimum value in this range, as the 
marginal rate becomes 4 percent for further increases in 
income. Elasticity at this point will be 1.87- At an 
incrementally larger income, e doubles, to 3-7^; then 
declines toward a second minimum at incomes of approximately 
$275,000. The average effective tax rate at this extreme 
would be 1.31 percent— lower than in other brackets because 
of deduction of progressive federal taxes. Elasticity at 
this extreme will be « 3.06, A $1 increase in AGI
increases taxable income by 90$; increases federal income 
taxes by .7 x 90 3 63$; and increases Louisiana taxable
Ill
Income by $1 - 10$ - 63$ * 27<t - Louisiana taxes rise by 
.04 x .27 “ 1$. Even though the marginal rate is 4 percent, 
it applies to only 27$ of each new dollar of AGI. The $1 
increase in income represents an Increase of .000364 
percent. The 1$ rise in Louisiana Income taxes represents 
a rise of .000278 percent. This ratio Is the income
elasticity *000 364 = .764. As income increases beyond this 
second breaking point, elasticity begins a steady decline. 
However, very few Individuals in Louisiana are taxed at the 
70 percent maximum federal income tax bracket. Such large 
income values as these are for the most part, not Important. 
The path of the income elasticity is shown In Table 4.1.
Similar calculations, under different assumptions 
concerning the taxpaying units, are made to generate two 
additional cases. Case B is typical of a Louisiana family 
unit; Case C Is typical of an unrelated Individual. Series 
B assumes a household taking four exemptions, filing 
jointly and Itemizing deductions equalling 15 percent of 
AGI. Series C assumes a taxpaying unit with one exemption, 
itemizing deductions totalling 15 percent of AGI. The 
calculations for cases B and C are summarized in Tables 4.2 
and 4.3. The Z y '  values are plotted and shown for comparison 
In Figure 4.2.
Thus the elasticity of the state personal income tax 
is a variable dependent on income and tax filing conditions. 
It is Important to discuss how much that elasticity might 
change during the relevant time frame for these projections.
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Table 4.1
Relationship between Adjusted Gross Income 
and Income Elasticity of the Louisiana 
Income Tax: Case A
Series A









$ 6600 $ 511 $ 0 0
8000 705 22 7.30 6.12
10000 1048 51 3.92 2.89
12000 1371 81 2.98 2.05
16000 2146 137 2.33 1.64
20000 3031 191 2.09 1.41
24000 4011 244 1.97 1.27
28000 5111 294 1.91 1.17
34000 6986 364 1.87 1.08
36000 7678 386 1.87 1.02
40000 9115 460 3.49 1.82
70000 22344 1010 2.52 1.76
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Table 4. 2
Relationship between Adjusted Gross Income 
and Income Elasticity of the Louisiana 











$ 8000 $ 569 $ 9 18.56 13.10
10000 905 36 5-57 3.84
12000 1228 63 3.78 2.60
16000 1952 117 2.74 1.81
20000 2760 169 2.37 1.51
2*1000 3652 219 2.19 1.34
28000 4636 267 2 .10 1.21
3*1000 63*1*1 335 2.03 1.10
36000 6956 357 2.02 1.10
40000 8270 399 2.01 1.04
50000 11915 496 2.02 0.94
70000 20*1*15 1070 2.62 1.05
100000 3*1500 1388 2.88 1.03
150000 601(60 2050 2.93 0.90
200000 883*10 2634 3.04 0.83
275000 132*115 3421 3.22 0.82
300000 147290 3715 4.85 1. 24
1000000 563790 14425 4.16 1.06
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Table 4.3
Relationship between Adjusted Gross Income 
and Income Elasticity of the Louisiana 











$ 4000 $ 302 $ 18 4.44 3.14
5000 491 25 3.97 2.73
6000 681 38 3.13 2.15
7000 942 50 2.79 1.87
8000 1122 64 2.52 1.63
10000 1530 89 2 . 24 1.45
12000 1952 115 2.09 1.33
16000 2876 164 1.95 1.17
18800 3591 198 1.90 1.11
19000 3644 200 3.79 2.23
20000 3915 223 3.58 2.01
25000 5420 333 3.00 1.58
30000 7090 436 2.75 1.40
40000 10915 623 2.57 1.09
50000 15352 786 2.55 0.97
70000 25615 1055 2.65 0.86
100000 42280 1409 2.84 0.77
130000 59915 1723 3.02 0.77
137500 64378 1800 3.05 0.78
140000 65685 1849 4.54 1.16
170000 83715 2297 4.44 1.13
Figure 4.2




Ajusted Gross Income Per Household, XIO^
Source: Tables 4.2,4.3, and 4.4
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It will be sufficient to show how elasticity changes in 
only one of the cases previously presented; Series B Is 
chosen as most typical. Beginning with AGI of $12,000, 
let income grow at 5 percent per annum. After five years 
time, the elasticity measure will have fallen from 3.78 to 
2.84.6 After ten years, income will have grown to $19,547, 
and elasticity fallen to 2.40. This decline will be more 
rapid as income changes are more rapid. In these times of 
significant inflation, It will not be surprising that money 
incomes grow at least as fast as the value used for this 
example.
Partial Elasticities. The previous section suggests 
that the elasticity of the state personal income tax with 
respect to total personal income (and per capita income 
under the assumption of income equality), must decline as 
those measures of income rise. The partial elasticity with 
respect to population is unity, if an increase in population 
does not alter the patterns of income distribution or 
consumption. This project will assume that such is the 
case and test its results for proof of this hypothesis.
Tax liability is a function of money income rather 
than real income. An Increase In real per capita Income, 
all else unchanged, will cause an Increase In tax revenues 
through the increase in nominal income (PCI), which is the
6At that point in time, AGI will be $15,315, which 
generates $108 in Louisiana Personal Income Tax liability.
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product of th? change in real per capita income (R?Y) time.:: 
the price level (CPI), or APCI = ARPY x CPI. A given 
percentage change in real income generates an equal percent­
age change in nominal income. A similar result holds for 
increases in the general price level: the revenue effect is 
only felt through the increase In money income.
Corporate Income Tax. The state corporate Income 
tax, assessed at a single rate and having rather modest 
exemption, should be a nearly proportional tax. As such, 
its Income elasticity should be quite stable in value. The 
paragraphs which follow will discuss these statements in 
more detail.
The exemption makes the income elasticity of the 
corporate income tax exceed unity, but decline as net income 
rises. In the limit, this elasticity would approach unity 
as the exemption becomes relatively less Important. The 
federal corporate income tax Is progressive, and thus has 
a higher average tax rate at larger values of net income.
This reduces the taxable base for Louisiana Income tax 
purposes. In the limit, only 52 cents of each dollar of 
net Income is taxable in Louisiana. Thus the average 
effective tax rate has a limiting upper value of .04 x 
(1-.48) ■ .0208 or 2,08 percent and a limiting maximum 
elasticity of 1.92. The Income elasticity of this tax Is 
largest, when viewed in the aggregate of all corporate 
taxpayers, if all corporations earn the same net income.
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Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 Illustrate the rar-ge of values for 
the Income elasticity of the corporate Income tax.
Table 4.4











$ 0 $ 0 $ 0 0
2000 400 0 — 0
2564 577 0 0
3000 660 14 8.82 6.88
4000 880 45 3-57 2.79
5000 1100 76 2.63 2.05
10000 2200 2 32 1.72 1. 34
20000 4400 544 1.47 1.15
24700 5434 691 1.43 1.12
25000 5500 700 1.43 0.74
50000 17500 1220 1.64 0.85
100000 41500 2260 1. 77 0.92
200000 89500 4 340 1.84 0.96
500000 233500 10580 1.89 0.98
The assumption underlying the Illustration Is that the 
corporation taken to be typical does all business in 
Louisiana, and thus obtains the largest possible exemption. 
Relaxing this assumption causes the elasticities to more 
quickly approach their limiting values. Methods of deter­
mining the income elasticity of the Louisiana personal income 
tax aggregated over all taxpayers, have been discussed.
Let the value of the elasticity so obtained be ep . A method 
of determining the elasticity of the corporate Income tax 
with respect to changes in net corporate Income was presented 
In the preceeding paragraphs. Let the elasticity so obtained
Figure A .3
Corporate Income Elasticity of Louisiana 
Corporate Income Tax
e
o M U>A VI Ol oo o o
Corporate Net Income Xl()3
Source: Table A.A
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be ec< Each of these elasticities is a pur? number. It 
makes no difference at this point that these two elasticities 
are calculated from different bases. Let the fraction of 
total income tax revenues derived from individual sources 
be Wp, and the fraction derived from corporate Income be 
Wc, where Wp + Wc = 1. Then the elasticity of the income 
tax, with respect to movements in the tax base (personal 
plus corporate net income) Is
ey * ep ‘wp + ec’wc- 
This measure is properly a base elasticity, and not an
Income elasticity since two different Incomes comprise the
base of the tax. However, the two elements of the base
generally move In the same direction, although the corporate
component Is the more volatile of the two. Thus it should
not be misleading to refer to the measure calculated
above as an income elasticity, and to calculate that
elasticity with respect to total personal Income.
Income Tax Estimating Equations. Of all taxes and 
tax groups Included in this dissertation, the personal 
Income tax has the strongest link to the Independent 
variables which measure Income because the base of this tax 
Is not very different from the income measures used. For 
this reason, and for the fact that the income tax is one of 
the most productive individual taxes levied by the State of 
Louisiana, it is Important that the tax revenue estimating 
equation provide a measure of the income elasticity of 
the tax.
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Over the period studied, the rate structure of the 
Income tax had remained constant. Thus there was no need to 
Incorporate into the model a variable for the tax rate.
There were shifts in tax revenues due to factors 
other than movements of the economic variables. Institution 
of a system of general withholding and the temporary non­
deductibility of federal income taxes paid resulted in 
shifts in tax revenues significant enough that the esti­
mating model should measure their effects. Thus dummy 
variables D4 and D5 were constructed: is unity for the
years 1970-1971-1972* and zero otherwise; and variable D5 
is zero for years before 1961, unity thereafter.
The income elasticity of the state income tax is 
increased if federal income taxes paid are deductible for 
purposes of computing state imcome tax liability. The 
extra deduction leads to lower tax bills, while most tax­
payers remain in the same marginal tax bracket as before. 
There is some offset to this, as some taxpayers revert to a 
lower marginal tax rate, hence lowering Income elasticity.
It is presumed that the elasticity-increasing effect is 
much stronger than the elasticity-decreasing effect. State 
personal Income tax brackets are broad enough that few 
taxpayers will shift to a lower marginal rate.
A purpose of modelling this shift was to determine 
how much state Income tax revenue was foregone by excluding 
federal income tax, what would be the new growth rate of 
tax revenues with respect to income growth, and how long
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Figure
Schematic Representation of Shifts 





I960 1965 1970 1975
Withholding is instituted; many individuals who 
previously failed to file commence filing
^Withholding becomes near-universal; again some 
non-reporters are forced to comply
cFederal income tax paid loses and regains its 
status as a special deductible item on state tax returns; 
those taxpayers at the taxable margin begin to pay income 
tax, then cease to pay income tax
^State income tax returns are tied to federal tax 
returns; greater compliance results
New state constitution defines taxable income to be 
almost identical to Federal Adjusted dross Income
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it would take the system to make up for those lost revenues.
The base shifts described above are shown graphically in
Figure 4 . It was further argued that the Income elastic­
ity of the state income tax could be expected to decline 
over time. An equation which models the features Just 
described would appear as
= ft. tpi ( a+bt+eD4+fD5 ). iocD4 * 10d^5 (*(.22)
The constant A reflects the system of deductions, exemptions, 
and marginal tax rates; t Is a time index. The coefficients 
a and b̂ determine the time path of income elasticity; 
coefficients e and f measure the shifts in Income elastic­
ities resulting from tax base changes. Coefficients c_ and 
d measure the shifts In the tax revenue function as a result 
of those base changes. No rate variable appears in this 
equation, or in other Income tax models, because the income 
tax rate schedules remained constant during the relevant 
time period.
A second model of the Income tax revenue function, 
presented below, explicitly includes a declining income 
elasticity.
TRlnc ■ A-TPIa k̂“t +̂bD^+cD5*l0dD^•10eD5 (4.23)
where k is a constant, and all other symbols are as 
previously defined.
The models discussed above utilized the income 
measure total personal income. Those models readily con­
verted to models using either the per capita income- 
population, or the real per capita Income-consumer price
124
index-population measures. The model
TR. * A.pCIa+bt+cD4+dD5•pope •iofD^*106D5 (4.24)Inc
displayed a structure similar to that of equation 4,22. The 
elasticity shift variables were not appended to the pop­
ulation variable.
Automotive Tax Group
Revenues of the three taxes comprising the auto­
motive tax group should be expected to rise as the state's 
total personal income rises. The taxed items are in part 
consumer goods, and are not considered to be inferior 
goods. In part the taxed goods are destined for business 
use; but the end result is the same* Higher Income and 
higher spending levels will require more vehicles and fuel 
to transport the merchandise. As services constitute an 
increasing portion of total output, this increase will be 
more moderate. Thus the income elasticity of the revenues 
of this tax group should be positive. Since most individuals 
in this state are dependent on automotive transportation, 
this Income elasticity might be thought to be less than 
unity.
Progressive federal income tax schedules exact 
ever higher percentages of earned income as income rises.
This in turn leaves progressively less disposable Income.
Thus a one percent increase in Income at a high Income 
level will cause a smaller percentage increase in spending 
on goods in the automotive tax group than a one percent
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Income Increase at a lower Income level. Changes In work 
and living patterns in the future may alter the dependence 
of Louisiana citizens on automobiles, and hence change the 
income elasticity.
In addition to the various forms of Income 
variables, a variable to reflect rate changes seemed 
necessary to properly model this tax group. Both dummy 
variables and actual rate variables were tried, with better 
results (larger values of the t, F, and R2 coefficients) 
obtained using the actual rate. This variable was generally 
the cents-per-gallon rate on gasoline, since this commodity 
was the major revenue producer in this group, and since 
some of the other rates moved much in line with that rate.
The sales tax rate was included, since automobile sales 
are subject to that tax. The dummy variable D3, to account 
for shifts in tax revenues due to the change to biennial 
collections for passenger auto licenses, also was necessary. 
Thus the automotive tax revenue function which modelled the 
above features was
TRaut = rsa*rgb *TPlc+<it+eD3.iof,EI3j (4.25)
where TRaut “ tax revenue of automotive tax group 
rs = sales tax rate 
rg = gasoline tax rate
c, d = parameters denoting time path of income 
elasticity
e = parameter denoting shift in income elasticity
f * parameter denoting shift In tax revenue 
function
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A second model of revenue generation of this group 
of taxes was
TRaut * rga-A*TPIb+ct*10dD3, (4.26)
where A = constant
This model assumed a negligible impact on revenues by sales 
tax rate changed, and a negligible influence on elasticity 
by D3*
Sumptuary Tax Group
The income elasticity of the revenues of the 
sumptuary tax group should be positive, as the goods are 
not inferior goods in any general sense. The income 
elasticity is probably less than unity, as the consumption 
of these goods (taxed on nonprogressive schedules) rises 
less rapidly than does TPI. The income elasticity will 
decline as incomes grow, as federal income taxes rise faster 
than income, leaving smaller proportions of disposable income.
The taxes in the sumptuary tax group have a more 
tenuous link to income levels than do the other non­
severance taxes studied. It was therefore important to 
carefully study the empirical results with respect to the 
significance of the income variable. While it was possible 
that the Income variable would add no explanatory value to 
the models, such was not generally the case.
The model which would seem best suited a priori 
to estimation of the sumptuary tax group revenues would 
contain an income variable, a variable to test for time-
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dependent income elasticity, and variables to reflect 
shifts in revenue and in income elasticity at the two 
major rate shifts. In the sumptuary tax group, rates were 
changed on several occasions, but the rates were several in 
number, and many were complex schedules. Rather than utilize 
a single rate to represent all rates and rate schedules, 
these rate changes were treated by a dummy variable Dl.
The simplest model which meets these criteria was
TR_lim * A .TPia+bt+cDl.10dDl (4.27)s uni
Equation 4.27 displayed declining income elasticity if 
the coefficient b_ was estimated to be negative. A second 
possible type of sumptuary tax group model explicitly 
included a declining income elasticity.
TRsum * A-TPia^-^^+bDi-lO001 (4.28)
Both models could be reformulated by substituting PCI—
POP and RPY— CPI— POP for the income measure TPI.
Other Taxes
This residual grouping of taxes contains some items 
that should not be considered income related, and some that 
should be. The Corporate Franchise Tax, Occupational 
License Taxes, and the Excise License Tax should rise with 
Income, reflecting greater production and general business 
expansion. These are the major components of Other Taxes, 
and should dominate the effects of the remaining items.
Thus a positive income elasticity is expected. But the 
direction of movement of this elasticity is not obvious.
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It will be left to the regression analysis to determine 
whether any significant change has occurred.
Only one of several administrative and legislative 
rate and base changes seemed of sufficient magnitude to 
model. That event was the change in the collection date 
of the Corporate Franchise Tax, in 1958. The significance 
of this change was tested by a variable taking on the 
value 1 in fiscal 1958, 0 otherwise. This variable was not 
significant In any models for this tax group, and so was 
deleted. Thus the basic model was
TRoth = A-TPIa+bt (*J.29)
An alternative form, using PCI and POP as the independent 
variables, was
TRoth = A*PCIa+bt*POPc (4.30)
Summary
For four of the five taxes and tax groups studied, 
a priori information and analysis suggests that the income 
elasticity of individual taxes and tax groups varies with 
time or income. These hypotheses will be tested in the 
regressions which follow, as Income- or time-dependent 
elasticities will be incorporated into the forecasting 
equations, in the same manner as changing elasticities 
were built Into the model to forecast income tax revenues.
Contrasting with the content of the next section, 
these changes in income elasticities may be a partial 
offset to the phenomenon that the income elasticity of a
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tax structure rises toward that of the most elastic tax of 
the structure. Thus Income elasticity of a tax structure
can be considered to be Increasing toward a decreasing
limit.
ANALYSIS OP THE DEPENDENCY OP THE INCOME 
ELASTICITY OF A TAX STRUCTURE UPON 
THE LEVEL OF INCOME
Previous sections have shown that it is possible
for individual taxes to have elasticities which vary with
Income changes. This section will prove that it is possible 
for a structure of constant elasticity taxes to have a 
system elasticity that changes with Income changes. These 
two results will be combined in a later section to 
Illustrate movements in elasticity of a more realistic tax 
structure. Finally, these results are extended to provide 
an analysis of the time path of the Income elasticity of the 
current Louisiana tax structure.
The Upward-Bound 
Elasticity Theorem
The following example suggests that the income 
elasticity of a tax structure grows as Income grows. The 
example Is purposely simplified, Involving only two taxes, 
each of constant elasticity. Let tax A be elastic with 
respect to income (eA « 2), and let it account for .5 of 
tax revenue at t ■ 0. Let tax B be Inelastic with respect 
to Income (Eg * .5) and let it account for ,5 of tax 
revenue at t * 0. Let Income grow at a constant rate of
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Table 4 .5
Symbols Utilized In Elasticity Exercise
Y * Adjusted Gross Income (the tax base)
TRa = tax revenue generated by tax A
TRB = tax revenue generated by tax B
TTR = total tax revenue (TRA + TRB)
a = share of total tax revenues generated by
tax A (TRa t TTR)
1-a » share of total tax revenues generated by
tax B (TRg f TTR)
eA = Income elasticity of tax A (percentage
change in TRA * percentage change in Y
£g = income elasticity of tax B (percentage
change in TRg * percentage change In Y
es = income elasticity of tax structure,
computed by
TR. TRrjÂ* — + ER * — E ; thus esTTR n TTR * *
can be written a*eA + (l-a)‘eB
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4 percent per /ear.
The w*. ighted average incomv elasticity of the tax 
structure is .5 x 2 + . 5 x .5 = 1.25. As income grows by 
4 percent, revenue grows by 4 percent x 1.25 " 5 percent 
from t * 0 to t 1 1. As income grows 4 percent, eA remains 
2, eB remains .5 ; but TRA has risen 8 percent, TRg only 2 
percent. At t = 1 the share of total tax revenues generated
by tax A was
= * V [1 + (.0*1 x 2)] — ci i .
5 [1 + T T W  X 1.25)/ ,5 J*
The share of total tax revenues from tax B was
l n » [1 + (.Oil x .5)] - JiPf7“ 5 n  + (.oit x i.25)] ■ e 5 7 -
The elasticity of the tax structure has risen to .51*13 x
2 + .*1857 x .5 - 1.2715, up from 1.25.
Income again rises *1 percent between t = 1 and t = 2.
A revenues rise 8 percent, B revenues, 2 percent. This
will remain unchanged, since the individual tax revenue
income elasticities are here defined as constants. The
system shows a revenue increase of .08 x .51*13 + .02 x
.*(857 “ .0509, reflecting the increase in elasticity over
the previous year. This same value could have been obtained
by multiplying the income changes by the new elasticity:
.0*1 x 1.2715 * .0509. The ratio TR^/TTR is now .51*13 x
. = .5286; TR^/TTR has fallen to .*1857 x 1 —  =1.0509 B 1.0509
.*171*1; system elasticity has risen to .5286 x 2 + ,*171** x 
.5 - 1.2929.
The elasticity of the system will continue to rise 
over time (as income increases), approaching a limit of
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e^. The rate of change slows over time as the ratio
TRAk * TRAk-l approaches unity, and TRBk t TRBk-l
TTRk + TTRk_1 TTRk 4- TTRk-1
approaches 1.02 - .944. Thus the elasticity of this simple 
l70%
tax structure is dependent on the level of income, and, as 
income grows over time, is dependent on time. However, it 
is not true that after k years of income increases that 
A's share » •5flO_8]k because the denominator is rising[105J
as overall elasticity rises. The time path of the income 
elasticity of this same tax structure, over ten time periods, 
is given in Table 4.6.
Elasticity is increasing by decreasing amounts, 
falling by less than .001 per year. Elasticity will show 
almost linear trend over short to Intermediate time frame. 
System elasticity Eg changes over time, as
changes: AY
(4.31)at = at-l x
at-l x
1 + Y eA
1 + AX * eSt-l Y
p AY
1 + T~ eA
1 + AY [a^-i* e 
Y
(4.32)
This formula is obviously recursive. That is, 
given a set of initial values, a time series for can be 
obtained.









+ Y ~ e A
1 + AY .̂ st-l
tr — i




This gives system elasticity in t'Vrms of ts 
previous value and other system parameters.
St ‘t-l
AY
1 + Y CA_________ _______ _ __
1 + AY [at-1.eA + ( I-ô .-l ) • eb]
Y Ay
. 1 + 7~ EA_____________________
1 + AY[>t-l*eA + (l-at-l)*ee^Y
'B
(4.35)
These formulae show that changes in the weights 
a and 1-a are responsible for the increase in the income 
elasticity of the tax structure. The weights in turn are 
changing because the revenues of the taxes of the structure 
grow at different rates. The relatively more elastic 
taxes of a tax structure grow faster than the relatively 
less elastic taxes. Thus the weights assigned to the 
relatively more elastic taxes rise, while the weights
Table 4.6
Time Path of Income Elasticity, 
Original Two-tax Model
t £S eSt-eS(t-l) a
0 1.2500 .5000
1 1.2714 .0214 .51432 1.2928 .0214 .5285
3 1.3142 .0214 .5428
4 1.3354 .0212 .5569
5 1.3565 .0211 .5710
6 1.3774 .0209 .5849
7 1.3981 .0207 .5987
8 1.4186 .0205 .6124
9 1.4388 .0202 .6258
10 1.4586 .0198 .6391
Source: Primary
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attached to the relatively less elastic ta/.es fall. The 
income elasticity of the tax structure thus rises as income 
rises.
The rate of change of the income elasticity of a 
tax structure will be more or less rapid according to 
several factors. The rate of change in the income 
elasticity of a tax structure is more rapid as the 
relatively more elastic individual taxes generate less 
revenue (have smaller weights) than the less elastic taxes. 
The more rapid the rate of increase in income, the more 
rapid will be the change in Income elasticity. The 
greater the disparity in the income elasticities of the 
individual taxes, the faster will be the change in the 
system income elasticity. Other simplified models will 
now be examined in order to provide support for these 
statements.
A model differing from the previous two-tax 
model only in the weights assigned to the taxes A and B was 
examined. The new weights were a * 0.2 and 1-a * 0.8. 
Initially, eg * 0.8; after ten years of income growth of 
4 percent per year, eg rose to 0.96033, a 20.0 percent 
increase. In the original model, eg Increased 16.7 percent, 
from 1.25 to 1.43877. If the Initial weights had been 
a « 0.4 and 1-a ■ 0.6, and all else unchanged, the income 
elasticity of the tax structure would have increased by
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17.3 percent,
In comparing the rates of change of es across the 
three variations above, a pattern was noted in the rate of 
change of eg within each of the models. Where the 
relatively more elastic tax contributed less than half of 
total tax revenues (o < 0.5), system income elasticity 
grew by increasing Increments. Where a > 0.5, es grew by 
decreasing Increments. The intuitive extension of this 
phenomenon is that, in a system of k taxes, eg increases 
at an Increasing rate as the relatively more elastic taxes 
contribute shares of total tax revenues smaller than 1/k.
The original two-tax model was altered to have a 
rate of income Increase of 10 percent per year, rather than 
4 percent; no other initial conditions were changed. The 
system income elasticity grew over ten years from eg * 1.25 
to eg - 1.65236. This was an Increase of 32.2 percent, 
compared to 16.7 percent for the original model. As 
expected, faster rates of income growth generated faster 
increases in the income elasticity of the tax structure.
Finally, the original model was altered to examine 
the role of disparity of the income elasticities of the 
individual taxes of a tax structure. The new set of income 
elasticities were e  ̂« 1.5 and eg * 1.0, all else unchanged. 
This structure had the same Initial system income elasticity 
as the original model, although the individual tax 
elasticities were much nearer each other in size. After
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ten years of Income growth at k pe7*cent per* year, Kg rose 
only to 1.27138* a 1.7 percent Increase. The less 
disparate set of income elasticities in this variation of 
the model led to a slower rate of change in the income 
elasticity of the tax structure.
These models have demonstrated that the income 
elasticity of a tax structure can vary over time, even 
though the income elasticities of the individual taxes are 
constant. This demonstration and the accompanying analysis 
constitute intuitive proof of the Upward Bound Elasticity 
Theorem. The model which follows applies this principle 
to a tax structure similar to that of the state of Louisiana.
An Extended Example of the
Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem
As indicated in an earlier paragraph, the income 
elasticity of the tax structure can be expected to move in 
the same direction as total personal income moves. This 
statement is true, regardless of the absolute size of the 
individual tax elasticities, and regardless of their weights 
in the tax structure, so long as they are positive and 
unequal. The impact of this statement will be demonstrated 
in the following example.
This second model utilizes a structure of five tax 
groups, each of which has a constant income elasticity. The 
initial conditions, while hypothetical, are similar in
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magnitude to those of the current Louisiana tax structure. 
Let the current value of Total Personal Income be $10,000 
million, and let that Income grow at a constant rate of 5 
percent per year. Let the tax structure be given by the 
following table. The current elasticity of this tax 
structure is ego “ x 0.30 + 1.0 x 0.25 + 1.4 x 0.20 
+ 0.8 x 0.15 + 0.7 x 0.10 * 0.72. Thus the system is at 
this point relatively inelastic.
In the next year, income will rise to $10,500 
million. The tax revenues are now $1036. The details of 
the revenue and share movements are to be found in the body 
of Table 4.7* Revenues rise by 3.6 percent while income 
rises 5 percent; this simply shows the elasticity of the
Table 4.7 








Severance tax 0.0 $ 300 0. 30
Sales tax 1.0 250 0.25
Income tax 1.4 200 0.20
Automotive taxes 0.8 150 0.15
Sumptuary taxes 0.7 100 0 .10
eS0 - 0 . 7 & 5  TTR = Ittt) 1.00
Source: Primary
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structure to be 0.72, as shown abo’/e. The severance tax 
already Is declining In share of total revenues. The 
elasticity of the overall tax structure Is now: eSj ■
0.0 x 0.250 + 1.0 x 0.266 + 1.4 x 0.234 + 0.8 x 0.152 
+ 0.7 x 0.099 - 0.79.
Ten years Into the future tax revenues will have 
grown to $1463.7, and the elasticity of the tax structure 
will be esl0 * 0.0 x 0.205 + 1.0 x 0.278 + 1.4 x 0.269 
+ 0.8 x 0.152 + 0.7 x 0.096 = 0.84.
The relatively Inelastic Automotive Tax group 
gains slightly In its share of total tax revenues before 
t * 10. This Is so because this tax Is more elastic than 
the system as a whole at that time. Over time, or more 
precisely, with income growth, this advantage will vanish, 
and this group eventually declines in share. Since the 
system elasticity will exceed the Automotive Tax group 
elasticity before ten years have passed in the above 
example, Its share will have begun to decline at that point. 
Of those taxes whose revenues vary with income, only the 
Sumptuary Tax group revenues decline from the outset. By 
reasoning similar to that employed above, this must be due 
to the fact that this tax group alone is less elastic than 
the tax structure as a whole.
As can be seen in Table 4,8, this structure achieves 
unitary income elasticity at t ■ 26, and that elasticity 
will continue to grow. This is so even though the income 
elasticities of individual taxes did not change. Another
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Table 4. c
Movement of Income Elasticity 
of A Structure of 
Five Taxes
I n c o m e T a x P r o p o r t i o n  
Tax Elasticity Revenue of Total
(X1C>9) Taxes
t-0
Severance Tax 0.0 $ 300.0 0. 30
Sales Tax 1.0 250 .0 0.25
Income Tax 1.4 200.0 0.20
Automotive Taxes 0.8 150 .0 0.15




Severance Tax 0.0 $ 300.0 0.2896
Sales Tax 1.0 262.5 0.2534
Income Tax 1.4 214 .0 0.2066
Automotive Taxes 0.8 156.0 0.1506




Severance Tax 0.0 $ 300.0 0.2498
Sales Tax 1.0 319-0 0.2657
Income Tax 1.4 280 .6 0.2336
Automotive Taxes 0.8 182.5 0.1520




Severance Tax 0.0 $ 300.0 0.2050
Sales Tax 1.0 407-2 0.2782
Income Tax 1.4 393-2 0.2688
Automotive Taxes 0.8 222.0 0.1517
Sumptuary Taxes 0.7 141.1 0.0964
eS10“°-843 TTR*$1463•7 1.0000
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0,0 $ 300.0 0.1325
Sales Tax 1.0 663-3 0.2929
Income Tax 1.4 773.9 0.3417
Automotive Taxes 0.8 328.7 0.1451




0.0 $ 300.0 0.1046
Sales Tax 1.0 846.6 0.2952
Income Tax 1.4 1085.5 0.3785
Automotive Taxes 0.8 400.0 0.1395




0.0 $ 300.0 0.0994
Sales Tax 1.0 888.9 0.2952
Income Tax 1.4 1161.5 0.3858
Automotive Taxes 0.8 415-9 0.1381
Sumptuary Taxes 0_*..7_ 244.6 0.0812
eS26*1*°°3 TTR*$ 3010.9 1.0000
Source: Primary
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of the important assumptions of this hypothetical example is 
that no exogenous change, such as legislative action with 
respect to tax bases and rates, occurs. Thus the model 
shows the smooth time path of an unchanging tax structure. 
The increase in income elasticity which accompanies economic 
growth would occur even if all taxes in the tax structure 
were relatively income-inelastic, and if no income- 
independent revenues, such as the severance taxes, existed.
An Example of a Tax Structure 
with Changing Individual Tax 
Income Elasticities
The Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem holds for a 
structure of taxes whose income elasticities are non-nega­
tive, unequal, and constant. Vickrey's independence 
assumption is not required, but his additive assumption is.7
The Louisiana tax structure does not meet these 
requirements: the Income elasticities are not constant over 
wide ranges of income. This section will analyze changes In 
the income elasticity of a tax structure, the individual 
taxes of which have changing income elasticities. This 
prepares the way for practical application of the knowledge 
previously gained concerning movements of tax structure 
income elasticity.
The tax structure to be considered at this time 
consists of six taxes and tax groups, to conform with the
^Vickrey, op. cit., p. 140.
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forecasting base used throughout this dissertation. The 
parameters of this model are in Table 4.9. The initial 
shares are the actual shares of the six taxes of the fore­
casting base in fiscal 1973-74. Under this proposed 
structure, system elasticity will still move toward the 
most elastic component as income rises; but the elasticities 
of all components are slowly falling, largely the result of 
progressive federal income taxation. Thus the limit toward 
which the system moves is itself declining. This structure 
has an initial income elasticity of 0.688. Given a constant 
rate of income increase of 10 percent per year, the elastic­
ity of the tax structure rises slowly, peaking at £3 ■
1.2303 at t - 88.
Table 4.9
Income Elasticity Movement, Changing 
Elasticities of Individual Taxes
Initial Share Initial Income Definition
of Elasticity of Elasticity
Tax Revenue Change
Severance Tax .3063 0.0 noneSales Tax .2667 1.0 £q *(1-.001 *t)
Income Tax .1323 1.4 e0 *(l-.002't)Automotive Tax .1379 0.8 e0 *(l-.001't)
Sumptuary Tax .0780 0.7 e0 *(1-.001 * t)
Other Taxes .0788 0.9 Cq•(1-.001* t)
Source: Primary
At the point of maximum system elasticity, the 








Thereafter Eg declines, reflecting the fact that Individual 
tax elasticities are declining. In fact, the largest 
revenue producer has the fastest decreasing elasticity, at 
the time elasticity peaks. Variations of this model 
suggest that faster income change and/or slower elasticity 
decline lead to larger values for peak elasticity.
The importance of the model is this: the regressions 
of tax revenues against the appropriate income and dummy 
variables, as described In an earlier section, provide 
estimates of the individual tax income elasticities and of 
their rates of change. Thus the model described here could 
use the parameters as provided by the regressions, and show 
the possible time path of the income elasticity of the 
current Louisiana tax structure.
The chapter containing the revenue forecasts will 
also forecast the time path of the income elasticity of 
the Louisiana tax structure. The forecasting method will 
use the technique Just developed. By combining reliable 
estimates of elasticities and their rates of change with 
the known current shares of revenues generated by the 
respective taxes, the future path of the income elasticity 
of Louisiana's tax structure can be charted. It is obvious 
that, given the appropriate estimates and parameters of
another tax structure, the future path of its income 
elasticity can be predicted. Thus the technique developed 
here, to incorporate changing income elasticities into the 
regression model, can be of value to other tax structures, 
notably those of other states whose tax revenues are 
predominately income-related.
Chapter 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE TAX 
REVENUE MODELS
It is the purpose of this chapter to test the models 
developed in Chapter ^. The reader is first reminded of the 
specific goals of this research. The mechanics of the 
regressions are explained in detail. The models are then 
tested to determine which will be used to produce the tax 
revenue forecasts. These forecasts appear in Chapter 6.
The results of the forecasting are discussed from three view­
points: the future trend of tax revenues for the State of 
Louisiana, possible alternative tax policies, and the proof 
of the hypotheses presented in Chapter
This paragraph serves to remind the reader of the 
two-fold Intent of the research undertaken here. First, 
the research is to provide Intermediate and long-run 
(two to ten year horizon) estimates of the revenues of 
certain taxes levied by the State of Louisiana, to provide 
additional data for those individuals and agencies that 
are responsible for the planning of the state's future 
fiscal activities. For longer-term estimates, if reliable 
enough, will provide an extra measure of knowledge about 
future revenues, and hence set the stage for determining 
what the state can or cannot "afford" in terras of its
1U5
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offerings of public goods and services. This Is more 
Important for those state activities which require long 
periods of time— two years to twenty years or more--to plan, 
activate, and bring to fruition. The second major purpose 
Is to seek substantiation of the hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 4. The first of these hypotheses was that as 
income grows, the income elasticity of the tax structure 
also grows; this is the so-called "Upward-Bound Elasticity 
Theorem" of Chapter 4. Evidence of the validity of this 
hypothesis will be obtained by examining the statistical 
significance of the revelant coefficients of the independent 
variables of the regressions performed and analyzed in 
later sections of this chapter. By similar examination, 
tests will confirm or deny the hypothesis of time-dependent 
income elasticities of the individual taxes being modelled.
All models of the tax revenue functions were 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), a single­
equation econometric technique. OLS is appropriate in such 
cases where the variable labelled as dependent has no 
influence over the variables labelled independent. This 
implies that, for the tax revenue models, the amount of 
tax revenue for a specific tax must have no influence over 
the current level of income.
It seems unreasonable that a higher tax rate on 
sales, alcohol, or tobacco would so alter spending habits 
as to significantly alter the aggregate level of income. 
Clearly, such tax rate changes could cause some economic
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dislocation, but the aggregate number of Jobs and level of 
Income should be relatively unaffected. The state income 
tax rate could conceivably affect the level of income by 
making Job opportunities in Louisiana more or less favorable 
to opportunities elsewhere. Thus a high income tax rate 
might encourage Job seekers to go to neighboring states. But 
the income tax is only one influence on mobile Job seekers. 
Certainly they should consider the entire tax burden, not 
Just the income tax liability; and the tax burden itself 
is probably a small influence over Job location.
The severance taxes perhaps have the greatest 
potential for reverse causation. Increased severance tax 
revenues, rather than the result of higher incomes, may be 
the cause of higher Incomes. Since the petroleum industry 
is such a large component of the state's employment and 
Income, Its success, through multiplier effects, affects 
the employment and income of the state. This does not 
create a need for simultaneous equations, since the revenues 
of the severance taxes are not to be estimated by using 
income as an independent variable. Rather, severance tax 
revenue estimates will be adapted from other sources.
Another cause for use of estimating methods other 
than OLS would be that one tax influences the revenues of 
another tax. For the most part, these influences seem 
negligible: how much would gasoline tax revenues rise or 
fall if Corporate Franchise tax revenues rose by $1 million? 
Certainly, some Interdependencies do exist: as vehicle
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license revenues rise, gasoline tax revenues will also. As 
alcoholic beverage dealer permits rise, so might alcoholic 
beverage tax revenues. These interdependencies have been 
negated by the use of tax groups. In most cases, taxes 
dependent on one another are in the same tax group, so that 
their revenues are treated as an aggregate and not as 
individual tax revenues. In this way, the use of OLS would 
still be valid.
The models introduced in Chapter 4 were fitted by a 
step-wise regression program which allowed the user to 
"force" selected variables into or out of the regression. 
The variable labels used are listed in Table 5.1. The 
particular package utilized in these and other regressions 
of this dissertation was BMD-02R.1 The results of these 
curve-fittings are given in the following paragraphs.
Before proceeding to the testing phase, some brief 
mention of the criteria used to judge the empirical results 
is necessary. Use of as a criterion for selecting 
equations was of limited value, since all R^ values were 
quite acceptable, with few falling below ,90. Most Impor­
tance was placed on the significance (t-values) of the 
variables judged a priori and by the analysis of Chapter 4
iBMD Biomedical Computer Programs, W. J. Dixon, 
editor. University of California Press, 1974. BMD-02R 
is the Stepwise Regression program and Is discussed on 
pages 305-331 of this manual.
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Figure 5.1
List of Tax, Income, and Dummy Variables 
Used in Regression Studies
Variable Variable
Name Description
LSAL Base 10 logarithm of Sales Tax revenues in
103 dollars
LINC Base 10 logarithm of Income Tax revenues in
103 dollars
LAUT Base 10 logarithm of Automotive Tax Group
revenues in 103 dollars
LSUM Base 10 logarithm of Sumptuary Tax Group
revenues in 103 dollars
LOTH Base 10 logarithm of Other Taxes revenues in
103 dollars
LSR Base 10 logarithm of Sales tax rate
LGR Base 10 logarithm Gasoline tax rate
RPY Real per capita income, in dollars, 1967 base
CPI Consumer price index, in decimal value, 1967
base
POP Louisiana population, in thousands
PCI Louisiana per capita Income, in current dollars
PCI = RPY » CPI
TPI Louisiana total personal Income in 103 dollars
TPI - PCI * POP
LRPY Base 10 logarithm RPY
LCPI Base 10 logarithm CPI
LPOP Base 10 logarithm POP
LPCI Base 10 logarithm PCI
Figure 5.1 (Continued)
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LTPI Base 10 logarithm TPI
D1 Dummy variable * 1 for years prior to 1952,
after 1967 for significant general tax 
changes; otherwise 0
D2 Dummy variable = 1 for years with wholesale
sales tax collections, otherwise 0
D3 Dummy variable for years of biennial license
collections = 1 for even years, 196*) and after
D*4 Dummy variable = 1 when federal income tax was
not deductible, otherwise 0
D5 Dummy variable = 1 after general withholding
instituted for income tax, otherwise 0
D6 Dummy variable = 1 when food and drugs exempt
from sales tax, otherwise 0
SD11 Dummy variable, * LTPI when D1 = 1, otherwise 0
SD12 Dummy variable, = LTPI when D2 = 1, otherwise 0
SD13 Dummy variable, = LTPI when D3 “ 1 * otherwise 0
SD14 Dummy variable, = LTPI when D*J = 1, otherwise 0
SD15 Dummy variable, = LTPI when D5 = 1, otherwise 0
SD16 Dummy variable, = LTPI when D6 = 1, otherwise 0
SD21 Dummy variable, = LPCI when D1 = 1, otherwise 0
SD22 Dummy variable, = LPCI when D2 = 1, otherwise 0
SD2 3 Dummy variable, = LPCI when D3 “ 1, otherwise 0
SD2*l Dumrv variable, = LPCI when D*l = 1, otherwise 0
SD25 Dummy variable, = LPCI when D5 = 1, otherwise 0
SD26 Dummy variable, » LPCI when D6 * 1, otherwise 0
SD31 Dummy variable, » LPOP when D1 = 1, otherwise 0
SD32 Dummy variable, - LPOP when D2 - 1, otherwise 0
Figure 5*1 (Continued)
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SD33 Dummy variable, = LPOP when D3 = 1 otherwise
SD3U Dummy variable, = LPOP when DU - 1 otherwise
SD35 Dummy variable, = LPOP when D5 = 1 otherwise
SD36 Dummy variable, = LPOP when D6 = 1 otherwise
SDUl Dummy variable, = LRPY when D1 = 1 otherwise
SDU2 Dummy variable, = LRPY when D2 = 1 otherwise
SDU3 Dummy variable, - LRPY when D3 = 1 otherwise
SDUU Dummy variable, = LRPY when DU = 1 otherwise
SDU5 Dummy variable, = LRPY when D5 - 1 otherwise
SDU6 Dummy variable, = LRPY when D 6 = 1 otherwise
SD51 Dummy variable, = LCPI when D1 = 1 otherwise
SD52 Dummy variable, = LCPI when D2 = 1 otherwise
SD53 Dummy variable, = LCPI when D3 = 1 otherwise
SD5U Dummy variable, = LCPI when DU = 1 otherwise
SD55 Dummy variable, = LCPI when D5 = 1 otherwise
SD56 Dummy variable, = LCPI when D6 1, otherwise
YT1 Product of LTPI and t, where t 
at beginning of fiscal year
= calendar year
YT2 Product of LPCI and t
YT3 Product of LRPY and t
PT1 Product of LPOP and t
PT2 Product of LCPI and t
XT1 Product of LTPI and (k- 
arbltrary constant


















to be Important to the model structure. Thus an equation 
with a very high R2, but with an insignificant income 
relationship, would have a low chance of being selected as 
the estimating equation. Although no specific criteria were 
used, there was a tendency to require higher levels of sig­
nificance (a ■ .01 or .02) of the variables Judged more im­
portant; less essential variables were subject to less 
stringent tests (a * .05 or .10).
Among empirical results roughly equal in quality 
according to the partially subjective tests above, prefer­
ence was given to results with smaller standard errors. A 
standard error of 1.0 represents an order of magnitude, 
since the models are log-linear. Thus a calculated stand­
ard error of 0.25 would build a 2o confidence interval, the 
upper and lower ends of which were an order of magnitude 
apart.
SALES TAX MODEL SELECTION
In Chapter 4, several models of sales tax revenue 
generation were considered. Those models, with the 
appropriate regression equations, are shown below. The 
paragraphs which follow describe the process by which these 
models and certain variations of them were used to arrive 
at the best model of the sales tax revenue function.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the respec­
tive coefficients. The first sales tax model was
TRsal “ rsa-TPIbt (4.16)
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LSAL * .68154 LSR + .00046 YT1 (.03127) (.00000)
R2 = 1.0000 C 5 -1)
The average deviation of the residuals of this equation 
was 0.0137, or approximately 3.2 percent of sales tax 
collections. The extremely large R2 value was generated by 
the origin force, as this model has no constant term or 
intercept. Thus an "uncorrected" R2 value is presented.
The residuals of this regression appeared to follow a 
cyclical pattern, with turning points in 1956, 1961, and 
1966. No explanation of this possibly autocorrelated 
phenomenon is provided.
The second model explaining sales tax revenues was
TR * r a. rppibt+cD2+dD6.10eD2. xofD  ̂ (4.18)s al s
LSAL = .56096 LSR + .00045 YT1 - .09096 SD12
(.13885) (.00002) (.09367)
+ .45035 SD16 + .63874 D2 - 3.15257 D6 
(.21367) (.64298) (1.51263)
R2 = 1.0000 (5.2)
Neither SD12 nor D2 were significant; repeating the 
computations without these variables produced the regression
LSAL = .61456 LSR + .00045 YT1 - 2.42303 D6
(.07544) (.00001) (1.40276)
+ .34399 SD16 
(.19764)
R2 * 1.0000 (5.3)
which was the best fit of the model
TRsal * r3a*TPIbt+cD6*10dD6 (5.4)
This equation has an income elasticity which grows slowly
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over time, and which is shifted {upward) by the food and 
drug exemption. The residuals followed a pattern similar 
to that described in equation 5*1 above.
Regressing sales tax revenues against the sales tax 
rate, total personal income, and the two dummy variables 
D2 and D6 produced no improvement; the coefficient of D2 
was not significant.
TRSai = rsa-TPIbt+cD6*10dD2*10eD6 (5-5)
resulted in the regression equation
LSAL - .50468 LSR + .00044 YT1 + .01456 D2
{.12601) (.00002) (.01340)
- 2.62365 D6 + .37531 SD16 
(1.40922) (.19893)
R2 = 1.0000 (5.6)
The third sales tax model was
TRsal = rsa-Abt*TPIc+dD2+eD6*10fD2*10&D6 (4.21)
LSAL = 1.06019 LSR + 1.00327 LTPI + .31946 SD16
(.08474) (.02144) (.19715)
- 2.33014 D6 
(1.39908)
R2 * 1.0000 (5.7)
The failure of the variable t to appear in equation 5.7
suggests that the term Abt is in reality constant.2 Neither
dummy variable associated with wholesale collections 
appeared. Thus the results shown in equation 5-7 were
2The variables t, SD12, and D2 were not admitted 
by the regression algorTthm; the F value of the regression 
could not be improved by .00001.
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for the model
TRsal “ rsa*TPIb+eD6*10dD6 (5.8)
The coefficient of SD16 suggested that the income elastic­
ity of the sales tax rises from 1.00327 to 
ey * 1.00327 + . 31946 
* 1.3227,
with the exemption of food and drugs from the tax. Since
the elasticity shift coefficient was not highly significant
(t * 1.6204), this model was tested:
TRsal " rga*TPIb *iodD6 (5-9)
It generated the regression fit
LSAL = 1.07512 LSR + 1.00705 LTPI - 0.06346 D6
(.08717) (.02205) (.02587)
R2 = 1.0000 (5.10)
In this model, income elasticity is a constant, at approx­
imately unit value. The exemption of food and drugs causes 
a downward shift in revenues of approximately 16 percent 
(antilog of .06346).
A final variation of equation 4.21 deleted all 
dummy variables, but retained the constant:
TRsai - A*rsa'TPIb (5.11)
The regression fit for this model was
LSAL = -0.61220 + 0.71476 LSR + 1.00704 LTPI
(.07383) (.02203)
R2 = .9954 (5.12)
This comparatively naive model displayed a rate elasticity 
of 0.71476, which as expected was less than unity. The
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equation also displayed an Income elasticity of 1.00704, 
or approximately unity. The absolute deviation of the 
residuals was .0132, or approximately 3 percent of sales tax 
receipts.
All models above used total personal income as the 
income measure. These models were transformed into two 
variations. First, total personal income was replaced by 
per capita income and population. Second, total personal 
income was replaced by real per capita Income, consumer 
price index, and population.
Varying the model of equation 5.11 to use the set 
of Income variables PCI— POP resulted In the regression
LSAL = - .72275 + .72794 LSR + .98683 LPCI
(.10791) (.12041)
+ 1.06367 LPOP 
(.33224)
R2 = .9955 (5.13)
A slightly more sophisticated model;
TRsal = r3a-A*PCIb+cD6-POPd+eD6 (5.14)
was attempted, but the variable representing the coef­
ficient e was not admitted by the regression. The resulting 
fit was
LSAL * - 1.21648 + .73484 LSR + 1.41919 LPCI
(.11618) (2.28257)
+ .98882 LPOP - .00003 SD26 
(.52074) (.00016)
R2 » .9958 (5.15)
Neither LPCI nor SD26 were significant. Other models 
utilizing the pair of variables PCI— POP, and all models
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utilizing RPY— CPI— POP, were of little value. While all 
equations tested had very high values and P values, those 
equations including RPY, CPI, and POP as the primary set of 
independent variables had a marked tendency to show no sig­
nificant relationship of sales tax revenues to the income 
measure. Further, the sales tax rate was frequently not 
admitted by the stepwise regression, even though program 
tolerances were set to encourage additional variables to 
be introduced. Finally, as the number of variables present 
was increased, there was a tendency for the significance of 
coefficients to decline and for standard errors to increase. 
This final problem was undoubtedly due to increased multi- 
collinearity.
In summarizing the sales tax equation selection 
process, it was noted that the dummy variable D2 and its 
related slope-shift variables were seldom significant. The 
variable D6 and the related slope-shift variables were 
typically significant. Thus the best model included D6, 
but not D2. The tax rate variable was generally signifi­
cant, so it was included in the model selected. In choosing 
the variable (or set of variables) which represented 
income, there was some evidence that using the measure TPI 
led to more credible results than did the use of (1) PCI 
and POP, or (2) RPY, CPI, and POP. The final decision for 
this model selection concerned the type of time-dependent 
elasticity. The best results were found in elasticities 
which increased linearly over time. Thus the preferred
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sales tax model was that of equation 5.4
TRsal * r3a-TPIbt+cD6*10dD6 (5-4)
INCOME TAX MODEL SELECTION
The paragraphs which follow outline the results of 
testing the income tax revenue generating models of Chapter 
4, and variations thereof. The empirical results of all 
three models 4.22-4.24 were similar in that the use of both 
revenue shift and elasticity shift dummy variables rendered 
most coefficients nonsignificant. Therefore, some simpler 
models were formulated. The first of these utilized only 
the revenue shift dummy variables in a variation of 
equation 4.24. This implied that the effect on income 
elasticity of removing the deduction for Federal income 
taxes paid was negligible. The model tested was
TRinc “ A*TPia+bt.iocD4.i0dD5 (5.16)
LINC = - 15.8827 + 1.72453 LTPI - .00237 YT1
(.93270) (.00403)
+ .21592 D5 + .47468 D4 
(.15420) (.10951)
R2 = .9680 (5.17)
The coefficient of LTPI was 1.72, but the income 
elasticity is the exponent a+b_t, which was, for the year 
1975,
ey - 1.72453 - .00237 (1975)
- 1.72453 - 4.68075
- - 2.95622
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This result carried little weight since the coefficient of 
YT1 was not significant.
Fitting the model of equation 5-17 resulted in the 
variable YT1 not being significant. This would imply that the 
coefficient b of the exponent a+bt was zero. Dropping the 
non-significant variable resulted in the simplified model
TRinc * A*TFIa*10bDi| *10cD5 (5.18)
This formulation assumed that the secular decline in income 
elasticity discussed in Chapter 4 was not a significant 
magnitude. Equation 5.18 was thus a model of constant 
income elasticity. The regression results for this equation 
were




R2 = .9671 (5.19)
All coefficients were highly significant. The elimination 
of YT1 from equation 5.17 did not significantly reduce the 
of the relationship.
Altering the form in which the variables D4 and D5 
appeared generated the model
TRinc “ A-TPIa+bDi,+cD5 (5.20)
This equation assumed that the revenue shifts accompanying 
the variables D4 and D5 were not significant features.
LINC * - 3.30053 + 1.16263 LTPI + 0.02947 SD14
(.12109) (.00658)
0.01034 SD15
(.00677) R2 - .9675 (5.21)
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All coefficients were significant. Surveying the
equations 5.19 and 5.21, it appeared that the shifts which
occurred in 1964 and 1970 were both significant, but the
form in which they should be modelled was left ambiguous.
Variations of equation 4.23 were tested in a similar
manner. The most important such model was
TRinc “ A-TFI3^ - ^  • 10bE)iK10cD5 (5.22)
The dummy variables shift the revenue function, but do not
alter the income elasticity. This reformulation produced a
much better fit than did equation 4.23:
LINC » - 5.47984 + .00143 XT1 + .20755 D4
(.00014) (.04685)
+ .08303 D5 (.04434)
R2 - .9674 (5.23)
All variables were significant at a * .01 or .02; the R^ 
value was acceptable.
The income elasticity of this model declines slowly 
over time. In 1975, that elasticity would be 
ey = .00143 (3000-1975)
= 1.4658
Omitting the elasticity shift variables from 
equation 4.24 left the equation
TRinc * A*PCIa+b^.popc+dt.ioeD4.iQeD5̂  (5.24)
but the resulting regression showed the coefficient of 
D5 nonsignificant, and showed large standard errors for the 
coefficients of LPCI and LPOP. Omitting the nonsignificant
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D5 left
TRinc “ A*PCIa+bt*POPc+dt*10eDl4 , C 5 * 25 )
which gave the following result:
LINC - - 22.015 - 2.51198 LPCI + 6.269*15 LPOP
(1.12715) (4.42164)
+ .12523 YT2 - .11057 PT1 + .33512 D4 
(.0*4351) (.04510) (.08840)
R2 = .9840 (5.26)
To determine the income elasticity of this result, note
that the partial elasticities (for fiscal 1975) were
e?Ci - - 2.51198 + .12523-1975
« 244.81925
and Epop = 6.26945 - .11057*1975
■ - 212.1142
Letting and g£ assume their historical averages of 9
percent and 1.5 percent, then the total income elasticity is 
r _ .09*244.82 - .015*212.11
y .09 + .015
« 30.30
This clearly unreasonable result was undoubtedly due to the 
increased standard errors of the coefficients of LPCI and 
LPOP. The true values of the parameters estimated by 
equation 5.25 could conceivably have quite a wide range: 
from .258 to 4.766 for LPCI, and from - 2.574 to 15.113 
for LPOP (using the estimate plus or minus two standard 
errors as an approximate measure). Once again, the problem 
of multicollinearity has reduced the value of the regressions. 
In fitting such variations as
TRlnc * A*PCIat*POPb*10cDi|*10dD5 (5.27)
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and TRinc * A* PCIat+bDl*+cD5 • POPd (5.28)
the results, as determined by a stepwise regression, did
not admit the variable PT2, which is associated with the
coefficient a. Finally, the model
A*PCIa-P0Pb *10cDit-10dD5 (5.29)
generated the result
LINC = 2.81858 + 1.84400 LPCI - 1.21981 LPOP
(.27118) (.90289)
+ .15978 D4 + .10292 D5 
(.04547) (.04292)
R2 - .9754 (5.30)
However, this model contains no provision for the shift or
time path of the elasticities with respect to per capita
income and population. The formulation is thus inferior
to the other models. Since the coefficient of LPOP is not
2significant, and since the R value is not greatly larger
than that of other models, this result will not be retained.
In testing models of the income tax revenue function
using the set of income variables RPY— CPI— POP, few
usable results were obtained. In order to build meaningful
models, as many as ten or twelve Independent variables had
to be Included; but those variables caused so much multi-
collinearity that very few variables emerged significant.
There were several cases of very unreasonable coefficients,
and of coefficients of perverse sign. An example of these
unreasonable results was
TFL « a *RPYat+eD4+PD5.cPIbt+gD5.popct+hD5.iodD4 m e
(5.31)
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The resulting regression was
LINC - - 20.575^9 - .00115 YT3 - .00284 PT2
(.00084) C.00114)
+ .00468 PT1 + 1.16107 SD35 + .79173 SD44 
(.00165) (1.44174) (2.11862)
+ 6.96142 SD45 - .98999 SD55 + .06340 D4 
(2.17376) (1.35611) (.17443)
R2 - .9859 (5.32)
As can be observed, most of the slope-shift variables 
(SD35* SD44, and SD55) were not significant; the standard 
errors were far too large to generate usable results.
revenue function using income measure TPI proved more 
reliable than either (1) PCI and POP or (2) RPY, CPI and 
POP. The latter two forms often resulted in regression 
fits in which estimated coefficients had perverse signs and 
large (greater than unity) standard errors. The dummy 
variables D4 and D5 were generally both significant. The 
time-dependent elasticities were generally nonsignificant. 
The model with the combination of best fit and most 
reasonable coefficients was
which is the model of the fit shown In equation 5.21. An 
alternative equation had a slightly smaller R2 and generally 
smaller t-values, but modelled a declining income elasticity. 
This equation was thus preferred a priori and by the 
analysis of Chapter 4. The model in question was
In summary, the various models of the income tax
TRlnc - A*TPia+bD4+cD5 (5.20)




In Chapter 4, various models of revenue generation 
for this tax group were proposed. Those models, and 
important variants of them, gave the empirical results which 
follow.
In testing equation 4.25, the coefficient of LTPI 
was not significant, and its standard error quite large. 
Income elasticity showed a tendency to rise over time in 
this relationship. This led to the formulation of an 
alternative model, omitting the constant term c In the 
exponent of TPI:
TRaut = r s a * rg b ■TPIdt+eD3.10^03 (5-33)
LAUT = - .10817 LSR + .44533 LGR + .00039 YT1
(.03903) (.07823) (•00001)
- .60929 D3 + .08323 SD13 
(.48402) (.06953)
R2 = 1.0000 (5-34)
The second automotive tax group revenue function
presented in Chapter 4 was
TRaut " A-rga*TPIb+ct+dD3-lOeD3, (4.26)
which generated the empirical equation
LAUT - 1.62129 + .*14*149 LGR - 1.70347 LTPI
(.06420) (1.25629)
+ .00116 YT1 - .48162 D3 + .06524 SD13
(.00057) (.43935) (.06303)
R2 = .9960 (5.35)
This equation estimates ey to be 
ey - - 1.70347 + .001l6t + .06524.
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For fiscal 1975, this would be
ey = - 1.70347 + .00116-1975 + .06524 
* - 1.70347 + 2.291 + .06524 
- 0.65277
Here too, the elasticity displays a slow upward trend.
The standard error of the LTPI coefficient Is quite large, 
and neither dummy variable Is significant.
Deleting the elasticity shift effect of D3 left the
model
Equation 5.37 estimates the income elasticity of the 
automotive tax group to be
This elasticity rises slowly over time. For fiscal 1975, 
this would result in
ey - - 1.31985 + .00098*1975 
= - 1.31985 + 1.93550 
= .61565
Still, the coefficient b was not significant. This suggested 
that an improved equation could be formulated as
TRaut * A-rga*TPIb+ct-10eD3 (5.36)
LAUT - 1.33489 + .46230 LGR - 1.31985 LTPI
(.06196) (1.20242)
+ .00098 YT1 - .02692 D3 
(.00055) (.00722)
r2 = .9958 (5.37)
e ■ - 1.31985 + .00098 * tJ
(5.38)
LAUT - .33559 + .44764 LGR + .00038 YT1 - .02621 D3
(.06078) (.00001) (.00722)
R2 - .9956 (5.39)
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The R2 value was not significantly lower than in 5-35 or 
5-37. All coefficients were significant; standard errors 
were small. This result indicated that income elasticity 
would be, in 1975
£y » .00038*1975 
- .75050
Substituting the pair of variables PCI— POP for
TPI in 5.40 generated the model
TRaut “ A*rga *PCIbt*P0Pct*10dD3 (5-40)
LAUT - - 0.07687 + 0.50756 LGR - 0.02721 D3
(.08914) (.00733)
+ .00035 YT2 + .00049 PT1 
(.00004) (.00012)
R2 = .9958 (5.41)
The income elasticity exhibited by this model was, for 1975 
ey - £1 ‘ Bl + £2*S2 
81 + 62





The following model of the automotive tax group 
revenue function utilized the set of income variables 
RPY— CPI— POP. It was constructed on the same theoretical 
considerations as equations 5.38 and 5.40.
TRaut “ A.rga*RPYbt.cPIct.popdt.ioeD3 (5.42)
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LAUT * -0.114 35 + 0.50669 LGR + 0.00036 YT3
C.09131) (.00008)
+ 0.00033 PT2 + 0,00048 PT1 - 0.02766 D3 
(.00008) (.00013) (.00776)
R2 * .9957 (5.43)
pWhile all coefficients were highly significant, the R value 
showed no improvement over either of the comparable models, 
the results of which were shown in equations 5.39 and 5.41.
In all of the automotive tax group revenue models considered 
above the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the gaso­
line tax rate varied little: the range of estimates was
0.43811 to 0.55202. This estimate is perhaps more inelastic 
than previously suspected.
In estimating the coefficients of the various models 
for this tax group, the gasoline tax rate was generally a 
significant variable, as was the dummy variable D3. The 
income measure TPI was not the only one capable of producing 
credible results. The following equations adequately 
modelled the revenue function of the automotive tax group.
TRaut * r a.r b ,rppjdt+eD3. iofD3® O (5.33)
TRaut = A*r a*TPIct*10eD3D (5.38)
TRaut - A-r„a *PCIbt*POPct*10dD3 g (5.40)
All three models displayed an increasing Income elasticity. 
Equation 5.33 was preferred to the others on the basis of 
the inclusion of an additional significant independent 




The models suggested by equations 4.27 and 4.28 and 
variations thereof were empirically tested. The results 
are shown in the paragraphs below. Equations 5.44 shows the 
regression which best fitted the model of equation 4.27.
LSUM = 2.81813 - 2.41347 LTPI + 0.00137 YT1(2.19216) (.35624)
-0.16892 D1 + 0.02847 SD11 
(.35624) (.05294)
R2 = .9853 (5.44)
None of the independent variables were significant.
Dropping the slope-shift variable SD11 from equation 
4.27 left the model
TR„ - A-TPIa+bt-10cD1 (5.45)£) Lull
LSUM = 5.32637 + 0.33816 LTPI + 0.00116 YT1(.21806) (.00086)
+ 0.05097 D1 
(.01911)
R2 - .9838 (5.46)
While all coefficients were significant at a = .10, further 
improvements were desired. Since the coefficient of YT1 was 
positive, the regression indicated that income elasticity 
was rising. An increasing income elasticity could also be 
modelled by the equation
TRsum “ A*TPIbt*10cD1 (5.47)
LSUM - 0.90209 + 0.00029 YT1 + 0.02037 D1
(.00001) (.00755)
R2 - .9844 (5.48)
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The regression results for equation 4.28 displayed 
problems similar to those of 5.44: large standard errors 
and nonsignificant variables. Thus a simpler model was 
constructed, which omitted the elasticity shift variable 
associated with Dl. This model was
TRsum " A*TPIa(k-t) * 10bD1 (5.49)
LSUM * - .83081 + .00079 XT1 + .01752 Dl(.00002) (.00825)
R2 - .9815 (5.50)
was the best regression fit of this model.
Equations modelled after the PCI— POP and RPY—
CPI— POP sets of Income variables were generally unsatis­
factory in that the standard errors were much larger due to 
increased multi-collinearity.
The income measure TPI was the only one to provide 
credible results for the Sumptuary Tax Group. The dummy 
variable Dl was generally significant. Thus adequate 
results were obtained from two equations. Equation 5.47 
had the higher R2 and P values of the two.
TRgum * A-TPIbt*10cD1 (5.47)
Equation 5*49
TRgiuIi " A-TPiaCk-t > • l0bD1 (5.49)
although it had a lower R2 and lower t-values, was also 
chosen. This latter explicitly modelled a declining Income 
elasticity, which the analysis of Chapter 4 indicated was 
the preferred form of elasticity movement.
1 7 0
OTHER TAXES MODEL SELECTION
Two models of the relationship between income and
this residual tax group were presented in Chapter
equations 4.29 and 4.30. The first model
TRoth * A*TPIa+bt (4.29)
generated the regression
LOTH - 4.05818 - 8.51953 LTPI + .00438 YT1
(3.57217) (.00162)
R2 = .9780 (5.51)
The standard error and the coefficient of LTPI both seem
much too large. Since income elasticity of this model was
increasing, the following model was tested:
T^oth " A-TPlbt (5.52)
LOTH - - 2.19238 + .00051 YT1
(.00002)
R2 « .9725 (5.53)
Income elasticity of this model would be, in 1975 
ey - .00051*1975 
- 1.007
A variation of equation 5.52, using the Independent variables
PCI— POP, was tested:
TRoth “ A*PCIat*P0Pbt (5.54)
LOTH - 5.79987 + .00023 YT2 + .00129 PT1
(.00007) (.00021)
R2 - .9831 (5.55)
The regression results for equation 4,30 exhibited 
very large standard errors, and were discarded. A slightly
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simpler equation related to that model was then tested:
TRoth " A-PCia.P0Pb (5.56)
LOTH * - 7.5^313 + .58734 LPCI + 2.9050 LPOP
(.13681) (.45033)
R2 = .9829 (5.57)
This equation had an R2 no higher, and standard errors 
considerably larger, than those of equation 5.55.
The additive form (a+bt) of time-dependent elastic­
ity did not behave well; neither did equations utilizing 
the independent variable set RPY— CPI--POP. Of the 
remaining equations, the most reasonable results were 
obtained from 5-52 and its related form 5-54. Of these, 
equation 5.52 had the higher t-values.
TR0th " A-TPIbt (5.52)
TRoth * A-PCiat.popbt (5.54)
The equations outlined above are used in the 
following chapter to formulate estimates of future revenues 
of each of the taxes and tax groups. These estimates are 
aggregated to obtain an estimate of total tax revenues. The 
selected regression equations and their resulting estimates, 
are used to analyze the time trend in the income elasticity 
of the tax structure of the State of Louisiana.
SUMMARY
A large number of alternative models have been 
examined for each of the five taxes and tax groups. The 
following paragraphs present the equations, chosen to
1 7 2
model the revenue generating processes of the nonseverance 
taxes.
Sales tax revenues were best modelled by equation 
5.4, which displayed an Increasing Income elasticity. 
Modelling Income tax revenues proved more troublesome. The 
best fit, equation 5.20, displayed a constant Income elas­
ticity. Equation 5-22 was slightly lower In quality of fit, 
but displayed a declining, and hence preferred, income elas­
ticity. Equation 5.33 was chosen to model automotive tax 
group revenues. The sumptuary tax group modelling process 
posed a problem similar to that noted in choosing an income 
tax model. The best fit was found in equation 5.47, but a 
slightly lower quality fit was found in a preferred formula­
tion, equation 5.49. Finally, the best model of the 
residual group Other Taxes was equation 5.52.
Thus the equations chosen to model nonseverance tax 
revenues were
1. TRsal - r a • TPIbb+c^  • 10^ ^  s (5.4)
2(a). TRinc - A ,TPIa+bD4+cD5 (5.20)
2(b). TR.inc A.TPIa(k-t) .iobD**.10cD5 (5.22)
3. TRaut r**r b .TPIct+dD3.10eD3 3 S (5.33)
4(a). TRsum - A-TPIbt*10cD1 (5.47)
4(b). TRsum se A-TPIaCk_t)*10bD1 (5.49)
5. TRoth - A*TPIbt (5.52)
Chapter 6
FORECASTS AND SUMMARY
In Chapter various models of tax revenue genera­
tion were hypothesized. In Chapter 5, those models and many 
variations of them were tested. The summary of the previous 
chapter presented several equations, at least one for each 
tax and tax group, selected as best fits for the various 
models of tax revenue generation.
One purpose of this chapter is to utilize those 
regression equations to forecast future levels of revenues 
generated by each of those models. This is done in two 
stages. First, the values of the independent variables are 
projected. Several time series of future levels of the 
independent variables are prepared. Each series explicitly 
makes a different set of assumptions regarding the time 
trend of real per capita income growth, population growth, 
and inflation. These projections are substituted into the 
regression equations to project future tax revenues. For 
those models in which a tax rate or tax base variable was 
present, forecasts are presented to illustrate the impact 
of a policy decision to alter that tax rate or base.
The coefficients of the equations recommended in 
Chapter 5 do more than enable the forecasting mechanism.
They provide empirical measures of the income elasticities
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of the various taxes and tax groups. The form of these 
elasticities and their values are used to predict the time 
path of the income elasticity of the Louisiana tax structure.
This chapter concludes by summarizing the major 
contributions of the dissertation, which are four in 
number.
1. The development of an improved methodology for 
long-range forecasting of state tax revenues.
2. The development of the Upward-Bound Elasticity 
Theorem.
3. The use of that methodology and theorem to 
produce estimates of individual tax revenues 
and total tax revenues.
4. The suggestion that the income elasticity of 
the tax structure of the State of Louisiana 
is increasing slowly, to exceed unity in 
approximately ten years.
PROJECTING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Forecasts of tax revenues rely in turn on forecasts 
of the values of the variables which determine those 
revenues: total personal income (TPI), per capita income 
(PCI), real per capita income (RPY), consumer price index 
(CPI), and population (POP). The first need is to generate 
some hypothetical future values for the basic variables 
RPY, CPI, and POP. Since this dissertation rests largely 
on functions which grow according to power formulae 
(growth in the manner of compounding interest) these 
hypothetical values in turn must be derived from estimates 
of future growth rates of these variables.
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That is, given the present values of RPY, CPI, and 
POP, and assuming a set of future growth rates for each 
variable, future values of all variables TPI, PCI, RPY, CPI 
POP, are obtained. These values, mapped through the regres­
sion functions selected for forecasts, generate revenue 
estimates for the various taxes under consideration.
On the following pages are found, first, alternate 
time series for each of the three variables RPY, CPI, and 
POP, reflecting different future growth rates for those 
variables; second, different combinations of growth patterns 
of these three variables, producing different scenarios 
of growth in TPI.
Tables 6.1 through 6.3 contain the extrapolations of 
the values of the Independent variables RPY, CPI, and POP. 
Table 6.4 contains selected sets of extrapolations for the 
independent variable TPI. Table 6.1 contains seven possible 
growth paths for real per capita income; entries are in 1967 
dollars. Each series represents a different long term 
growth rate for the independent variable. For each series, 
it Is assumed that RPY falls 1 percent in 1974, 4 percent in 
1975; that income rises 2 percent in 1976, 4.5 percent in 
1977; and that the growth rate declines over three years 
time to the limiting value indicated in the column subhead.
Table 6.2 contains four possible sequences for the 
consumer price index, 1967 base; each series assumes a 
different long term rate of inflation. Each sequence assumes
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inflation to 1977 at rates forecast by the Federal Budget 
Team.1 Inflation is then assumed to decline steadily until 
the limiting value indicated by the column subhead is 
reached. Table 6.3 provides seven possible time paths for 
the state’s population. Each series is based on a different 
assumption regarding long-term population growth. Series 
1 and 2 each assume a long-term annual growth rate of 0.6 
percent. That limiting value is reached in five years time 
in Series 1, three years time in Series 2. Similar state­
ments hold for Series 3 and 4.
Table 6.4 contains five representative time paths 
of total personal Income, which is the product of RPY, CPI, 
and POP. Thus different combinations of the three latter 
variables generate different paths for total personal income. 
The three-digit descriptor for each series indicates (1) 
which RPY series was chosen, (2) which CPI series was 
chosen, and (3) which POP series was chosen. Thus income 
path 3-3-5 is built from the third series of RPY extrap­
olations, the third series of CPI extrapolations, and the 
fifth population growth pattern. Of all possible combina­
tions of the RPY, CPI, and POP series, Income path 1-1-1 
represents the most conservative foreseeable growth in TPI. 
Income path 6-1-7 approximates the same average growth rates
1"Economic Premises Are Given that Back Revenue 
Estimates," Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1975, p. 4.
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as pertained over the time period studied, 1948-1974.
Income path 3-3-5 assumes the same average growth rates as 
obtained during the period 1969-1974. Income path 5-4-3 
assumes moderate real growth, substantial inflation, and 
slow population growth; these values are thought to be 
reasonable estimates of future growth rates in Louisiana. 
Income path 7-4-7 represents the largest foreseeable growth 
rates In the variables RPY, CPI, and POP.
Table 6.1
Actual3- and Projected Values of 
Real Per Capita Income (RPY)
1971-1985
m - - - - - - ur— nr~rwr— m - - - - - rrr— m
Annual Growth Rate of RPY
Year 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.3% 2.5% 3.0% 3.7%
1971 $2722 $2722 $2722 $2722 $2722 $2722 $2722
1972 2 845 2845 2845 2845 2845 2845 2845
1973 2953 2953 2953 2953 2953 2953 2953
1974 2923 2923 2923 2923 2923 2923 2923
1975 2807 2807 2807 2807 2807 2807 2807
1976 2863 2863 2863 2863 2863 2863 2863
1977 2991 2991 2991 2991 2991 2991 2991
1978 3081 3097 3097 3105 3105 3111 3117
1979 3127 3174 3174 3201 3201 3220 32391980 3159 3221 3237 3275 3281 3317 33591981 3190 3270 3302 3350 3363 3416 34831982 3222 3319 3368 3427 3448 3519 3612
1983 3254 3368 3435 3506 3534 3664 3745
1984 3287 3419 3504 3587 3622 3733 3884
1985 3320 3470 3574 3667 3713 3845 4028
aActual values for 1971-73 are calculated from per 
capita income values in Statistics of the Developing South, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, p,
1 7 8
Tab1e 6.2
Actuala and Projected Values of 
Consumer Price Index 
1971-1985
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - m ---- - - - - ttt~— —  n v  - - - - - - ~ n r r
Inflation rate, in percent per year 
Year 3.0 ^,0__________ 5.0__________ 6 .0
1971 121.3 121. 3 121. 3 121.3
1972 125.3 125.3 125. 3 125.3
1973 133.1 133.1 133.1 133.1
197^ 147-7 147.7 147.7 147.1
1975 164.if 164. 4 164 .4 164.4
1976 177.3 177.3 177.3 177.3
1977 189.0 189 .0 189.0 189.0
1978 198.8 199.8 199.8 200. 3
1979 206.9 206 .9 208. 7 212.31980 214. 4 215.2 219- 2 225.11981 220.8 224 .8 230.1 236.21982 227. 4 232.8 241.6 248.2
1983 234. 3 242.1 253.7 260 .6
1984 241. 3 251.8 266.4 273.6
1985 248.5 261.8 279-7 287. 3
Reserve







Actuala and Projected Values of Population 


















1971 3693 3693 3693 3693 3693 3693 3693
1972 3738 3738 3733 3738 3738 3738 3738
1973 376*1 376*1 376*1 3764 3764 3764 3764
197** 3802 3738 379*1 3802 3780 3805 3820
1975 3836 3809 382*1 3836 3832 3847 3878
1976 3867 3832 3855 3867 3867 3890 39 36
1977 389*1 3855 3886 3897 3901 3932 3995
1978 3917 3878 3917 3929 39 36 3976 4055
1979 39*10 3902 3923 3960 3972 4019 41161980 396*1 3925 3980 3992 4008 4064 41771981 3988 39*19 *1012 4024 4044 4108 42401982 *1012 3972 *104*1 4056 4080 4153 4304
1983 *1036 3996 4076 4088 4117 4199 4368
198*1 *1060 *1020 4109 4121 4154 4245 4434
1985 *108*1 *10*1*1 4142 4154 4191 4292 4500
aActual values for 1971-1973 are from Statistical 
Abstract of Louisiana, Fifth Edition (197*0, Table I-2T, 
page 2.
^limiting value reached In 1978, declining from
1.1 percent




Selected Projections of Total Personal Income 
(In millions of current dollars)
Year TPIllla tpi617 TPI335 TPT74 7 TPI543
1974 $16,414.2 $16,491.9 $16,319.2 $16,491.9 $16,379.9
1975 17,701.9 17,895.8 17,683.6 17,895.8 17,646.6
1976 19,629.1 19,979.7 19,629.1 19,979.7 19 ,568.2
1977 22,012.5 22,584.0 22,063.8 22 ,344 .5 21,967.5
1978 23,991.6 25,079.0 24,355.1 25,316.9 24,361.3
1979 25,466.0 27,421.4 26,311.2 28,303.5 26,829.31980 26,847.9 29,705.0 28,438.7 31,582.8 29,394.11981 28,089.2 31,980.1 30,725.6 34,911.6 31,896.31982 29,395.4 34 ,441. 3 33,199.4 38,585.1 34 ,608.3
1983 30,770.9 37,088.6 35,878.1 42,629.5 37,538.8
1984 32,201.8 39,940.2 38,775.7 47,118. 3 40,719.3
1985 33,693.8 42,997.2 41,894.8 52,076.3 44,184.5
Source: Tables 6. 1-6.3
aTPIijk ' RPY(1)* CPI(J)•P0P(k)
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FORECASTING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The hypothetical future values of the income 
variables, which were set forth In the previous section, are 
now applied to the relevant regression equations, in order 
to forecast revenues of the six taxes and tax groups. Two 
distinct models of tax revenue generation are studied.
First, those equations pointed out at the close of 
Chapter 5, as the best fits for each of the taxes, are 
compiled into Model I .  Revenues for the individual taxes, 
and for their sum, total taxes, under existing tax rates 
and under selected tax rate changes, are produced. The 
revenue forecasts are then used to analyze the future 
time path of the Income elasticity of the entire Louisiana 
tax structure. Second, a set of equations, not necessarily 
the best fits, but preferable a priori and according to the 
analysis of Chapter ^, are compiled Into Model II. As will 
be seen, some individual tax equations are common to both 
models. The procedures described above for Model I are 
duplicated in Model II.
Model I
Both first and second forecasting models contain 
an equation for forecasting each of the six taxes and tax 
groups. The first model contains the equations Judged 
best fits of the various revenue generators described in 
Chapter 5- None of these equations displays decreasing 
Income elasticity.
1 8 2
Sales tax. Sales tax revenue forecasts are made 
using the model
TRsal * rsa *TPIbt+cD6 *10dD6 (5.4)
estimated by
LSAL * .61456 LSR + .00045 YT1 - 2.42303 D6
+ .34399 SD16 (5.3)
Tab1e 6.5
Sales Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model I 
(in millions)
Fiscal

























If the sales tax rate were raised to 4 percent, with no tax
base changes, the resulting sales tax revenues would be as
shown ;In Table 6 .6.
Table 6.6
Sales Tax Revenue Forecasts 
Four Percent Sales Tax 
(in millions)
, Model I, 
Rate
Fiscal

























The Income elasticity of this sale? tax model rises 
slowly over time, from 1.2327 in 1975 to 1.2372 in 1985-
Severance taxes. Future levels of severance tax 
revenues are primarily dependent on two factors: the speed 
of the decline in physical production of crude oil, 
condensate and natural gas, and the rate of price changes 
for crude oil and condensate. Professors Beard and Scott 
provide two sets of projections.2 The more pessimistic set 
assumes that crude oil and condensate production decline ten 
percent per year through 1979-80, while natural gas 
production declines nine percent annually. Crude oil and 
condensate prices are projected to rise in line with the 
overall price index: nine percent in 1975-76, six percent 
annually thereafter. The less pessimistic forecasts assume 
the rate of decline in oil production to fall slowly from 
ten percent in 1975-1976 to six percent annually in 
1979-80. Gas production was forecast to decline at a 
declining rate, from eight percent in 1975-76 to five 
percent in 1979-80. Changing technology in exploration and 
production, and pressures of demand and price, seem to make 
the latter projections the more reasonable set. Projections 
beyond the horizon of the Beard-Scott work were made by 
continuing into the future the smallest of the rates of 
production decline: six percent for crude oil, five percent 
for natural gas.
2Beard and Scott, op . cit. , p. 4.
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The less pessimistic forecasts by Beard and Scott, 
as derived from Information In Tables 5 and 6 of "Revenue 
Projections for Louisiana State Government, Fiscal Years 
1974/75-1979/80" are as follows.
Table 6.7
Revenues from Severance Tax on 
Crude Oil, Condensate, and Natural Gas 
(In millions)






Source: Beard and Scott, op. clt. , Tables 5 and 6, p. 12,
Applying the smallest rates of production decline further 
into the future, revenues would be
Oil Gas Total
1980/81 $3lITo $lFB7o $4'7'57o
1985/86 327.0 126.0 453.0
These forecasts, plus those of the minor severance taxes,
produce the following projections of total severance tax
revenues. Implicit in these totals is the assumption of
a steady decline ($.5 million per year) in the revenues of
the minor severance taxes. Continuing this same assumption,
the forecasts for 1980/81 and for 1985/86 would be $489
million and $461,5 million, respectively.
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Table 6.8
Total Severance Tax Revenues 
Forecast by Beard and Scott 
(In millions)







Source: Beard and Scott, 0£. clt. , Table 2, p. 4.
Income tax. The Income tax model assuming constant
income elasticity subject to shifts is used for Model I.
This model is represented by the equation
TRlnc “ A.TPia+bD4+cD5 (5.20)
The regression fit of this equation is
LINC » - 3-30053 + 1.16263 LTPI + .02947 SD14
+ .01034 SD15 (5.21)
The dummy variable D4 is zero, and D5 is unity, for all 
years of the forecasts. Thus the estimated income elastic­
ity of the Louisiana income tax is I.I6263 + .01034 - 
1.17297.
The estimates of future income tax revenues are 
found in Table 6.9 .
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Table 6.9
Income Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model I 
(In millions)
fllscai
















Automotive tax group. Forecasts for the taxes
pombined Into this group are made from the model
TRaut “ rsa.rgb.TPIdt+eD3.10fD3 (5.33)
and Its regression equation
LAUT = - .10 817 LSR + .44533 LGR + .00039 YT1
- .60929 D3 + .08323 SD13 (5.34)
There are Initially five sets of forecasts, corresponding
to the five different time paths of total personal income
previously chosen. The forecasts presented In Table 6.10
assume unchanged tax rates and bases.
Table 6.10
Automotive Tax Group Revenue Forecasts, Model I
(in millions)
Fiscal
Year T P I m TPI6l7 TPI335 TPI747 tpi543
1975 $181.7 $183.2 $181.4 $183.1 $181.1
1976 197.0 200. 0 196.9 199.9 196. 31980 264.4 288,3 277,5 303.5 285.4
1985 319.2 385.5 377,5 446,8 393.4
The estimated coefficients of the model Imply that an
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Increase In the sales tax rate would decrease automotive tax 
group revenues slightly. The cross-elasticity is - .10817. 
An increase in the gasoline tax rate would significantly, 
but less than proportionately, Increase revenues for the 
group.
Table 6.11 contains illustrations of both sales tax 
and gasoline tax rate increases, as applied to the time 
path of total personal Income 5-4-3,
Table 6.11
Effect of Sales and Gasoline Tax Rate Changes on 
Automotive Tax Group Revenues 
(in millions)
Gasoline tax 8$ 8$ 10it 104
Sales tax 34 44 34 44
1975 $181.1 $175.6 $200.1 $193.9
1976 196.3 190.3 216.8 210.2
1980 285.4 276.7 315.3 305.6
1985 393-4 381.3 434.5 421.2
Thus an increase in the sales tax rate would increase sales 
tax revenues, but decrease automotive tax group revenues. 
Since the sales tax revenue function has less than unit 
rate elasticity, the increased revenues of a higher sales 
tax rate are further dampened.
Sumptuary tax group. Forecasts are made using the
model
TRsum “ A.TPIbt.lOcDl, (5.47)
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Its regression fit
LSUM = .90209 + .00029 YTI + .02037 D1, (5*48)
and the five time series for movements of total personal 
income as described earlier.
Table 6.12
Sumptuary Tax Group Revenue Forecasts, Model I
(in millions)
Year TPI111 TPI617 TPI335 TPI74 7 TPI54 3
1975 $118.5 $119.3 $118.4 $119.3 $118.31976 126. 4 127.6 126.4 127.6 126.11980 154. 2 163.4 159. 4 169.3 162 .5
1985 180.2 207. 3 204. 2 231.5 210.6
The revenues forecast here display an income 
elasticity which grows slowly over time, from .57275 in 
1975, to .57565 In 1985. The rate of growth In sumptuary 
tax group revenues reflects both this income elasticity and 
the rate of growth In total personal income.
Other taxes. The forecasts of revenues from this 
tax group are made according to the revenue-generation 
model
TRoth - A-TPlbt (5.52)
and the resulting regression fit of that equation,
LOTH = - 2.19238 + .00051 YTI (5.53)
This tax group Is modelled with an income elasticity which 
increases over time. The range of estimated values of that 
income elasticity is 1.0073 for 1975, 1.0124 for 1985.
Table 6.13 provides five sets of other taxes revenue
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estimates, ba: ed on five possible ncome p.ths.
Table 6.13
Other Taxes Revenue Estimates, Model I 
(In millions)
Fiscal
Year TPI111 TPI617 iP*335 TPIm TPI543
1975 $128.3 $129.7 $138.2 $129.7 $127.9
1976 143.6 146.2 143. 6 146.2 143.1
1980 203. 9 225. 8 216.1 240.2 223.4
1985 268, 0 343.0 334.1 4l6.4 352.6
Total tax revenues. The forecasts which follow are 
based on future movements in total personal income 
represented by time path 5-4-3. Real per capita income is 
thus assumed to grow at 2.5 percent per year. This rate 
exceeds the 2.0 percent average annual gain from 1969 to 
197^, but falls short of the 3-0 percent average annual gain 
from 194 8 to 1969. Thus the 2.5 percent growth rate 
falls between that of the post-World War II economic 
expansion and that of a relatively slow-growing economy.
Such an intermediate value is a reasonable estimate of future 
real per capita income growth; this estimate assumes that the 
national economy is managed so that no severe recessions or 
economic disruptions occur. Inflation is assumed to occur 
at an annual rate of 6 percent* This assumption is based 
largely on two observations. First, inflation has >een 
more severe, nationwide, in the past decade than in the two 
decades preceeding it. Second, at least part of that 
Inflation can be traced to deliberate federal policy aimed
1 9 0
at reduction in the rate of unemployment. It is assumed that 
such policy will be continued in future years, so that 
future rates of inflation will approximate those of the past 
several years. The population growth rate is assumed to 
decline to 0.8 percent per year. This value is lower than 
annual growth rates prevailing in the past decade and 
quarter-century, and is in keeping with both state and 
national long-term trends toward lower birth rates. Addi­
tionally, it is assumed that there are no administrative/ 
legislative tax rate or tax base changes. The income time
Table 6.14




































Total $1,511.8 $1,602.5 $2,169.1 $3,113.9
aSource: Table 6.5 
^Source: Table 6.8 
^Source: Table 6.9 
“Source: Table 6.10 
eSource: Table 6.12 
^Source: Table 6.13
path 5-4-3 represents a 9.6 percent a v e r a g e  annual growth 
rate in total personal income. This is a rate of Increase
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■jcomparable to that used by other researchers. Before 
concluding the analysis of this model, forecasts of total 
tax revenues will be calculated for income time paths 1-1-1 
and 7-4-7, to provide pessimistic and optimistic projections 
in addition to the expected values generated by path 5-4-3- 
In Table 6.15 are found the ratios of the individual 
tax and tax group revenue estimates to the estimate of 
total tax revenues. The more elastic taxes show increasing 
proportions of total tax revenues. This trend Is reinforced 
by the absolute decline of severance revenues, and would be 
further reinforced by use of the more pessimistic set of 
Beard/Scott estimates of severance revenues.
Also as predicted in Chapter 4, those taxes whose 
elasticity falls below the tax structure average elasticity
Table 6.15
Ratio of Tax Revenue Estimates to Total 
Tax Revenue Estimates
1975/76 1976/77 1980/81 1985/86
Sales . 2482 . 2680 . 3373 . 4044
Severance . 3641 .3295 .2254 .1482
Income . 1050 . 1120 .1278 . 1402
Automotive . 1198 .1225 .1316 . 1263
Sumptuary .0783 .0787 . 0749 .0676
Other .0846 .0893 . 1030 . 1132
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Source: Table 6.14
^Beard and Scott, op. clt., p. 4; and Legler and 
Papke, op. clt. , p. 176.
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will decline In share. In the forecasts shewn, the auto­
motive and sumptuary groups show declining shares of total 
taxes In 1985 and 1980, respectively. This happens as 
the system average elasticity grows to exceed the elastic­
ity of the tax groups.
The next step will be to measure the Income 
elasticity at each of the four forecast years. The income 
elasticities of the various taxes are given in the table 
below.
Table 6.16 
Income Elasticities, Model I
1975/76 1976/77 1980/81 1985/86
Sales 1.2327 1.2332 1.2350 1.2372
Severance 0 0 0 0
Income 1.1730 1.1730 1.1730 1.1730
Automotive 0.7703 0.8539 0.8554 0 .7742
Sumptuary 0.5931 0.5934 0.5946 0.5960
Other 1.0073 1.0078 1.0098 1.0124
The weighted average income elasticity of the 
Louisiana tax structure thus varies over time as the 
individual elasticities and their weights vary.
Forecasts of total tax revenues and of income 
elasticity time paths were calculated using two additional 
income patterns. Income time paths T P I m  and TPI747 were 
selected to provide lower and upper bounds for future values 
of nominal tax revenues. Forecasts for these two income
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Tab1e 6.17
Time Path of Income Elasticity, Model I, 










Source: Table 6,15 and 6.16
patterns, and for the expected Income path TPI^^, are 
summarized in two tables below. Table 6.18 compares the 
total tax revenue forecasts of the three patterns. Table 
6.19 compares the projected time path of income elasticity 
for the selected income time paths.
Table 6.18
Alternative Forecasts of Total Tax Revenues, Model I
(in millions)
Year TPP111 Tpp543 TPI747
1975/76 $1,514.5 $1,511.8 $1,525.3
1976/77 1,605.5 1,602.5 1,625.5
1980/81 2,024.7 2,169.1 2,314.9
1985/86 2,467.4 3,113.9 3,662.8
The projections differ most markedly in the 1980/81 and 
1985/86 forecasts. Thus must be true, since the different 
income series were Identical prior to 1974-75. The 
differing assumptions concerning growth rates become more 
apparent with the passage of time. Income path TPIj^i
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generates forecasts which exceed those from TPI^^ due 
to the differing population growth rate assumptions.
Table 6.19 summarizes the movement in income 
elasticity projected by each of the three selected income 
paths. The different time paths occur only because the 
levels of income are different; the income elasticities of 
the individual taxes are the same throughout Model I.
Table 6.19
Alternative Time Paths of Income Elasticity, Model I
Year TPIlll TPI543 TPI
1975/76 .6537 .6531 .6567
1976/77 .7037 .7032 .7087
1980/81 .8078 .8276 .8458
1985/86 .8685 .9175 .9489
Model II
The techniques illustrated in the previous section 
will now be applied to a variation of the first forecasting 
model. This variation contains two taxes which have 
declining income elasticities. The Income tax estimating 
equation is
TRlnc « A.TPia(k-t).10bD4.10cD5 (5 .22)
The sumptuary tax group equation Is
T R ei,„ “ A-TPia(k-t) .iobDl (5.49)sum 3
and all other equations are unchanged from Model I.
The specific equation for estimating Income tax
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revenues is
LINC * - 5.^7984 + .00143 XT1 + .20755 D4
+ .08303 D5 (5.23)
This equation models two sources of revenue shifts, but 
does not allow those shifts to affect the income elasticity. 
The income elasticity depends on the time variable alone, 
and declines slowly:
el 9 75 * -00143 x (3000-1975) = 1.46575
e1985 ” -00143 x (3000-1985) = 1.45145
The tax revenue estimates which follow are based on equation
5.23 and on the five hypothetical time paths of total
personal income.
Table 6.20
Income Tax Revenue Estimates, Model II 
(In millions)
Fiscal income Income Income Income income
Year Path 111 Path 617 Path 3 35 Path 747 Path 54 3
1975 $168.6 $171.4 $16 8.4 $171.4 $167.91976 191.6 196.6 191.6 196 .6 190.7
1980 274 .8 318.5 298.9 348. 2 313.6
1985 338.1 481. 7 463.8 636.1 501.1
The best fit for this variation of the sumptuary 
tax group revenue generator Is
LSUM = - .83081 + .00079 XT1 + .01752 D1 (5.50)
The income elasticity of this tax group falls slowly with 
time :
e1975 “ .00079 x (3000-1975) - .80975 
e1985 “ .00079 x (3000-1985) - .80185
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The table below contains estimates of futu 'o sumptuary 
tax group revenues, based on the equation above and on five 
hypothetical income paths.
Table 6.21
Sumptuary Tax Group Estimates, Model II 
(in millions)
FiscalIncome I n c o m e I n c o m e I n c o m e  Income
Year Path 111 Path 617 Path 335 Path 747 Path 5*13
1975 $113.7 $114. 7 $113.6 $114.7 $113.4
1976 122.0 123.8 122 .0 123. 8 121. 71980 148.9 161.6 156.0 169-7 160 .2
1985 167.0 202 .7 198.9 236 .8 207.5
Total tax revenues of this model are forecast as 
shown in Table 6.22.
Table 6.22
Total Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model II, 
Income Path TPI543
fcstimatecT^e venues






























Total $1,516,1 $1,609.3 $1,203.3 $3,175.4
aSource Table 6.5
^Source Table 6.8





The ratios of the individUr.l tax and tax g.'oup 
forecasts to the total tax revenue forecasts are given in 
Table 6.23. The elasticity estimates of Table 6.2*1, 
combined with the relative shares of total taxes in Table 
6 .23, yield the weighted average income elasticity of the 
entire tax structure. These values are shown in Table 6.25.
The income elasticities of Table 6.25 are higher 
than those of Table 6.17 primarily because of the larger 
estimate of the income elasticity of the income tax. To a 
lesser degree, the changed forecasts for income tax revenues 
and sumptuary tax group revenues, and their declining 
elasticities, contribute to the change.
Table 6.23
Ratio of Tax Revenue Estimates to Total Tax 
Revenue Estimates, Model II
Tax 1975/76 1976/77 1980/81 1985/86
Sales .2475 .2669 .3321 .3966
Severance .3631 . 3281 .2219 .1453
Income .1107 .1185 .1423 .1578
Automotive .1195 .1220 . 1296 .1239
Sumptuary .0748 .0756 .0727 .0654
Other .0844 .0889 .1014 .1110




Income Elasticities, Model II
Tax 1975/76 1976/77 1980/81 1985/86
Sales 1.2327 1.2332 1.2350 1.2372
Severanee 0 0 0 0
Income 1.4658 1.464 3 1.4586 1.4515
Automotive 0.7703 0.8539 0.8554 0.7742
Sumptuary 0.8098 0.8090 0.8058 0.8019
Other 1.0073 1.0078 1.0098 1.0124
Table 6.25
Time Path of Income Elasticity, Model II, 







The reliability of the forecasting techniques was 
tested by comparing actual tax revenues for fiscal years 
1974/75 and 1975/76 to forecasts of those years’ tax revenue 
by the estimating equations of Models I and II. These fore­
casts were prepared from the income patterns previously used 
and from the actual values of personal income. This 
additional measure was Introduced to display the accuracy 
of the estimating equations In the absence of error in 
projecting the independent variables.
Three significant phenomena were apparent. First, 
all estimates of total non-severance tax revenues were below
the actual tax revenues. Second, the forecasting error was 
compounded by errors In the forecast of personal Income. 
Third, the estimates obtained from Model II were clearly 
superior to those of Model I, Such estimates lend more 
support to the hypothesis of declining income elasticities 
of some individual taxes. Table 6.26 compares the forecasts 
obtained from Model II, using both projected and actual 
income levels, to actual tax revenues.
Table 6.26
Comparison of Actual Tax Revenues, 1974/75 and 

























































































Total Non- $1035.7 $965.8 0.933 $1023-0 0.988
Severance
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The largest forecast errors occurred in the income 
tax revenue function. The estimate was $33*1 million low in 
197V75, $37*5 million low in 1975/76. The simplest ration­
alization is that the model understated the increase in 
income elasticity and/or revenue due to increased enforce­
ment levels in the 1970's. The non-severance tax revenue 
forecast was 0.918 of actual in 197^/75, 0.933 in 1975/76.
Actual personal income in 197^ was $16,766 million, 
compared to the projected value of $16,380 million. 
Similarly, 1975 personal income was $18,591 million, which 
exceeded the forecast of $17,6^7 million. Forecasts based 
on actual income levels were 0.970 and 0.988 of actual non­
severance revenues in 197^/75 and 1975/76. These ratios 
suggest that considerable accuracy was gained by the use of 
more precise values of the independent variables.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The paragraphs which follow outline the effects on 
total tax revenues and on the income elasticity of the tax 
structure of an increase in the state sales tax rate to 
*1 percent. The effects are measured using forecasting 
Model II and income path TPI-,.,,. The moderate real growth, 
substantial inflation, and slow population growth which 
characterize TPI^^ represent the time path of Income with 
the highest likelihood of occurring, according to the author. 
The forecasts of tax revenues which would result from this 
policy action are found in Table 6.27.
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Of course, any of the five time paths, or any other
time path not so far presented, can be used for the fore-
casting process. Estimates can be revised by shifting
from one income pattern to another that appears more likely
Table 6.27
Total Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model II, 4 Percent
Sales Tax Rate, Income Path TPI^/j^
Tax 1975/76 1976/77 1980/81 1985/86
oalesa $ 447.8 $ 512.5 $ 873.1 $1,502.7
Severance13 550.5 528.0 489.0 461.5
Income^ 167.9 190.7 313.6 501.1
Automotived 175.6 190. 3 276.7 381. 3
Sumptuarye 113-4 121.7 160.2 207.5
Other*" 127.9 143.1 223.4 352.6
Total $1,583.1 $1,686.4 $2 ,336.0 $3,406.8
aSource: Table 6.6
b Source: Table 6.3
cSource: Table 6.20
^Source: Table 6.10
eSource: Table 6 .21
^Source: Table 6.13
Table 6.28 transforms the entries in Table 6.27 Into ratio 
form. Each new entry shows the ratio of total tax revenues 
generated by each tax and tax group for each year forecast.
The time trend in each of the individual taxes 
and tax groups behaves very much as indicated in Chapter 4. 
The most significant difference between the hypothetical 
results of Chapter 4 and the estimates of elasticities 
provided here is that the absolute decline in severance
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Table 6.28
Ratio of Tax Revenue Estimates to Total 
Tax Revenue Estimates, Model II,
4 Percent Sales Tax Rate
Income Path TPI^^3
Tax 1975/76 1976/77 1980/81 1985/86
Sales . 2829 • 3039 . 3738 . 4411
Severance .3^77 . 3131 .2093 .1355
Income . 1060 .11 31 .1343 . 1471
Automotive .1109 . 1129 .1184 .1119
Sumptuary .0716 .0722 . 0686 .0609
Other .0808 .0849 .0956 .1035
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Source: Table 6.27
tax revenues results in more rapid change in income elastic­
ities than does the constant value assumed in Chapter 4.
The automotive tax group and the sumptuary tax group 
display declining shares of total tax revenues In 1985/86 
and 1980/81, respectively. These tax groups have become 
less elastic than the average for the entire tax structure. 
This is almost precisely as Indicated in Chapter 4.
As explained earlier, total tax revenues rise less 
than the increase in sales tax revenues, as a small decline 
in automotive tax group revenues accompanies the increased 
sales tax rate. The individual tax and tax group income 
elasticities are unchanged; they are found in Table 6,22. 
Table 6.29 displays the time path of the income elasticity 
of the tax structure under this policy change.
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Table 6.2 9
Time Path of Income Elasticity, Model II 






With an Increased sales tax rate (and with no other 
administrative or legislative changes in tax rates, tax 
bases, or enforcement) the tax structure of the State of 
Louisiana is projected to become practically unit elastic 
in approximately ten years. The increase in the rate of a 
slightly income-elastic tax thus hastens the increase in 
the income elasticity of the tax structure. Had the same 
first-year increase in revenues been the result of an 
increased gasoline tax (or other income-inelastic source), 
the increase in income elasticity over time would have been 
slowed.
This serves to explain why the tax structure has not 
already become unit elastic. In view of the Upward-Bound 
Elasticity Theorem, and of the hypothetical examples and 
empirical evidence, the tax structure could have become unit 
Income-elastic years ago. The reason that it did not is 
in large measure due to the fact that many of the recent 
(and not co recent) tax increases have been on income- 
inelastic sources: gasoline, liquor and tobacco, oil and
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natural gas. By Increasing the share of total tax revenues 
produced by these sources, the income-elasticlty of the tax 
structure falls.
The State of Louisiana levies taxes which display a 
wide range of Income elasticities. Thus it is theoretically 
possible for the state to deliberately manipulate the income 
elasticity of its tax structure by raising or lowering 
rates on selected taxes. The potential growth in tax 
revenues can then be matched to the potential growth in 
expenditures.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This final section of the dissertation Is devoted 
to a summary of Its contributions. These contributions are 
divided Into two broad areas: advances in methodology, and 
empirical results.
Advances in Methodology
From a very extensive literature on the subject 
of state tax revenue forecasting, this dissertation has 
borrowed many relevant techniques. The contribution of 
this research is not the originality of the individual 
techniques, but their combination into a unified model. 
Several researchers, beginning with Groves and Kahn, utilized 
log-linear models. Singer initiated the use of dummy 
variables (in linear models) to model revenue shifts.
Dockel modelled elasticity shifts perhaps without realizing
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it. Wilford and others treated total personal income as 
the product of per capita income and population. Several 
researchers, learning from the omission of Groves and Kahn, 
included rate variables in their models. Several researchers 
have built Cor attempted to build) models with inter­
dependence of taxes. This dissertation utilizes all of the 
above features in its models of tax revenue generation. To 
the author's knowledge, this combination of features is 
unique. The equation used to model the revenue generation 
process of the automotive tax group illustrates many of these 
features. The sales tax rate appears explicitly, which 
indicates interdependence. The exponent of TPI, which is 
the income elasticity of the tax group, is time-dependent 
and subject to shifts. The dummy variable D 3  shifts the 
revenue function as well as its income elasticity.
In addition to properly adapting a number of extant 
techniques In the building of state tax revenue generation 
models, this dissertation has added features which are, for 
the most part, original. Several authors had commented 
that, while their models assumed constant Income elastic­
ities, variable elasticities might in fact be more realistic. 
However, no researcher explicitly and knowingly utilized 
income elasticities which varied with time or with income. 
Wilford noted that the income elasticity which he estimated 
was an average for the time series.
Thus this dissertation, in building exponents of the 
income variable(s) in forms incorporating a time variable,
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has explicitly modelled variable income elasticities.
These forms of income elasticities are necessary to a 
properly specified model of the revenue generating process 
of many of the state's taxes.
Several researchers, among them Dockel, Wilford, 
and Richardson, have observed that the Income elasticity 
of the tax structure rose over time. Dockel ascribed the 
rise to exogenous change; Wilford gave no explanation.
The forecasts by Beard and Scott imply a rising income 
elasticity, but they do not comment on that feature. 
Richardson alone, in an article written at about the same 
time as parts of this dissertation, notes that the rise in 
income elasticity is due to endogenous factors. His 
writings imply that the more elastic taxes contribute 
greater portions of total tax revenues over time, and hence 
alter the weights used to compute income elasticity.
This dissertation has formalized that concept, with 
an analysis of the Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem. This 
theorem states that the income elasticity of a tax structure 
tends, over time, to approach the income elasticity of the 
most elastic component of that structure. This effect was 
precisely demonstrated for a structure of constant-elastic- 
ity taxes, and was simulated for a more realistic structure 
which contained some variable-elasticity taxes.
Significance of Forecasts
In addition to developing an Improved methodology
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for the use of an elasticities approach to ;: tate tax 
revenue forecasting, this dissertation has applied that 
methodology to the problem of forecasting tax revenues for 
the State of Louisiana, However, this methodology can be 
useful in developing models of tax revenue generation for 
the tax structures of other states.
These forecasts serve three purposes. First, the 
forecasts provide to various legislators and administrative 
officials reliable estimates of the nominal amount of money 
generated by the state's taxes, as currently levied, In 
the intermediate and long run. As stated before, an 
elasticities approach is most effective over a relatively 
long time horizon. The estimates can be revised to reflect 
varying patterns of future income growth.
Second, policy-makers are given information 
concerning the impact, on individual tax revenues and on the 
aggregate total tax revenues, of various tax policy changes. 
This is accomplished through manipulation of the tax rate 
variables and the dummy variables which reflect shifts in 
tax rates, tax bases, or tax administration. The previous 
section provided estimates of the Impact on total tax 
revenues of an increase in the sales tax rate, for a 
specific pattern of Income growth. The same techniques 
can be employed to determine the impact of even higher tax 
rates, or increases In other tax rates, such as the gasoline 
tax rate. These Impacts can be measured at the supposed 
time path of income or at any other income growth pattern.
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Finally, the forecasts of tax reverses enable the 
estimation of the time path taken by the income elasticity 
of the tax structure. All of the estimates published in 
this dissertation indicate an income elasticity currently 
significantly below unity, but growing at a moderate rate. 
None of the estimate how income elasticity growing to 
exceed unity by fiscal 1985, but the shortfall is very 
slight in all cases. The estimates suggest that the income 
elasticity of the tax structure will rise more rapidly as 
income grows more rapidly, and that income elasticity will 
be increased if policy changes Increase rates on the 
relatively elastic taxes. Specifically, income elasticity 
is estimated to become practically unitary by 1985 if 
income grows approximately 9*6 percent annually, and if the 
sales tax rate is increased to 4 percent.
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